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This thesis studies the process of price discovery in the FX market via three empirical 
chapters. In the presence of high frequency trading and its expansion in the FX market, the 
first empirical chapter contributes to the literature by analysing how high frequency quoting 
affects price discovery in the foreign exchange market. It finds that while an increase in 
dealers’ quotation speed is positively associated with short-term (within 1 minute) price 
discovery, this is not the case for longer-term (1-day) price discovery. These results cast doubt 
on the overall benefit of high frequency activities for long term price discovery in the foreign 
exchange market. 
The second empirical chapter studies the impact of economist affiliation, quoting 
speed, and the geographical proximity on dealers’ contribution to price discovery around 
macroeconomic news announcements. The findings show that dealers with affiliated 
economists have higher contribution to price discovery and their contribution increases by 
increases in the research scope of their affiliated economists. The locality of dealers and 
economists to news sources is also found to create an information advantage for dealers. 
In the presence of the manipulation of the World Markets/Reuters benchmark in 
the foreign exchange market, regulators need a robust and timely methodology that identifies 
potential manipulation in order to better direct their limited resources towards more targeted 
in-depth investigation. The third empirical chapter of this thesis develops a manipulation 
index (ManIx) which captures the potential manipulation intention of dealers during the 
fixing period through a unique algorithm and simulation. The application of this model is 
able to identify banks that are prone to potential manipulative behaviour. The results 
concerning the identified banks are supported by verification of these bank with disclosure 
of regulatory investigations. Overall, ManIx offers a decision support tool to both regulators 
and banks to monitor market participants for manipulative behaviour.  
Table of Contents 
iv 
 
Table of Contents 
Intellectual Property Statement ................................................................................... i 
Acknowledgment ......................................................................................................... ii 
Abstract…… ............................................................................................................... iii 
Table of Contents ....................................................................................................... iv 
List of Tables, Figures, and Equations .................................................................... viii 
List of Abbreviations ................................................................................................... x 
Chapter 1. Introduction ............................................................................................... 1 
1.1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 1 
1.2. Research Questions and Contributions ............................................................................. 3 
1.2.1. Quote Dataset ................................................................................................................ 3 
1.2.2. High Frequency Quoting and Price Discovery in the FX Market ......................... 4 
1.2.3. Do Economists Add value to the FX? ....................................................................... 7 
1.2.4. Monitoring the Foreign Exchange Rate Benchmark Fix ....................................... 10 
1.3. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 12 
Chapter 2. Literature Review ..................................................................................... 13 
2.1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 13 
2.2. The FX Market .................................................................................................................... 14 
2.2.1. Emergence of FX Market Microstructure ............................................................... 14 
2.2.2. Key Players in the FX Market .................................................................................... 16 
2.2.3. The Difference between the FX and Equity Markets ............................................ 16 
2.3. High Frequency Trading, Definition, Expansion, and History .................................... 19 
2.4. Impact of HFTs on Financial Markets............................................................................. 22 
2.4.1. Liquidity ........................................................................................................................ 23 
2.4.2. Volatility ........................................................................................................................ 24 
2.4.3. Transaction and Adverse Selection Costs ................................................................ 25 
2.4.4. Fairness and Social Welfare ........................................................................................ 26 
2.4.5. Price Discovery and Price Efficiency ....................................................................... 26 
2.5. Macroeconomic News Announcements and Price Discovery ..................................... 29 
2.5.1. Price Discovery and Information Advantage .......................................................... 31 
2.6. Choice of Price Discovery Model ..................................................................................... 36 
2.7. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 39 
Table of Contents 
v 
 
Chapter 3. Data Description ..................................................................................... 43 
3.1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 43 
3.2. Emergence of Electronic Trading Platforms in the FX Market .................................. 44 
3.3. The FX market, A Quote Driven Market ........................................................................ 46 
3.4. Data Collection Procedure ................................................................................................. 48 
3.4.1. The Quote Data Collection Procedure .................................................................... 48 
3.4.2. Macroeconomic News Dataset Collection Procedure ........................................... 49 
3.5. The Quote Dataset Description and Summary Statistics .............................................. 50 
3.5.1. Quote Dissemination .................................................................................................. 50 
3.5.2. Dealers and their Geographical Distribution .......................................................... 52 
3.6. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 54 
Tables ........................................................................................................................................... 55 
Chapter 4. HFQ and Price Discovery in the FX Market .......................................... 58 
4.1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 58 
4.2. Data ....................................................................................................................................... 61 
4.3. Methodology ........................................................................................................................ 63 
4.3.1. Contribution to Price Discovery ............................................................................... 63 
4.3.2. Measuring Quotation Speed ....................................................................................... 64 
4.3.3. Additional Quotation Characteristics ....................................................................... 66 
4.4. Results and Discussion ....................................................................................................... 69 
4.4.1. Summary Statistics ....................................................................................................... 69 
4.4.2. Regression Analysis ..................................................................................................... 72 
4.5. Conclusions .......................................................................................................................... 77 
Tables ........................................................................................................................................... 78 
Appendix I ................................................................................................................................... 89 
Chapter 5. Do Economists Add Value to the FX market? ........................................ 93 
5.1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 93 
5.2. Data ..................................................................................................................................... 101 
5.2.1. Macroeconomic News Announcements and Coverage by Economists ........... 103 
5.2.2. Events, Quotes, News, and Dealer Coverage ....................................................... 105 
5.3. Methodology ...................................................................................................................... 108 
5.3.1. Event ........................................................................................................................... 108 
5.3.2. Contribution to Price Discovery and Quoting Speed and Behaviour ............... 109 
Table of Contents 
vi 
 
5.3.3. Affiliated Forecasts – AF.......................................................................................... 110 
5.3.4. Geographical Proximity of Dealers, Economists, and News Sources ............... 111 
5.3.5. R-Index – R ................................................................................................................ 114 
5.4. Results and Discussion ..................................................................................................... 115 
5.4.1. Economist Affiliation, Local Market Makers, Speed, and Price Discovery ...... 115 
5.4.2. Location, and Affiliation on Quoting Behaviour and Information Content .... 124 
5.4.3. Contradiction to Previous Findings in Chapter 4? ............................................... 129 
5.4.4. Locality to The Eurozone ........................................................................................ 130 
5.5. Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 131 
Tables ......................................................................................................................................... 133 
Appendix I ................................................................................................................................. 139 
Appendix II ............................................................................................................................... 142 
Chapter 6. Monitoring the Foreign Exchange Rate Benchmark Fix ...................... 143 
6.1. Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 143 
6.2. Background, Motivation and Data ................................................................................. 151 
6.2.1. The Forex Market – A Quote Driven Market ....................................................... 151 
6.2.2. The WMR Benchmark .............................................................................................. 152 
6.2.3. Data ............................................................................................................................. 154 
6.3. The Manipulation Intention Index (ManIx) .................................................................. 155 
6.3.1. The Identification Phase ........................................................................................... 156 
6.3.2. The Statistical Verification Phase ............................................................................ 158 
6.4. Results and Discussion ..................................................................................................... 160 
6.4.1. An Overview of Fix Rate Discovery ...................................................................... 160 
6.4.2. ManIx and Regulatory Investigations ..................................................................... 161 
6.4.3. Out of sample test ..................................................................................................... 164 
6.4.4 Network Analyses – Signs of Collusion .................................................................. 165 
6.5. Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 168 
Tables and Figures .................................................................................................................... 170 
Appendix I ................................................................................................................................. 181 
Chapter 7 Conclusion ............................................................................................... 184 
7.1. Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 184 
7.2. Summary of Findings and Regulatory Implications ..................................................... 185 
7.2.1. High Frequency Quoting and Price Discovery ..................................................... 185 
Table of Contents 
vii 
 
7.2.2. Do Economists Add Value to the FX? .................................................................. 186 
7.2.3. Monitoring the FX Rate Benchmark Fix ............................................................... 188 
7.4. The Limitations of The Current Study & Future Research ........................................ 189 





























List of Tables, Figures, and Equations 
viii 
 
List of Tables, Figures, and Equations 
Tables 
Table 3.1. Summary statistics of Number of Quotes per Minute ............................................ 55 
Table 3.2 Geographical Distribution of Dealers ........................................................................ 56 
Table 3.3 Geographical Distribution of Quotes ......................................................................... 57 
Table 4.1 Dataset Descriptive Statistics ....................................................................................... 78 
Table 4.2 Observable Intention of a Dealer ................................................................................ 79 
Table 4.3 Speed Summary Statistics ............................................................................................. 80 
Table 4.4 Dealers’ Aggressiveness ................................................................................................ 81 
Table 4.5 Dealers’ Quoting Intention .......................................................................................... 82 
Table 4.6 Buy-Sell Intention and Widen Spread ......................................................................... 83 
Table 4.7 Speed Measure and Price Discovery across Short and Long Term Horizons ...... 84 
Table 4.8 Speed Measure and Price Discovery of Ask and Bid on a Minute Basis by 
Currency ........................................................................................................................................... 85 
Table 4.9 Speed Measure and Intraday Price Discovery Volatility .......................................... 86 
Table 5.1 Countries Macroeconomic News Announcements and Coverage by Dealers and 
Economists ..................................................................................................................................... 133 
Table 5.2 Quoting and News Summary Statistics .................................................................... 134 
Table 5.3 Information Advantage and Economist Affiliation ............................................... 135 
Table 5.4 Affiliated Economist Characteristics and Dealers’ Quoting Behaviour .............. 136 
Table 5.5 Robustness Test of Locality of Economists and Dealers to Eurozone .............. 137 
Table 6.1 Dataset Summary Statistics......................................................................................... 170 
Table 6.2 Randomization process ............................................................................................... 172 
Table 6.3 ManIx Summary Statistics .......................................................................................... 173 
Table 6.4 Dealers with Manipulative (Significant Abnormal) Activities during Fixing ...... 174 
Table 6.5 Investigations, Law Suits and Fines .......................................................................... 175 
Table 6.6 Dealers with Manipulative Activities during Fixing ................................................ 176 










Figure 3.1. Average Number of Quotes per Minute .................................................................. 51 
Figure 6.1 Example of Statistical Verification through Bootstrapping ................................. 171 






































List of Abbreviations 
AT Algorithmic Trading 
ATs Algorithmic Traders 
BIS Bank for International Settlements 
CFTC Commodity and Future Trading Commission 
CME Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
DBMS Database Management System 
DOJ Department of Justice (U.S.) 
DOT Designated Order Turnaround 
EBS Electronic Broking System 
ECB European Central Bank 
FCA Financial Conduct Authority 
FED Federal reserve (U.S.) 
FINMA Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority 
FSB Financial Stability Board 
FX Foreign Exchange [Market] 
HFQ High Frequency Quoting 
HFQs High Frequency Quoters 
HFT High Frequency Trading 
HFTs High Frequency Traders 
LSE London Stock Exchange 
MiFiD Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 
NASDAQ National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations 
NYDFS New York Department of Financial Services 
List of Abbreviations 
xi 
 
NYSE New York Stock Exchange 
OCC Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
Regulation ATS Regulation Alternative Trading System 
Regulation FD Regulation Fair Disclosure 
Regulation NMS Regulation National Market System 
SEC Securities and Exchange Commission 
 TSE Tokyo Stock Exchange 
U.K. United Kingdom (of Great Britain and Northern Ireland) 
U.S. United States (of America) 
WM Company World Market Company 
WM/R Fix World Market / Reuters Fix Rate 





















Chapter 1. Introduction 








1.1. Introduction  
The foreign exchange (FX) market is the biggest and arguably the most important 
financial market in the world with a daily turnover of $5.3 trillion (BIS, 2013). The FX market 
is a secondary underlying market for primary investment markets and affects almost every 
aspect of a country’s economy such as output, employment, inflation, cost of imports and 
exports, commodity prices, and capital flow (King et al., 2011; BIS, 2011). In recent years, 
advances in computing and telecommunication technologies have paved the way for the 
emergence and expansion of new highly sophisticated and extremely fast market players 
know as High Frequency Traders (HFTs). Nowadays, HFTs account for more than 40% of 
the FX market and over 70% of the equity markets trading volumes (Hoffmann, 2014; Zhang, 
2010).  
The pervasiveness of HFTs in financial markets has attracted the attention of 
regulators, academics, and practitioners regarding their potential negative impact on the 
quality of financial markets (Conrad et al., 2015). The impact of HFTs on equity market 
functions such as liquidity, volatility, price efficiency, and the price discovery process has 
been extensively studied, although, there is a lack of study on the impact of these new market 
players on the functioning of the FX market (see chapter 2 for a survey on the existing 





studies). Because the FX market is a decentralised, over the counter, geographically dispersed, 
quote driven, and 24/7 market (FSB, 2014) and is fundamentally different from equity 
markets, expansion of the findings regarding the impact of HFT on equity markets to the 
FX requires further examination. There are two reasons for the lack of studies on the impact 
of HFT in the FX market, the first is the lack of reliable data and the second is difficulties in 
identifying HFTs (BIS, 2011). Due to the characteristics of the FX market, collection and 
construction of a reliable dataset is difficult; however, in recent years, the expansion of 
electronic trading platforms in the FX market has reduced the complication and complexity 
of data collection processes and the identification of market participants.  
This thesis strives to fill some of the gaps regarding the impact of these new market 
players, High Frequency Quoters (HFQs 1 ), in the FX market literature and regulatory 
framework via three empirical chapters. The first empirical chapter examines how HFQs 
impact overall long-term and short-term price discovery process in the FX market. Since one 
of the main driving forces behind exchange rate movements is macroeconomic news, the 
second empirical chapters examines how information collection sources such as economists 
and dealers’ quoting speed impact their contribution to price discovery. Finally, the third 
chapter develops an algorithm for identifying market participants who disrupt the price 
discovery of the WM/R fix rate, that is arguably the most important benchmark in the FX 
market.  
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 1.2 discusses the research 
questions and contributions of this thesis and further explains the three empirical chapters 
briefly and section 1.3 concludes.  
                                                 
1 Because the FX market is a quote driven market and market makers disseminate quotes to initiate a trade, in 
this thesis, high frequency traders and high frequency quoters are used interchangeably, in the context of the 
FX market. 





1.2. Research Questions and Contributions 
1.2.1. Quote Dataset 
As stated above there are two reasons for a lack of studies regarding the impact of 
HFQs on the FX market. First the lack of reliable data and second, identifying market 
participants. The first contribution of this thesis is construction of a unique real time tick-
by-tick bid and ask Quote Dataset that includes the identification of market participants and 
their locations and is accurate to the millisecond. The data in this dataset are collected from 
Thomson Reuters Eikon, one the most prominent FX trading platforms in the inter-dealer 
market. The high frequency and real time nature of the Quote Dataset makes it suitable for 
studying high frequency quoting. The existence of market makers’ identification and 
locations in the Quote Dataset allows close observation of individual market participants’ 
behaviour. Therefore, this dataset overcomes the existing barriers in studying High 
Frequency Quoting (HFQ) in the FX market and allows the investigation of many 
unexplored areas in this field.  
The Inclusion of the identification and location of individual market participants 
allows an examination of individual market players’ quoting speed (the most prominent 
feature of HFQs) and its impact on price discovery in the first empirical chapter (chapter 4). 
The location and identification of market players in the Quote Dataset also allows for 
construction of the link between market makers and their affiliated economists and 
subsequently studying the impact of affiliated economists, geographical proximity, and 
quoting speed on price discovery around macroeconomic news announcements in the 
second empirical chapter (chapter 5). Finally, the identification of individual market 
participants facilitates close observation of individual market players’ quoting behaviour 
around the WM/R fixing windows that leads to the design, implementation, and test of an 
algorithm for identifying manipulators of the most prominent FX benchmark, in the third 





empirical chapter (chapter 6). These three empirical chapters are a small portion of the 
unexplored areas in high frequency studies in the FX market that are facilitated by the 
construction of the Quote Dataset. This dataset could be used for future research to explore 
many of the unexplored areas in the FX market. 
The Quote Dataset spans 286 days from April 22nd, 2013 to March 27th, 2014. 
Excluding Saturdays and Sundays the Quote Dataset includes 236 days and 98,860,278 
quotes from the EUR/GBP, EUR/JPY, EUR/USD, GBP/JPY, GBP/USD, and USD/JPY 
currency pairs. These currency pairs are the most liquid currency pairs in the world and their 
constructing currencies, Euro, British Pound, U.S. Dollar, and Japanese Yen, account for 
77.7% of the overall FX turnover. In total, there are 94 dealers active in 49 cities and 44 
countries, from all the six continents, forming 109 dealer-locations. 
The Quote Dataset is unique in its kind in the scope and scale of its coverage. The 
last similar dataset to the Quote Dataset is HFDF93 that has been used in studying the FX 
market for more than 20 years. Research continued using HFDF93 up to recently such as, 
Chelley-Steeley and Tsorakidisb, (2013). The HFDF93 dataset include quotes from three 
currency pairs, USD/DEM, USD/JPY, and DEM-JPY, from 1992 to 1993. Although 
HFDF93 had contributed to the field of FX market microstructure for 2 decades, the FX 
market has significantly changed in both structure and nature in the last 20 years. The Quote 
Dataset constructed as a part of this thesis, therefore, also allows future research to study the 
current market microstructure of the FX market. In order to make this dataset available for 
future research the construction and collection method of the Quote Dataset is explained in 
chapter 3.  
1.2.2. High Frequency Quoting and Price Discovery in the FX Market 
As mentioned above the innovations in financial markets has given rise to new highly 
sophisticated market players known as high frequency traders. There is a growing concern 





within market participants and regulators regarding the negative impact of HFTs on the 
functioning of financial markets. The first empirical chapter of this thesis (chapter 4) 
contributes to this debate by evaluating the impact of market participants’ quotation speed 
on price discovery in the FX market. In other words, chapter 4 examines the applicability of 
the extension of findings in equity markets on the impact of HFTs on price discovery. 
Findings from this analysis allow market participants and regulators to have a better 
understanding of the role that a market player’s quoting speed has on FX market quality. 
This chapter, to the best of my knowledge, is the first investigation on the impact of High 
Frequency Quoting (HFQ) of price discovery in the FX market. 
The dataset used for the empirical study of chapter 4 is a subset of the Quote Dataset 
that was introduced in section 1.2.1 and is explained in more detail in chapter 3. Because 
price discovery is a continuous process and the goal of chapter 4 is to observe this process 
at the highest frequency possible, two conditions are imposed on the Quote Dataset, in order 
to be used for chapter 4’s empirical work. First, the dataset of chapter 4 includes merely the 
days where there is no interruption in the data collection, and second, market makers’ 
repetitive quotes2 are removed since they do not contain any new information. This dataset 
spans from April 23rd, 2013 to March 11th, 2014 and includes 115 trading days and 39,250,175 
quotes from 92 dealers in 6 continents, 42 countries, and 49 cities, which form 104 dealer-
locations.  
In order to measure market participants’ contribution to price discovery, the 
Weighted Price Contribution of Barclay and Warner (1993) is used. This model measures the 
cumulative contribution of a market participant to the total price movement in the market. 
Following Pascual and Pascual-Fuster’s (2014) findings that bid and ask quote are not equally 
informative, the bid and ask price discovery contribution for dealers is calculated separately. 
                                                 
2 A repetitive quote from a dealer is a quote where its ask and bid prices are equal to those of the previous 
quotes of the dealer. 





Market makers’ contribution to price discovery is calculated in the two time horizons of 1-
minute and 1-day. The 1-minute time horizon is used as a proxy for short-term or market 
price discovery and the 1-day time horizon is used as a proxy for long-term price discovery. 
In order to examine the impact of dealers’ speed on their contribution to price discovery, a 
speed measure is based on the tick frequency measure proposed by Guillaume et al., (1997). 
In addition, due to the strong inventory control effect of FX dealers (Lyons 1995) that leads 
to one sided trading of market maker (Harris, 2003, p280), the observable intention, quoting 
aggressiveness, and spread widening measures are constructed to quantify dealers’ quoting 
behaviour. 
Chapter 4’s findings shows that an increase in the quoting speed of dealers positively 
impacts their ability in predicting short-term price movements (contributing to short-term 
market price discovery), while it has no impact on their contribution to long-term price 
discovery. This discrepancy between the impact of speed on short-term and long-term price 
discovery is consistent with the fact that an increase in dealers’ speed increases their price 
discovery volatility, thus undermining their contribution to long-term price discovery.  
The contribution of the empirical work in chapter 4 is twofold. First, these findings 
strongly support the short-termism of FX market participants. In other words, the results 
show that market makers mainly focus on short-term value rather than long-term value. The 
short-termism of market participants could lead to lower concentration and attention to 
fundamental information regarding an asset and consequently impair the price discovery 
process, causes market overreaction, and reduces market efficiency (Froot et al., 1992; 
Menkoff, 2001; Zhang, 2010; Vives, 1995). Second, chapter 4’s results also contribute to the 
regulatory debates regarding the impact of HFTs on financial markets. While the speed of 
market participants allows them to better predict the short-term price movements in the 
market, the lack of relationship between speed and long-term price discovery raises concerns 
regarding the potential negative impact of increasing speed in the FX market. The regulatory 





implication of these findings suggests that the speed arms race of market participants might 
be a social waste, since it does not impact the most important function of financial markets 
long-term information discovery. In addition, the strong relationship between speed of 
market participants and price discovery volatility lends supports to criticism that HFT could 
increase market volatility.  
1.2.3. Do Economists Add value to the FX? 
Analyst affiliation and the geographical proximity of market makers and analysts to 
a firm is found to play an important role in information advantage, competitive advantage, 
and the contribution of dealers to price discovery, in equity markets. It is found that dealers 
with affiliated analysts have higher a contribution to price discovery and they are more 
informed than dealers without analyst affiliation (Madureira and Underwood, 2008). 
Empirical studies show that local market makers and analysts possess an information 
advantage over non-local market makers and analysts (Berger et al., 2009; Bae et al., 2008; 
Annand et al., 2011; Bolliger, 2004; Schultz, 2003; Kedia and Zhou, 2011). However, to the 
best of my knowledge, there is no similar study in the FX market that evaluates the impact 
of economist affiliation on market makers’ contribution to price discovery. Due to 
fundamental and structural differences in information transparency (i.e., private information 
in equity markets) and information transfer medium (i.e., the centralised exchanges in equity 
markets) between equity and the FX markets, the validity and expansion of these findings in 
equity markets to the FX market require further examination. Furthermore, macroeconomic 
news and firm specific news have exhaustively different scopes and scales. While firm specific 
news is to do with the future cash flow of a company and impacts merely the equity price of 
the company, macroeconomic news is regarding the whole state of a country’s economy and 
impacts every financial market and aspect of a country’s economy.  





The second empirical chapter of this thesis (chapter 5) for the first time, to the best 
of my knowledge, studies the impact of economist affiliation on the contribution of market 
makers to price discovery around macroeconomic news announcements. This chapter 
examines whether market makers with affiliated economists systematically are more 
informed than dealers without economist affiliation. Furthermore, in the presence of HFTs 
and their increasing share from the FX market (Rime and Schrimpf, 2013) and HFTs’ ability 
in reading and reacting to macroeconomic news before others (Groß-Klußmann and 
Hautsch, 2011; Scholtus et al., 2014; Biais et al., 2015; Martinez and Rosu, 2013), in addition 
to early access of HFTs to some of the macroeconomic news announcements (Mullins et al., 
2013; Goldstein et al., 2014), quoting speed of market participants is also studied. Finally, the 
impact of the geographical proximity of dealers, affiliated economists, and macroeconomic 
news sources to each other and their interactions on the information advantage of market 
makers is also examined. The answer to these questions not only show how price discovery 
happens around macroeconomic news announcements, but also answers what role 
geographical proximity plays in this process. 
The dataset used for the empirical analysis of chapter 5 consists of four sections of 
quote, macroeconomic news, economist forecasts, and economist geographical information 
datasets. The existence of identification in the Quote Dataset allows the construction of a 
link between dealers and their affiliated economist and the macroeconomic news that their 
affiliated economists have forecasted. The Quote Dataset used in this chapter is a subset of 
the Quote Dataset explained in section 1.2.1 and chapter 3. The macroeconomic news 
announcements dataset, economist forecasts dataset, and economists’ geographical 
information are collected from Bloomberg. The collection procedure of these datasets are 
also explained in chapter 3 and summary statistics and characteristics of these datasets are 
presented in chapter 5. 





The methodology used in chapter 5 is analogous to that in chapter 4 regarding the 
calculation of market makers’ contribution to price discovery and their quoting speed, 
however, with a different time frame of study. The time frames of study in chapter 4 are 1-
minute and 1-day, while that of chapter 5 is a 4-minute window around macroeconomic news 
announcements. The geographical proximity of dealers, economists, and macroeconomic 
news sources to each other is calculated as the weighted average of their geographical 
proximity to each other, weighted by the number of news items released from each 
constructing zone of a currency pair. Finally, the impact of the above mentioned variables 
on the contribution of market makers to price discovery is measured. 
The findings regarding the impact of economist affiliation on market makers’ 
information advantage shows that economist affiliation not only creates an information 
advantage for market makers, but also increases in the scope of economists’ research 
regarding a country’s economy, increases the dealers’ information advantage level. 
Furthermore, market makers’ quoting speed also plays an important and significant role in 
dealers’ contribution to price discovery. These results depict two main points, first, the 
impact of information collection sources (i.e., economists or analysts) on their affiliated 
market maker is independent of market structure and information medium transparency and 
structure. Second, the speed of market participants plays an important role in their 
contribution to price discovery, since it allows them to react to news quickly and incorporate 
new information into prices before slower traders. Findings regarding the geographical 
proximities illustrate the importance and limitation of locality of economists and market 
makers to macroeconomic news sources and each other.  Locality of market makers and their 
affiliated economists to the country of macroeconomic news announcements creates an 
information advantage for market makers. Interestingly the results show the limitation of 
information availability from one geographical proximity. In other words, the results show 





that there is a limitation to the amount of information that can be accessed from the same 
location, independent of its quality.  
The contribution of chapter 5 is threefold. First, it shows the importance and impact 
of information collection sources and their geographical location on information quality, and 
the information advantages of market makers. Chapter 5 illustrates the interaction between 
geographical proximity of dealers, economists, and macroeconomic news sources and how 
they impact market makers’ information content. However, it should be added here that 
since the results show that affiliated economists’ research scope directly impacts the level of 
dealers’ information advantage, and there is no evidence of privileged access to public 
information, there is no concern regarding market fairness and a regulation such as 
Regulation FD regarding this matter does not seem necessary. Second, it shows that the 
advantage of economists’ forecasts is limited only to dealers with affiliated economists and 
illustrates the difference in information distribution mechanisms between FX and equity 
markets. Third it sheds light on the role of the market maker’s quoting speed on the price 
discovery process around macroeconomic news announcements that also has policy 
implications. The importance of market makers’ quotation speed and the ability of fast 
market makers in reacting to macroeconomic news, before others, suggest that selling early 
access to macroeconomic news announcements creates an unfair market environment and 
could impose significant adverse selection costs on slower market participants.  
1.2.4. Monitoring the Foreign Exchange Rate Benchmark Fix 
On 12th June 2013, three reporters from Bloomberg reported that FX traders had 
been manipulating the most important benchmark of the FX market, known as WM/R fix 
rate, for years. The breaking of this news triggered more than 20 investigations in many 
countries and led to the highest amount of fines ever imposed on banks in recent history3. 
                                                 
3 The collection of the fines and law suit settlements exceeds $11.8 billion. 





The reason for such a large scale investigation and fines is that WM/R affects $3.6 trillion of 
assets including pension funds, multinational companies, and almost any entity with global 
investment and transactions. In other words, the WM/R fix rate impacts upon the resource 
allocation of economic agents who are involved in any form of global investment, thus can 
be extremely costly to society. This scandal raised strong concerns regarding the functioning 
of the FX market and the need for regulatory oversight of this widely unregulated market. 
In the era of algorithmic and high frequency trading, the challenge that regulators 
face is the design of a monitoring system that can oversee such trading activities in a cost 
effective manner, and provides a timely warning signal that prompts further investigation. 
Chapter 6 of this thesis (third empirical chapter) for the first time designs, implements, and 
tests an algorithm for identification of WM/R fix rate manipulators, called Manipulation 
Index or ManIx. It is designed to identify the market participants who strategically and 
systematically place their quotes in order to manipulate the WM/R fix rate. ManIx consists 
of two phases of identification and statistical verification that is based on bootstrap 
methodology. It is implemented on a subset of the Quote Dataset that includes merely the 
quotes from WM/R fixing window that is a 60-second window centred at 4pm G.M.T. and 
spans from April 22nd, 2013 to March 27th, 2014. ManIx identifies 17 out of 69 dealer-
locations in the dataset and 8 of them have been investigated by regulators or sued by their 
clients and investors. Among these banks 4 of them account for 68% of the fines imposed 
by regulators. These findings confirm the ability of the ManIx in capturing the abnormal 
behaviour of market participants around the WM/R fixing window and its applicability for 
regulators and market participants.  
The contribution of Chapter 6 to the regulatory framework and academic literature 
is threefold. First, it designs a timely monitoring system that addresses the challenge of 
monitoring the unregulated FX market. Second, it contributes to the new debate on the 
response of regulators to the rapid changes in financial technology. Finally, chapter 6 





demonstrate the usefulness of using quote data for identifying potential misbehaviour in the 
FX market.  
1.3. Conclusion 
Overall, this thesis attempts to address three main questions regarding the price 
discovery process in the FX market. First, what impact the quoting speed of market 
participants has on the long-term and short-term price discovery process of the FX market. 
Second, how the affiliation with economists impacts market makers’ information advantage 
and how the geographical proximity of economists, dealers, and macroeconomic news 
sources to each other affects the market makers’ contribution to the price discovery. Third, 
























2.1. Introduction  
This chapter surveys the existing literature on high frequency trading, price discovery, 
and some of the factors affecting the information advantage of market makers and their 
contribution to price discovery in both equity and the FX markets.  All the literature surveyed 
in this chapter regarding the impact of high frequency trading on financial markets (except 
the work of Chaboud et al., 2014) is focused on equity markets. Therefore, it should not 
come as a surprise that even though this thesis studies the impact of high frequency quoting 
on the FX market, the overwhelming majority of the literature presented here is with regards 
to equity markets. Since, the findings of the researches on equity markets cannot uncritically 
be applied to the FX market due to the significant differences between the nature, market 
structure, regulation, and price discovery process between the FX and equity markets (Booth, 
1984; King et al., 2013; Osler et al., 2011; Harris, 2003), the lack of study of the impact of 
these new highly sophisticated and fast traders on the FX market is one of the main 
motivations of this thesis.  
Two out of three empirical chapters of this thesis, chapter 4 and 5, are based on 
similar studies in the equity markets and therefore, the related literature regarding these two 
chapters are surveyed in this chapter.  However, due to the absence of any academic literature, 
regulatory document, or previous study related to the third empirical chapter (Chapter 6), no 
literature regarding this chapter is surveyed.  





This chapter is structured as follow. Section 2.2 surveys the past literature on market 
microstructure studies in the FX market and discusses the broad categories of financial 
markets with the focus Over-The-Counter (OTC), regulated market, order driven and quote 
driven markets. Section 2.3 defines high frequency trading, explains its expansion and gives 
a brief history on the emergence of high frequency trading in financial markets. Section 2.4, 
surveys the empirical and theoretical studies on the impact of high frequency trading on 
liquidity, volatility, transaction and adverse selection cost, social welfare and fairness, and 
price discovery and price efficiency. Section 2.5, reviews the current literature on price 
discovery and information advantage sources of market makers around macroeconomic 
news announcements. Section 2.6 reviews the existing price discovery models and discusses 
the reasons for the choice of Weighted Price Contribution (WPC) model. Section 2.7 
concludes the overall theoretical and empirical findings of the surveyed literature and sets 
out the main questions that the consequent empirical work will focus on and are unsolved 
to date.   
2.2. The FX Market  
2.2.1. Emergence of FX Market Microstructure  
After the abandonment of fixed exchange rates in the 1970s, researchers had little 
evidence to guide the development of exchange-rate models. In the 1990s, in response to the 
disappointing performance of macro-based exchange rate models, FX market microstructure 
emerged. Researchers in the FX market microstructure take a macroeconomic approach to 
understand the mechanics of exchange rate determination. Early microstructure researchers 
conducted their studies by directly observing the trading process in the market and engaging 
with FX dealers (King et a., 2013) reasoning that “economists cannot just rely on 
assumptions and hypotheses about how speculators and other market agents may operate in 
theory, but should examine how they work in practice, by first-hand study of such markets” 





(Goodhart, 1988, p.438). The progress of FX market microstructure research was slow until 
the mid-1990s when electronic trading platforms emerged and generated large and accurate 
trading records4. These observation directed researchers to the features of the FX market, 
such as trading flow and private information 5 , which had been considered irrelevant 
previously.  
Order flow in the FX market is defined as the net of buyer-initiated and seller-
initiated orders and quantifies the net buying pressure (Evans and Lyons, 2002). “A central 
hypothesis of the foreign exchange market microstructure literature is that order flow allows 
the wider market to learn about the private information and trading strategies of better 
informed participants and therefore represents the conduit through which information 
becomes embedded within market prices” (p.584). Large banks who can observe the order 
flow on a real-time basis, can use the information embedded in order flow to inform their 
trading decisions (Sager and Taylor, 2008)6. Cheung and Chinn (2001) surveyed FX traders 
in the U.S. and report that traders believe that a large customer base and consequently better 
information are the sources of large players’ competitive advantage in the market. Evans and 
Lyons (2002) show that the order flow can explain 60% of the variation in Deutsche 
Mark/Dollar log price changes.  
There are two different approaches in the literature regarding the quantification of 
order flow. Evan and Lyons (2002) define order flow as the difference between the number 
of buy-initiated and sell-initiated trades, while Berger et al., (2008) define order flow as the 
difference between the volume of buyer and seller initiated trades. Although, Berger et al., 
                                                 
4 In the late-1990s the FX market evolved by increases in automated trading and the emergence of new 
electronic trading technologies that increased transparency and transaction speed and reduced transaction cost 
(King et a., 2013).For further details on electronic platforms, geography and composition of currency trading, 
and players in the FX market see King et al. (2012) and chapter 3 section 3.3.  
5 For further review of the literature on order flow and private information see Cheung and Chinn (2001).  
6 Sager and Taylor’s (2008) findings, however, challenges the value of the information that can be obtained 
from commercial available order flow datasets that are published with the minimum lag of 1 day. They show 
that these datasets do not improve the quality of the exchange rate forecasts.   





(2008) argue that the order flow measure based on the volume term is superior to the order 
flow quantified from number of traders (such as the order flow that is measured from quote 
data rather than trade data), Love and Payne (2008) show that differentiating buyer-initiated 
from seller-initiated trading interest explains price variations better than the difference 
between buy and sell quantities. 
2.2.2. Key Players in the FX Market 
Any investigation of a market begins by determining the key players and the structure 
of that market. The FX market is a two layers market that is divided into the wholesale or 
inter-dealer market and the customer-dealer or retail market (King et a., 2013). The customer-
dealer and inter-dealer sections of the FX market account for 25% and 75% of the trading 
volumes in this market, respectively (Danielsson and Payne, 2002). The inter-dealer market 
segment is divided into two segments of direct and indirect inter-dealer trades. Direct inter 
dealer trade consists of telephone and D2000-1 based trades and indirect inter-dealer trade 
consists of voice brokered trade and electronically brokered trade such as EBS and D2000-
2 (Danielsson and Payne, 2002). Therefore, it can be concluded that the dealers are the main 
players in the FX market and the inter-dealer market accounts for the overwhelming majority 
of the trading activities in this market. The focus of this thesis is on the inter-dealer segment 
of the FX market and strives to examine the impact of new highly sophisticated market 
participants’ behaviour in the FX market on this market quality.  
2.2.3. The Difference between the FX and Equity Markets  
As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter there are fundamental differences 
between the FX and equity markets that introduce some challenges in applying the findings 
in equity markets to the FX market. This section points out these differences. 





2.2.3.1 Market Structure 
Equity and FX markets have fundamentally differences market structures. Equity 
markets are regulated7 and organised markets where publically listed companies are traded 
and have a specific market place such as NYSE, LSE, and TSE and are mainly order driven 
markets (Maxwell, 1994, p.41; Harris, 2003, p.34 and p.58). The FX market, on the other 
hand, is a market that currencies are purchased now for delivery in two days (Maxwell, 1994, 
p.193) and is a geographically dispersed, decentralised, OTC, quote driven (dealer) (FSB, 
2014) and unregulated market. Primary suppliers of equity securities are public corporations 
who use equity markets to raise capital for financing their operations (Maxwell, 1994, p.252), 
while the sole suppliers of currencies are central banks and governments (Harris, 2003, p.39). 
Although both equity and FX markets are used by short-term speculators, equity markets are 
mainly used by investors while the FX market is mainly used by asset exchangers. For 
instance, in the U.S. 20% of national wealth is invested in equity markets, while less than 1% 
of it is in the FX market (Harris, 2003, p.33 and p.45). 
Equity markets are usually order driven markets where trades are arranged by 
matching buy and sell orders according to a set of rules8 (Harris, 2003, p. 34). In order driven 
markets traders can offer or take liquidity. “Traders who offer liquidity indicate the terms at 
which they will trade. Traders who take liquidity accept those terms” (Harris, 2003, p.94-95). 
On the other hand the FX market is a quote driven market, where dealers are involved in 
every trade and anyone who wants to trade must trade with a dealer. In these markets dealers 
are sole providers of liquidity and only dealers set the prices. In dealer markets, dealers also 
frequently trade among themselves, however, the public cannot trade directly with each other 
(Harris, 2003, p. 92-93). Dealer markets are made up of a large number of market makers 
                                                 
7 For a list of the U.S. federal security laws see Gitman et al., (2011) page 49 and for regulatory bodies see Harris 
(2003) page 62. 
8 For order precedence rules see Harris (2003) chapter 6. 





who are linked together via a mass telecommunications network and there is no centralised 
trading floor (Gitman et al., 2011, p.41; Maxwell, 1994, p.41). Market participants in the FX 
market are located in the major commercial and investment banks around the world  (Hillier 
et al., 2010, p. 847). Some brokers and data providers organise markets in the currencies and 
traders use these services in order to lower the cost of searching for liquidity (Harris, 2003, 
p. 58).   
2.2.3.2. Price Discovery 
One of the other differences between the FX and equity markets is the process of 
price discovery in these markets. The process of price discovery in the FX market is typically 
assumed to be based on the mechanism outlined by Glosten and Milgrom (1985) that focuses 
on the adverse selection cost faced by uninformed dealers. The Glosten and Milgrom (1985) 
framework suggests that dealers, in order to protect themselves from losing to informed 
traders, quote prices that reflect the customer’s expected information. In other words, their 
framework implies spreads are positively correlated with trade size (Osler et al., 2011). This 
is found to be valid in the U.S. stock markets (see Bernhardt and Hughson, 2002; Peterson 
and Sirri, 2003), however, Osler et al., (2011) argue that Glosten and Milgrom’s (1985) model 
does not apply to the FX market. The authors find that spreads quoted to customers in the 
FX market do not follow the behaviour predicted by the adverse selection cost model. They 
conclude that the “standard adverse selection model does not adequately describe the price 
discovery process in FX” (p. 1715). They explain that the difference between the mechanisms 
of spread determination can be either due to the fact that dealers may narrow their spreads 
to attract informed customers in order to extract information from their trades or the 
transitory market power theory of Green et al., (2007). Green et al., (2007) argue that if a 
dealer knows that a customer might have a higher liquidity search cost per share and the 





customer is not in a position to monitor the dealer’s execution quality, the dealer might take 
advantage of this situation by quoting wider spread. 
2.3. High Frequency Trading, Definition, Expansion, and History 
High Frequency Trading (HFT) is a subset of Algorithmic Trading (AT), where 
computers monitor markets and manage the trading process at high frequency, focused on 
market making (Chaboud et al., 2014; Cole and Smart, 2013). HFT is a relatively new term 
that is not yet clearly defined and usually refers to proprietary professional traders for whom 
their trading strategies generate a large number of trades on a daily basis. The characteristics 
of High Frequency Traders (HFTs) are: “(1) The use of extraordinarily high-speed and 
sophisticated computer programs for generating, routing, and executing orders; (2) use of 
co-location services and individual data feeds offered by exchanges and others to minimise 
network and other types of latencies; (3) very short time frames for establishing and 
liquidating positions; (4) the submission of numerous orders that are cancelled shortly after 
submission; and (5) ending the trading day in as close to a flat position as possible (that is, 
not carrying significant, unhedged positions over-night)” (SEC, 2010, p. 3606). 
These characteristics of HFTs are not merely a definition and the existing literature 
confirms the truth of them. HFT relies on extremely fast speed (O’Hara, 2015) in that the 
time needed for execution of HFT strategies is measured in milliseconds (King et al., 2011). 
The fact that HFTs spend considerable resources to gain a few milliseconds of speed 
advantage suggests that there are large payoffs for being faster than others (Hoffmann, 2014). 
Speed is so essential for high frequency trading firms that they set up (co-locate) their server 
as geographically close as possible to electronic platforms to reduce transmission time 
(Detrixhe et al., 2014; King et al., 2011). The emergence of co-location by itself, on the other 
hand, has increased HFT activities (Frino et al., 2014). HFTs are usually on the passive side 
of the market and rely on complex algorithms for the execution of a vast amount of orders 





in a very small time frame9 and short holding periods. HFTs compete on the basis of speed 
for an average estimated net profit margin of 0.1 cents per share traded, in the U.S. equity 
markets, that requires extremely fast and high volume turnover to cover fixed costs. 
(Hagströmer and Nordén, 2013; Goldstein et al., 2014; BIS, 2011). HFTs use sophisticated 
algorithms to submit and cancel orders rapidly and frequently in order to execute their trades 
quickly (Goldstein et al., 2014; Chordia et al., 2013) and keep their inventories close to zero 
(Jovanovic and Menkveld, 2012; Menkveld, 2013). Due to the short holding period and high 
turnover of HFTs they are mainly active in mostly liquid assets (BIS, 2011)  
Computerised trading dates back to 1998, however, its expansion started after the 
introduction of regulation Alternative Trading System (Regulation ATS; Reg ATS) in 2000, 
including electronic exchanges and the Regulation National Market System (Regulation NMS; 
Reg NMS) in 2007 in the U.S. and MiFiD in 2007 in Europe. Decimalisation, automation of 
electronic limit order books, Reg NMS, and Reg AT have paved the way of HFT in recent 
years. Regulation ATS in 2000 facilitated the entrance of a variety of non-exchange 
competitors while Regulation NMS in 2007 laid the road map for a market composed of 
multiple linked trading venues via rules over access and trade priority. In Europe MiFiD in 
2007 had a similar impact on allowing new competition and trading venues. The result of 
these regulations was the fragmentation of markets in the U.S. and Europe with the 
dispersion of trading across a variety of exchanges and markets (O’Hara, 2015; Goldstein et 
al., 2014; Carrion, 2013). 
Shortly after its appearance in equity markets, HFT emerged in the FX market in 
early 2000. The emergence of HFT in the FX was facilitated by the wider use of electronic 
                                                 
9 Characteristics of HFTs are the same in both equity and the FX market and thus HFTs are mainly active in 
the most liquid currency pairs. As a result, more sophisticated HFT players in the FX market are mainly active 
on EBS and Reuter trading platforms that are currently the predominant source of interbank liquidity in the 
FX market. However, these platforms traditionally have much larger minimum trade size requirements. The 
minimum normal trade size on these platforms is 1,000,000 units of the base currency. Since this minimum 
trade size is too big for HFT purposes some platforms such as EBS in 2010, have launched new services that 
allows trader to trade smaller quantities (i.e., 100,000 units of base currency) (BIS, 2011). 





trading platforms in the FX market. Some of the HFTs in the FX market evolved from HFTs 
in equity markets. Some equity hedge funds began to implement their algorithms that were 
developed for equity markets in the FX market and take advantage of very deep liquidity, 
broad participation, ease of access and arbitrage opportunities in the FX market. Other firms 
originating from equity markets, started by implementing pure latency models, and exploiting 
arbitrage opportunities in the FX market. Other HFTs have been developed by existing FX 
specialists that have decided to move into the HFT in the FX market. Some banks also 
conducted some HFT in proprietary trading, however, they are not prominent players in this 
area. These banks do not perceive HFT as a prominent trend for their business and rather 
see HFT as a way to keep up with technology in the FX market. HFTs' firms mainly focus 
their trading activities in FX on inter-dealer electronic platforms such as EBS and Reuters, 
both based in London, and multi-bank ECNs such as Currenex, Hotspot FX and FXall. 
HFT firms are also active on CME for trades involving FX futures (BIS, 2011). 
Estimates of HFT activity in different markets varies (Carrion, 2013). The share of 
HFT in all equity trades in the U.S. at the beginning of the 2000s was merely 10% and grew 
to almost 50% of trading volume by late 2012 and between 40% and 60% of trading activities 
across all the U.S. financial markets for stocks, options and currencies (Goldstein et al., 2014). 
Zhang (2010) estimates that HFT accounts for more than 70% of dollar trading volume of 
U.S. capital markets. Hagströmer and Nordén, (2013) estimate that HFT market making 
accounts for 63% to 72% of trading volume and 81% to 86% of limit order traffic in 
NASDAQ-OMX Stockholm. Identified groups of HFT account for 68.3% of the dollar 
trading volume of a sample of NASDAQ listed firms (Carrion, 2013). In late 2012, HFT 
accounted for almost 45%, 40%, and 12% of equity trading volume in the European Union, 
Japan, and the rest of Asia, respectively (Popper, 2012a). 
However, in recent years the profitability and volume of HFT are declining. HFT’s 
trading volume has shrunk from six billion shares, 61% of trading volume, in 2009 to three 





billion shares, 51% of volume, in 2012 (Popper, 2012b). Rosenblatt Securities brokerage firm 
estimate that the total profit was at most $1.25 billion in 2012, that is 35% less than that of 
2011 and 74% lower than its peak of approximately $4.9 billion in 2009 (Goldstein et al., 
2014). The reason for this reduction in profit of high frequency trading firms is the increase 
in costs of rights and hardware to maintain co-location. In addition, high data connection 
streams have become much more expensive than they were in 2008–2009. Many HFT firms, 
in order to keep up with their competitors, feel the pressure to obtain new technologies 
(Goldstein et al., 2014). These have led to suggestions that some HFT firms have been 
reducing their staff or completely closing down operations (Popper, 2012b). 
Despite the shrinking share of HFTs in equity markets the FX market has observed 
an impressive increase in the share of HFT in recent years. HFTs share in the spot FX market 
has increased from 3% to 40% in the last decade according to an estimate from Boston-
based Research firm Aite Group (Hoffmann, 2014). HFTs accounted for 35% of spot FX 
volume in October 2013 up from 9% in October 2008 and around 30% to 35% of 
transactions on EBS platform are high-frequency driven (Detrixhe et al., 2014). 
2.4. Impact of HFTs on Financial Markets 
Some believe that HFT is simply faster trading and thus HFTs’ strategies are not new 
and therefore nothing has changed in the economics of the market (Chordia et al., 2013). 
For instance, Mendkveld (2013) examines one large high frequency trader in Chi-X market 
and concludes that HFTs are simply the fast version of traditional market makers10. On the 
other hand, others argue that there are two main differences between computer and human 
traders. First, computers process and act on information faster than humans and second, 
there is a higher correlation between computers’ trading strategies than those of humans 
                                                 
10 However, there is no agreement about how much of this market making is “true” market making (BIS, 2011). 





(Chaboud et al., 2014). The higher speed and high correlation in trading strategies of 
computers could induce short-termism in the market that could push  prices away from 
fundamental value (Froot et al., 1992).  
Overall, there are two different views regarding the impact of HFT on financial 
markets. The advocates of HFT ague that HFTs have taken over the market-making function 
and benefit the markets by adding to price discovery and liquidity and reduced arbitrage 
opportunities, thus making prices more efficient. However, opponents of HFT argue that 
since HFTs do not have affirmative obligation, similar to traditional market makers, there 
are concerns that they can exit the market at will and cause disruption to the functioning of 
markets. They argue that HFTs’ liquidity provision is unreliable and is outweighed by 
disruptive practices such as order spoofing, predatory trading, herding, or overloading the 
market infrastructure with excessive messages (Carrion, 2013; Hoffmann, 2014).  
2.4.1. Liquidity 
Empirical studies find that computerised trading causally improves market liquidity 
(Hoffmann, 2014; Hasbrouck and Saar, 2013; Castura et al., 2010). Hasbrouck and Saar (2013) 
find that HFT improves liquidity by reducing the bid-ask spread and increasing displayed 
depth in the limit order book. Brogaard et al., (2014) find that HFTs provide liquidity in 
volatile and stressful days and around macroeconomic news announcements. Carrion, (2013) 
shows that spreads are wider when HFTs provide liquidity and tighter when they consume 
liquidity. In other words, HFTs are liquidity providers when it is scarce and consume liquidity 
when it is plentiful, which means they add to market liquidity (Carrion, 2013; Hendershott 
and Riordan, 2011). Hendershott et al., (2011) find that AT improves standard measures of 
liquidity, namely quoted and effective spread in NYSE. Castura et al., (2010) find that HFT 
has increased the liquidity at the inside.  





However, as explained above, HFTs do not have any affirmative obligation to 
provide liquidity at all times, similar to traditional market makers. This creates the fear that 
in challenging and unfavourable conditions they withdraw from the market as market makers. 
For instance, Anand and Venkataraman (2013) state that external liquidity providers 
(analogues to HFT market makers) exited from Toronto Stock Exchange when faced with 
unfavourable conditions. Kirilenko et al., (2011) finds that although HFTs did not cause the 
Flash Crash on May 6, 2010, they exacerbated the conditions by reducing their market 
presence when faced with challenging conditions. 
One of the differences between the activity of ATs in equity and FX markets, despite 
the structural difference between these two markets, is the inexistence of rebate for liquidity 
provision in the FX market (Chaboud et al., 2014). Due to this difference, findings regarding 
the impact of ATs and HFTs on liquidity are contrary. Although BIS (2011) argues that HFT 
has benefited the FX by distributing liquidity across the decentralised market, Chaboud et 
al., (2014) finds that during the minute following the U.S. non-farm payrolls announcement, 
when volatility is high, the share of AT liquidity provision reduces more than that of human 
traders. In other words, when the FX market is volatile ATs reduce their liquidity provision.  
2.4.2. Volatility 
Volatility is the other important measure of market quality that is directly influenced 
by liquidity. Based on the empirical studies above it is reasonable to assume that HFTs have 
also reduced financial market volatility. However, the findings regarding price volatility are 
mixed (Hoffmann, 2014). Hasbrouck and Saar (2013) find that HFT has reduced short-term 
volatility. Castura et al., (2010) argue that there is no evidence that the increase in the HFT 
activity ratio to total market ratio has increased short-term volatility. Hagströmer and Norden 
(2013) conclude that HFTs mitigate intraday price volatility. However, Zhang (2010) finds 
that HFT “is positively correlated with stock price volatility after controlling for firm 





fundamental volatility and other exogenous determinants of volatility”. In the FX market, 
Chaboud et al., (2014) find no evidence that AT increases FX volatility and state that there 
is some evidence that AT might have reduced the volatility slightly.  
2.4.3. Transaction and Adverse Selection Costs 
One of the frequently argued impacts of HFTs on the financial markets is the costs 
that they impose on long-term investors and slow traders such as transaction cost and 
adverse selection cost. Theoretical models of Biais et al., (2015) and Martinez and Rosu (2013) 
suggest that fast traders impose adverse selection costs to slower traders by obtaining 
information before slow traders. Hagströmer and Nordén, (2013) state that in modern 
market making anyone who is unable to adjust his posted orders quickly in response to new 
information in the market, will be picked off by competitors. Brogaard et al., (2014) show 
that HFTs impose adverse selection costs on other investors. However, the authors state 
that since HFTs trade against the transitory pricing error, they reduce long-term investors’ 
trading costs. Conrad et al., (2015) find that high frequency quotation activity is correlated 
with lower transaction costs. Castura et al., (2010) argues that reduction in the bid and ask 
spread over previous years has benefited all investors regarding the total cost of trading. 
Malinova et al., (2013) show that the reduction of HFTs’ message traffic causes an increase 
in spreads and an increase in the trading costs of retail and other traders. In the FX market, 
Chaboud et al., (2014) explain that since the portion of FX market that they study is a 
wholesale market, the adverse selection cost imposed by AT is potentially smaller than it is 
in the equity market (Chaboud et al., 2014). Overall, “adverse selection today has taken on a 
different shape. In a high speed, co-located world, being informed means seeing and acting 
on market prices sooner than competitors. Today, it pays to be faster than the average bear, 
not smarter. To be uninformed is to be slow” (Haldane, 2011, p.4 as cited in O’Hara, 2015). 





2.4.4. Fairness and Social Welfare 
An import question that arises is the impact of HFTs on fairness and the social 
welfare of financial markets due to the imposed adverse selection costs by HFTs. SEC (2010, 
p. 3605) raises the question, “Is it necessary or economically feasible for long-term investors 
to expend resources on the very fastest and most highly sophisticated systems or otherwise 
obtain access to these systems? If not, does the fact that professional traders likely always 
will be able to trade faster than long-term investors render the equity markets unfair for these 
investors?”. 
Since speed is a source of market power, it allows fast traders to impose adverse 
selection costs on other market participants and thus ignites a costly arms race that degrades 
social welfare (Hoffmann, 2014). HFTs reduce welfare when they impose adverse selection 
cost on other investors, by picking of their quote at “superhuman speed that anyway would 
have been revealed to investors anyway at a lower frequency” and HFTs might be engaged 
in a socially wasteful arms race (Menkveld, 2014). If the HFTs’ main goal is to be faster than 
competitor HFTs on a publically observed signal, they overinvest in technology relative to 
social optimum (Goldstein et al., 2014). However, Biais et al, (2015, p. 295) notes that “with 
stochastic news arrivals, fast trading can be socially useful because it reduces the delay until 
the asset can be reallocated in response to news”. 
2.4.5. Price Discovery and Price Efficiency 
Financial markets have two important functions, price discovery and liquidity 
(O’Hara, 2003). Therefore, informativeness of price and incorporation of new information 
into prices are important functions of financial markets. The impact of HFTs on them should 
be examined. The majority of empirical studies on the impact of HFT on financial markets 
have studied this function and the majority of them find that HFTs add to price discovery 
and price efficiency of financial markets. However, some other studies raise concerns 





regarding the short-termism of HFTs and the correlation between their strategies that cause 
HFTs to react similarly, which, as a result, leads to an overreaction to the same news and 
consequent price discovery distortion.  
It is found that ATs add to price efficiency by placing more efficient quotes that 
incorporate new information quickly, thus preventing arbitrage opportunities and demanding 
liquidity to move the prices towards the efficient price (Hendershott and Riordan, 2011; 
Hoffmann, 2014). Brogaard et al., (2014) find that HFTs add to price discovery and facilitate 
price efficiency by trading in the opposite direction of pricing errors and in the direction of 
permanent price changes. The authors, similar to Hendershott and Riordan (2011), find that 
this is done via liquidity demanding orders of HFTs. They find that HFTs’ trading direction 
is correlated with “macroeconomic news announcements, market-wide price movements, 
and limit order book imbalances” (p. 2267). Carrion (2013) find that information from order 
flow is more efficiently incorporated in prices on the days that HFT activity is high. Castura 
et al., (2010) find that there is an overall improvement in price efficiency of the U.S. equity 
markets over time and the growth of HFT has lowered mean reversion and increased price 
efficiency. 
In the FX market, Chaboud et al., (2014) study the frequency of triangular arbitrage 
opportunities in the EUR/USD, USD/JPY, and EUR/JPY currency pairs. They state that 
the existence of triangular arbitrage opportunities provides the clear evidence on 
informationally inefficiency of prices in the FX market. They find that expansion of AT in 
the FX market coincided with a considerable reduction in triangular arbitrage opportunities, 
increase in price efficiency by reduction in autocorrelation of high-frequency returns, and 
increased the price discovery process speed. Overall, they conclude that AT has added to the 
efficiency of the price discovery process in the FX market. 





Contrary to the studies above, Zhang (2010) studies the impact of HFTs on the U.S. 
capital markets and finds that HFT impairs the price discovery process. He finds that HFT 
hinders market ability in incorporating information about firm fundamentals into prices 
because HFTs overreact to fundamental news and this overreaction is almost completely 
reversed later on, suggesting that HFT pushes prices away from fundamental value. He 
concludes that HFT has harmful effects on U.S. capital markets.  
Contrary to Chaboud et al., (2014) who state that the correlation between ATs 
trading strategies does not push prices away from fundamental value, Kozhan and Tham 
(2012) who study triangular arbitrage opportunities in EUR/USD, GBP/USD and 
EUR/GBP, argue to the contrary. They argue that in contrast to the common notion of 
competition that it improves price efficiency, competition among arbitrageurs could limit 
efficiency. They argue that computers entering the same trade at the same time causes a 
crowding effect and deviates prices from their fundamental value. Their finding is consistent 
with the theoretical model of Froot et al., (1992) who show that markets, where market 
participants concentrate on short-term information 11 , are less efficient in pricing than 
markets with long-term investors, due to concentration of short-term investors on 
information unrelated to fundamentals.  
The existence of short-termism and deviation of prices from fundamental value in 
the FX market is well documented and argued. O’Hara (2015, p. 263) argues that “In the 
high frequency world, it is not clear that information-based trading necessarily is based on 
fundamental information”. Gençay and Gradojevic, (2013) state that large volatility in the 
exchange rate cannot be explained by slow-moving macroeconomic variables. Cheung and 
                                                 
11 Scholtus et al., (2014) finds that in the case of co-location, a round trip for HFTs could be completed within 
100 microseconds that is equivalent to 0.1 millisecond or 0.0001 second. It takes at least 5 seconds to read the 
previous sentence, during which an HFT could have completed 50,000 round trips equivalent to 100,000 trades. 
It takes 100 milliseconds to blink during which an HFT can complete 1,000 round trips equivalent to 2,000 
trades. 





Chinn, (1999) find that the deviation of exchange rates from their fundamental value in the 
short-term is due to excess speculation and price manipulation. Evans and Lyons (2002) 
show that the order flow in a short horizon might be unrelated to existing fundamental 
macroeconomic news. 
Two reasons are given for the short-termism of market participants in the FX market, 
inventory effect and trading strategies. In the FX market, the general preference of dealers is 
to complete their roundtrip and have zero inventories, thus after each trade with a customer 
they usually pass their accumulated inventory rapidly to another dealer. If the second dealer 
passes his position to another dealer, in order to maintain a zero inventory, a process known 
as “hot potato trading” is formed. The transfer of the position from a dealer to another 
dealer is continued until a dealer passes this position onto one of his customers (Lyons, 1995; 
Bjønnes and Rime, 2005; Lyons 1997; King et al., 2011) This dealers’ intention for  passing 
on inventory imbalance has informational effects on the exchange rates (Jong et al., 2001). 
On the other hand, some suggest that chartist behaviour of traders (i.e., technical traders) 
who act on unrelated information to fundamental value of an asset might explain some of 
the large movements and the overshooting of exchange rates (Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 
2005).  
2.5. Macroeconomic News Announcements and Price Discovery 
There is perhaps no question more central to economics than how markets arrive at 
prices (Andersen et al., 2007). Empirical studies show that exchange rates are driven by new 
information arriving about fundamentals that are macroeconomic news announcements 
(King et al., 2011; Scholtus et al., 2014; Gençay and Gradojevic, 2013)12. Although prior to 
                                                 
12 Savaser (2011) studies the impact of scheduled macroeconomic news announcements by using customer 
price-contingent orders and his results imply “that there may be a component of the news response that purely 
reflects institutional feature such as order types and not necessarily the content of the public information itself” 
(p. 107).   





the 1990s exchange rates models using monthly or quarterly macroeconomic data could not 
explain the exchange rates movement (Payne, 2003), recent studies show that exchange rates 
incorporate new macroeconomic information almost instantaneously. Andersen et al., (2007) 
study the impact of real time U.S. macroeconomic news on GBP/USD, USD/JPY, and 
EUR/USD future contracts and find that macroeconomic news produces a conditional 
mean jump, therefore, exchange rate dynamics are linked to fundamental news. Evans and 
Lyons, (2008) show that macroeconomic news arrival accounts for more than 30%13 of the 
DM/USD (Deutschmark / Dollar) exchange rate and is immediately and directly 
incorporated into prices. Ederington and Lee, (1995) study interest rate and FX futures 
markets from 1988 to 1992 and find that price changes as a result of macroeconomic news 
announcements starts within 10 seconds and “basically [completes] within 40 seconds of 
release” (p. 117). They find that prices adjust to macroeconomic news in a series of numerous 
small, but rapid, price changes. Cheung and Chinn, (1999), survey U.S. FX traders and found 
that macroeconomic news is quickly incorporated into the exchange rate. Carlson and Lo 
(2006) observe that the full impact of a news announcement from the Bundesbank (German 
Central Bank), in 1997, hits the DM/USD market 35 seconds after its release.  
Equity markets, as well as the FX market, demonstrate a rapid and almost 
instantaneous response to the release of macroeconomic news. Scholtus et al., (2014) find 
that the speed of trading strategies based on U.S. macroeconomic news, on the S&P 500 
ETF, is crucially important and that a delay of 300 milliseconds significantly reduces the 
performance of news-based trading strategies. They state that the current round trip time of 
an HFT in the case of co-location is less than 100 microseconds that combined with machine 
readable news feed is clearly unbeatable by human speed. Chordia et al., (2015) studies the 
impact of 15 types of macroeconomic news announcements on the stock index ETF, and 
                                                 
13 They identify three sources of currency price variation, macroeconomic news arrival, direct impact of 
macroeconomic news on order flow, and order flow unrelated to fundamentals. 





future and find trading activities intensify within a quarter second after a news release and 
prices start reacting within a tenth of a second and fully respond to macroeconomic surprises 
within five seconds. They argue through one channel that HFTs and ATs are perceived to 
profit is a rapid reaction to the public information released due to their technological 
advantage.  
These empirical studies mentioned above, show three important aspects of price 
discovery around macroeconomic news announcements in financial markets. First, in the FX 
market macroeconomic news announcements are one of the most prominent driving forces 
behind exchange rate determination. Second, in both the FX and equity markets 
macroeconomic news announcements are incorporated in prices almost instantaneously. 
Third, by looking at the timeline of studies in the FX market, it can be vividly observed that 
throughout the time of advancements in technology and the increases in speed of the FX 
market and market participants, the speed of price discovery in the FX has increased 
dramatically. These findings are in line with Martinez and Rosu’s (2013) statement that HFTs 
as strategic informed traders react to new information immediately and ensure that it is 
incorporated into prices instantaneously. 
2.5.1. Price Discovery and Information Advantage 
2.5.1.1. Equity Markets 
In the equity markets fundamental information regarding a firm are news such as 
earnings announcement (Abarbanell and Bushee, 1997). Therefore, the private information 
in equity markets is considered to be advanced knowledge of a firm’s cash flows (Green, 
2004) which determines the change in fundamental value of a company. Private information 
possessed by market participants can be observed from their trading activities (Green, 2004). 
For instance, Koski and Michaely (2000) observe that larger than usual impacts of trading 
activities before a dividend announcement on prices is a sign of having possession of private 





information by some of the market participants. Therefore, if having prior information gives 
the market makers the added advantage and enables them to incorporate new information 
into their prices, the market maker should have a higher contribution to price discovery than 
others (Madureira and Underwood, 2008). In other words, systematically higher 
contributions of some dealers to price discovery, than others, could be due to their 
information advantage.  
The sources of the market makers’ information advantage in equity markets could be 
due to analysts coverage (analyst affiliation), geographic location, or through their 
participation in underwriting syndicates (Schultz, 2003). Madureira and Underwood, (2008) 
study the interaction between market making and analyst affiliation on price discovery and 
find that market makers with affiliated analysts contribute more to the price discovery 
process than market makers without affiliated analysts. Anand et al., (2011) find that the local 
market makers spend more time at the inside bid and ask quotes and initiate larger changes 
in the quotes than non-local market makers. In addition, their average information share is 
almost twice that of non-local market makers. Market makers relocating farther away from 
the firms headquarters experience a reduction in their contribution to the price discovery 
process. These results suggest geographically proximate (local) market makers possess an 
information advantage over non-local market makers. Kedia and Zhou (2011) show that 
firms’ stocks that are traded by local dealers, exhibit lower quoted and an effective spread 
and also more informative prices. Bolliger (2004) finds that there is more advantage for local 
brokerage house in Europe over foreign brokerage houses. The studies mentioned above 
demonstrate the importance of having analyst affiliation and geographical proximity of 
market makers as part of their information advantage.  
Although analyst affiliation is found to improve the information advantage of market 
makers, not all analysts have the same accuracy. Financial analysts and brokerage houses 
compete for forecast accuracy that is one of their most important dimensions (Bae et al., 





2008). An analyst’s ability in forecasting earnings more accurately than statistical models 
(Brown and Rozeff, 1978 and Bradshaw et al., 2012) and the profitability of his 
recommendations (Womack, 1996 and Jegadeesh et al., 2004) could be due to skilful 
processing of public information or their superior access to companies’ management through 
visits to company headquarters, investor office meetings, and broker-hosted investor 
conferences. Access to a firm’s management is found to be an important source of an 
analyst’s informational advantage (Green et al., 2014). Green et al., (2014) examine whether 
access of analysts to a firm’s management at broker-hosted conferences impacts on the 
informativeness of research by analysts. They find that “analyst recommendation changes 
have larger immediate price impacts when the analyst׳s firm has a conference-hosting 
relationship with the company” (p. 239). They argue that analysts’ access to management 
remains a prominent source of informational advantage. 
In addition to access to management, the geographical proximity of an analyst is also 
found to have a prominent impact on their forecast accuracy. Geographically proximate 
analysts are more accurate in their forecast and their forecast revisions impact on prices more 
than other analysts. These findings suggest that geographically proximate analysts possess an 
information advantage over others, which leads to their higher performance (Malloy, 2005). 
The geography of economists forecasting ECB monetary policies matters for their forecasts’ 
accuracy (Berger et al., 2009). Using a sample of 32 countries Bae et al., (2008) find an 
economically and statistically significant local analyst advantage even after controlling for 
firm and analyst characteristics. In addition, they find that analysts have lower forecast errors 
for the local stocks that they follow than that of foreign stocks.  
Berger et al., (2009) argues that financial analysts benefit from geographical proximity 
due to similarities in culture, language, closeness to local market conditions in which firms 
operate, and potentially better links to decision makers. Bae et al., (2008) believes that local 





advantage could be due to an analyst’s relationship and personal connections with firm 
representatives and their ability to observe what goes on in firms directly. The authors state 
that alternatively, local analysts could speak directly with employees, customers, and 
competitors. 
2.5.1.2. The FX Market 
In the FX markets the fundamental value of a currency is partly determined by 
macroeconomic variables. Because all market participants in the FX market have access to 
the same public information, the existence of private information has often been denied 
(Jong et al., 2001; Ito et al., 1998; Gençay and Gradojevic, 2013). However, empirical studies 
such as Ito et al., (1998) do not support this perception regarding the FX market and find 
evidence to the contrary. They argue that the view that FX traders’ exclusive information 
source is public information or the view that all market participants interpret public news the 
same need to be relaxed. They explain that relaxing this view is eased by recognising that 
private information can be price relevant without being related to any fundamental 
information. Evans and Lyons (2012) show that private information obtained from trading 
customer order flow can predict exchange rates as well as macroeconomic news. Similar to 
Ito et al., (1998), Kim and Verrecchia (1994, 1997) argue that information asymmetry after 
public information release might increase by the different abilities of market participants in 
interpreting news. In other words, he argues that information content and the information 
advantage of market participants is affected by the way that they interpret the same 
macroeconomic news. 
The impact of the market makers’ locality on their information advantage has also 
been found to be a source of information advantage for FX market makers. Gençay and 
Gradojevic, (2013) state that FX traders’ location might offer a temporary informational 
advantage. They explain that local advantage (region-specific private information) could arise 





from the local knowledge that non-local traders might not be able to obtain. “With regard to 
the USD/JPY currency pair, Japanese banks receive FX orders from the largest Japanese 
corporations and this may offer a temporary informational advantage” (p. 92). They find that 
5% to 25% of variation in exchange rates is due to region-specific private information. Jong 
et al., (2001) find a prominent but not exclusive role of German banks in price discovery of 
DM/USD. Covrig and Melvin (2002) studied USD/JPY markets and identified a period of 
high concentration of informed traders in Tokyo. They demonstrate that Japanese quotes 
lead the rest of the market in these periods. They find that Japanese quotes contribution to 
price discovery, in the aforementioned period, to the rest of the world is 5 to 12 percentage 
points higher. They believe that Japanese traders have more information about the USD/JPY 
currency pair than the rest of the market. The price leadership of Deutsche Bank prior to the 
German central bank interventions (Peiers, 1997) or price leadership of Japanese banks in 
the Yen market (Ito et al., 1998) are some of the examples regarding information asymmetry 
in the FX market due to region-specific private information.  
Overall, although the geographical proximity of a dealer to a country and the dealer’s 
order flow are found to be the source of private information, no study has ever examined 
the role of the dealer’s geographical proximity to macroeconomic news origin and the dealers’ 
affiliation with the economist (for forecasting macroeconomic variables) on dealers’ 
information content and advantage. Furthermore, as different interpretations of public 
information is also found to be a source of information asymmetry, no study has ever 
examined the impact of the economist affiliation on the contribution of market makers to 
the price discovery in the FX market. Consequently, no study was found to examine how 
affiliated economists’ geographical proximity affects the information content of their dealer. 
 





2.6. Choice of Price Discovery Model  
In order to measure markets or market participants’ contribution to the price 
discovery process three models of Information Share (IS) by Hasbrouck (1995), Component 
Share (CS) by Gonzalo and Granger (1995), and Weighted Price Contribution (WPC) by 
Barclay and Warner (1993) are widely used in the literature. Due to the limitations and 
complication of using IS and CS in high frequency studies this thesis utilises the WPC model. 
This section explains each model and discusses the reasons behind the choice of WPC, its 
advantages over IS and CS models, WPC’s suitability for high frequency microstructure 
studies, and the complications and limitations that prevent usage of IS and CS in market 
microstructure high frequency studies.  
The IS model is suggested by Hasbrouck (1995) and is an economic approach based 
on an implicit unobservable efficient price common to all markets. Hasbrouck (1995) defines 
information share associated with a particular market as the proportional contribution of that 
market's innovations to the innovation in the common efficient price. The common factor 
is the implicit efficient price of the security, which is defined statistically as the random-walk 
component of the prices from the diverse markets. The innovation variance in this random 
walk is a measure of the information intensity of the efficient price process. The IS model 
enables measurement of lead and lag relation between the quote revisions of individual banks, 
such as to identify price leaders in the market. The CS model complements the IS model and 
provides a different view of the price discovery process between markets and focuses on the 
components of the common factor and the error correction process. (Bailiea et al, 2002; 
Korczak and Phylaktis, 2010; Yan and Zivot, 2010; Jong, et al, 2001).  
Although IS and CS are closely related and both models use the vector error 
correction model (VECM) as their basis, they have different points of view on price 
discovery. The major difference between the two models is the role of the variance of the 





innovations. Only IS takes into account the variability of the innovations in each market's 
price, while the CS model ignores the variance of the innovation and is concerned with only 
the error correction process. For instance, assume a security is traded in two markets, A and 
B and the price of this asset in cointegrated and highly correlated in both markets. Assume 
that the first market’s price responds to deviations from the second market’s price described 
by the error correction term, but the second market does not respond to deviations from the 
first market. According to the Gonzalo and Granger model price discovery only occurs in 
the second market while, the Hasbrouck metric suggests that both markets contribute to 
price discovery because of the high correlation between the two markets. In other words, the 
CS model completely ignores a market’s reaction to new information, thus the IS model is a 
more adequate measure of the amount of information generated by each market or market 
participant (Jong, et al, 2001; Bailiea et al, 2002; Korczak and Phylaktis, 2010; Yan and Zivot, 
2010). Since the goal of this thesis is to examine the role of individual market participants 
and their contribution to price discovery, the CS model is not an appropriate model for this 
thesis’s empirical studies.  
However, despite the advantage of IS over CS, this model also is not an appropriate 
choice for studying irregularly time spaced high frequency data and studying individual 
market participants contribution to price discovery. Similar to most econometric models that 
have been designed based on the equidistant observations (Zebedee, 2001), the IS model 
requires regularly spaced data (Kehrle and Peter, 2013). One of the fundamental 
characteristics of high frequency data in the FX market is that trades and quotes can occur 
at varying time intervals (i.e., not equally spaced) (Goodhart and O’Hara, 1997). Since, lag 
structure analyses such as the IS model are based on the implicit assumption of a constant 
discount parameter and they are designed for regular intervals and high frequency data is 
observed at irregular intervals, use of these models with high frequency irregularly spaced 
data might not be correct (Zebedee, 2001; Jong and Nijman, 1997). In addition, because not 





all dealers update their quotes at equal frequency, and the IS model requires significant time 
variation, use of IS at market maker level14 is not possible (Anand et al., 2011)15.  
Finally, the main drawback of the IS model is that it does not provide a unique 
measure of information share and its output is a range between upper and lower bounds for 
a market or market participant’s information share. Depending on the sample frequency and 
number of information sources this range can vary significantly. This range is generally small 
when the number of information sources are small and the differences among them are large, 
however, the range diverges considerably when there are more than two information sources. 
In addition, estimation of IS based on high frequency sampling might be distorted by 
transitory frictions and misrepresent which market moves first in response to new 
information. Thus, determining the leading market or market participant is rather vague 
(Kehrle and Peter, 2013; Frijns and Schotman, 2009; Yan and Zivot, 2010). Due to reasons 
specified above, since the empirical studies of this thesis are based on high frequency and 
irregularly spaced data and the observation of individual market participants contribution to 
price discovery, the use of the IS model is not appropriate16. 
On the other hand, the WPC model does not encounter any of the aforementioned 
issues regarding the IS and CS models and their usage at high frequency. WPC is a non-
parametric measure of price discovery (Wang, 2014) and is not based on any assumption 
regarding the distribution of prices and regularity of observations’ interval. WPC’s output is 
a unique number for the contribution of each market or market participant to price discovery 
                                                 
14 Assuming each market maker as a separate market.  
15 In order to address this issue Anand et al., (2011) use the WPC model. 
16 One method for converting irregularly spaced data to equally spaced data is sampling the data at an arbitrary 
frequency (for instance see Kehrle and Peter, 2013; Korczak and Phylaktis, 2010), however, this method induces 
two main issues in the data. First, if the chosen interval is very small and the trading is not frequent, there will 
be many intervals with no new information and heteroscedasticity of a specific form and non-synchronous 
trading problem will be introduced into the data (Engle and Russel, 1998; Jong and Nijman, 1997). Second, the 
arbitrary choice of sampling frequency will induce imputation bias (Jong and Nijman, 1997) which means that 
the behaviour of some market participants and their role in the price discovery process could partly or 
completely be ignored. 





in a given time period, calculated as a weighted sum of dealers’ contribution to price 
discovery during the given time period. (Barclay and Hendershott, 2003; Madureira and 
Underwood, 2008; Anand et al., 2011) 17 . The WPC model is explained and discussed 
extensively in section 4.3.1. 
2.7. Conclusion 
Algorithmic and high frequency traders, new players in financial markets, emerged 
as a result of advances in technology and the increase in speed of financial markets. HFTs 
share of trading volume in financial markets increased from 10% to 70% in the U.S. equity 
markets. However, in recent years, their share of trading has reduced in the equity markets 
while the FX market has observed an increase in the share of HFT. Nowadays, they account 
for more than 40% of trades in the $5.3 trillion dollar a day FX market.  
The studies surveyed here evaluated the impact of HFT on the quality of financial 
markets in five main areas; liquidity, volatility, transaction and adverse selection costs, social 
welfare and fairness, and price discovery and price efficiency. The empirical studies on the 
impact of HFT on the liquidity of equity markets is in favour of HFTs and finds that they 
significantly improve equity market liquidity. However, the fear of HFTs exiting the market 
in challenging conditions is shown to be true, and it can cause serious damage to market 
stability and resilience in volatile and unstable market conditions. Regarding the impact of 
HFT on price volatility in equity markets, the empirical findings are mixed. While some argue 
HFT has not increased volatility in equity markets, some suggest HFT is positively correlated 
with stock price volatility. In addition, no evidence is found that AT increases short-term 
price volatility in the FX market. The emergence of HFT in financial markets undoubtedly 
has imposed adverse selection costs on slower traders as shown by theoretical and empirical 
                                                 
17 For examples and applicability of the WPC model usage in the FX market see Ligon and Liu (2013) and 
Wang (2014). 





studies in both equity and the FX markets. The imposing of adverse selection costs on slower 
traders by HFTs could ignite (might already have ignited) a socially wasteful arms race. 
Regarding the transaction costs, findings show mixed results. While some show a 
considerable reduction in the cost of trading, others find to the contrary. 
Similarly to the impact of HFTs on other markets’ functions, the findings regarding 
their impact on price discovery and efficiency are mix. Some find that HFTs speed up the 
price discovery by quickly incorporating news information into prices, reducing arbitrage 
opportunities and making price formation more efficient by reducing autocorrelation. Other 
research groups argue that due to similarities and the correlation of HFT strategies and their 
short trading and holding period, HFTs concentrate on information unrelated to 
fundamental and push prices away from fundamental value due to crowding effect or herding 
on the same information. 
In the FX markets, macroeconomic news is one of the main driving forces behind 
exchange rate movements and the price discovery process. However, although the existence 
of private information regarding public information is mainly denied in the FX markets, it 
was shown that different interpretations of the same macroeconomic news or customers’ 
order flow can create an information asymmetry amongst market makers. In equity markets, 
analyst affiliation and the geographical location of analyst and market makers are found to 
be the source of information advantage regarding firms’ fundamental information. However, 
in the FX market, except some studies on the region-specific information asymmetry, no 
study was found to examine the role economist affiliation and geographical location of 
economists and market makers (to the macroeconomic news source and each other) in the 
information content of the dealers. 
This thesis strives to fill the gap in the existing literature by examining three questions 
regarding the price discovery process in the FX market. As mentioned in the introduction of 





this chapter, the overwhelming majority of the studies on the impact of HFT and AT are 
conducted on equity markets and because the findings of these studies cannot uncritically be 
applied to the FX market, further examination is needed to evaluate the impact of these new 
market participants on the FX market. In addition, although the words HFT and AT imply 
the high speed of these market participants, no study, to the best of my knowledge, has 
examined the impact of HFTs and ATs’ speed on financial markets. This thesis, first, 
evaluates the impact of market participants’ speed on price discovery in the long and short-
term in the FX market (Chapter 4). It is important to understand how the ever increasing 
speed of market participants, affects market quality. The answer to this question can 
determine whether the phenomenon of HFT is an arms race with no social benefit or the 
contrary.  
Second, the existing literature in equity markets shows the positive impact of 
geographical proximity of market makers and analysts to a firm’s location and affiliation of 
analysts with market makers on market maker’s information advantage. However, such a 
study has not been conducted regarding the impact of economist affiliation with market 
makers and their geographical proximity to macroeconomic news sources in the FX market. 
In addition to fundamental differences between the FX and equity markets, the scope and 
scale of firm-specific news and a country’s macroeconomic news are exhaustively different. 
This is the motivation for the second empirical chapter (chapter 5) of this thesis. The 
examination of this question deepens our understanding of the factors that affect market 
participants’ information advantage and impact of information creation sources considering 
the different structure of equity and the FX markets. Finally, this thesis by using its unique 
Quote Dataset for the very first time designs, implements, and tests an algorithm to identify 
the dealers that exhibit manipulative behaviour around the WM/R fix rate (Chapter 6). The 
answers to the aforementioned questions above, in addition to their regulatory implications, 





allow us to better understand the impact that HFT and AT have on the quality of the biggest 
























Chapter 3. Data Description 
“Our ability to analyse the working of markets is limited by the availability of 
relevant data” 







This chapter explains the two main datasets that are used in this thesis. Since both 
datasets are unique, the collection procedures of them are also explained, for future 
researches’ use. The core dataset for empirical analysis of this thesis is the quote database, 
collected from Thomson Reuter Eikon. The main feature that makes the Quote Dataset 
unique, is that it includes the identity and location of dealers, who disseminate the quotes 
and includes quotes from EUR/GBP, EUR/JPY, EUR/USD, GBP/JPY, GBP/USD, and 
USD/JPY currency pairs. The second dataset is the macroeconomic news announcement 
dataset that is collected from Bloomberg and contains the news that affects these six currency 
pairs from the United Kingdom (U.K.), the United States (U.S.), Eurozone countries, and 
Japan.  
Since each empirical chapter utilises a portion of the Quote Dataset, this chapter 
explains the entire Quote Dataset and sub-datasets that are used in each empirical chapter 
are explained in more detail in each chapter. The first empirical chapter, chapter 4, utilises 
merely the days that there has been no interruption in data streaming, since the continuity of 
prices for studying the price discovery process is a necessity. The second and third empirical 
chapters, chapters 5 and 6, utilise a smaller subset of the Quote Dataset, due to the nature of 
their research questions. Chapter 5 utilises the quotes within the 4-minute window around 





the macroeconomic news announcements and chapter 6 examines the quotes merely within 
the 60 seconds time frame around the WM/R fixing windows. Regarding the 
macroeconomic news announcement dataset, the collection procedure is presented here and 
more detailed characteristics of the dataset that is used for empirical work of this thesis is 
presented in chapter 5.  
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 gives a brief background 
on the emergence and expansion of electronic trading platforms in the FX market and 
section 3.3 introduces the FX market, its characteristics, and use of indicative quotes in 
studying this market. Section 3.4 explains the collection procedure of the quote and 
macroeconomic news datasets. Section 3.5 describes the Quote Dataset summary statistics 
and section 3.6 concludes.  
3.2. Emergence of Electronic Trading Platforms in the FX Market 
The usage of communication technology for integrating financial markets goes back 
to 1840 when the use of telegraph facilitated exchanges to integrate into national networks 
and attract investors from around the world. Commenced establishing a telegraph line 
between New York and London decreased the delay between the exchanges from 5 days to 
20 minutes and with further improvements later this delay was reduced to 30 seconds by the 
First World War. Establishment of these links meant that different stocks could be traded 
around the world which meant the facilitation of the capital flow from around the globe 
(Michi, 2010). 
The first electronic equity market, NASDAQ, an electronic alternative to over-the-
counter stock exchanges, was launched on February 8, 1971. This was followed by the launch 
of the fully automated Designated Order Turnaround (DOT) system on March 1, 1976 by 
the NYSE to route smaller orders electronically. The DOT was able to handle limit orders, 





basket trades, and other type of market orders. On April 21, 1999 the regulation of 
Alternative Trading System (ATS) became effective and contained all the systems that SEC 
previously had called proprietary trading systems, broker-dealer trading systems, and 
Electronic Communication Networks (ECN). On October 9, 2002 Tradebot System Inc., 
for the first time traded more than 100 million shares in a single day. March 30, 2007 Chi-X 
Europe was launched (Perez, 2011).  
The growth of electronic trading platforms was not limited to equity markets and 
also expanded to the FX market. The first multi-bank platform in the FX market was 
Currenex that was launched in 1999, by providing quotes from different FX dealers on a 
single page. This platform increased transparency, decreased transaction costs and attracted 
a growing customer base. In response to this new competition, top FX dealers launched 
proprietary single-bank trading platforms for their customers, such as BARX in 2001 by 
Barclays, Autobahn by Deutsche Bank in 2002, and Velocity by Citigroup in 2006. According 
to BIS average trading volume on single-bank trading systems has doubled over the time 
horizon of 2007 to 2010. Electronic trading and electronic brokering are transforming the 
FX markets by reducing transaction costs and increasing market liquidity and have paved the 
way for algorithmic trading. There are three types of ECNs in FX market, electronic broking 
systems (such as EBS and Thomson Reuters Matching), multi-bank trading systems (such as 
Currenex, FXall, and Hostspot FX), and single-bank trading systems (King and Rime, 2010). 
The emergence of ECNs in the FX market paved the way for high frequency and algorithmic 
trades in the FX market. Larger and more sophisticated HFT players tend to trade on EBS 
and Thomson Reuters which are the main source of interbank liquidity and very few HFTs 
trade on single-bank platforms, since HFT needs a diverse information-rich environment 
(BIS, 2011).  





3.3. The FX market, A Quote Driven Market 
The FX market is a geographically dispersed, decentralised, quote driven, and 
primarily over the counter market (FSB, 2014). Due to this attribute, there is not a single 
database that contains all the transactions conducted in this market. However, active dealers 
in the FX market disseminate the price that they are willing to trade on, in the form of 
indicative data (Goodhart and O'Hara, 1997). Indicative quotes are disseminated on different 
platforms with the most important one being Thomson Reuters (Martens and Kofman, 
1998). More than 50% of all the electronic trading in the foreign exchange market occurs on 
the Reuters platform (Risk, 2011) and the majority of the main players in the FX market 
disseminate their indicative quotes on this platform.  
In recent years, advances in communication technology have contributed to the 
integration of the FX market and enabled customers to access multi-pricing sources 
simultaneously. This has led to an increased share of electronic trading in the FX market, 
with 90% of the trades in the FX spot market being conducted via electronic platforms (FSB, 
2014). Though the overwhelming majority of the FX market trades occur on electronic 
platforms, there is not a single database that includes all the trades in this market. However, 
the vast majority of transactions in the FX market, conducted on an electronic platform, 
originate from a quote in two ways. First, a customer asks for a quote from a dealer or 
multiple dealers, simultaneously, for ask and bid prices for a specific size and subsequently 
accepts the desired side. Second, dealers stream a series of quotes, with predefined sizes. A 
trader could accept either side of a quote (ask or bid) and conduct a transaction (RBS Market 
Place, 2014a; 2014b). In either of the situations, a quote disseminated by a dealer is displayed 
on multiple electronic platforms, while a transaction is recorded merely on a single platform. 
Furthermore, a quote is disseminated with the identity of the market maker, while transaction 
data do not include any identity information due to privacy reasons.  





Many studies evaluated the quality and information content of indicative and 
transaction data in order to evaluate whether indicative data is an adequate dataset to be used 
in studying foreign exchange market microstructure. Phylaktis and Chen (2009) compare 
tick-by-tick matched, four month of Reuters’ high frequency indicative quotes with D2000-
1 transaction data for DEM/USD and GBP/USD. By using different information measures, 
they found that tick-by-tick indicative data are not inferior in terms of quality of information 
and contains higher information content than transaction data. In addition, they found that 
indicative data has the same effect on order flow as transaction data. They found that 
transaction data lag 5 to 10 minutes behind indicative data. They argue this result shows that 
indicative data have the predominant role in incorporating fundamental information into the 
prices.  
Goodhart and O'Hara (1997) believe that indicative quotes illustrate traders’ 
heterogeneous price interpretation better than transaction data. They explain that transaction 
price depends on the agreement of both counterparties while indicative quotes can be 
updated instantly. They add that studies using transaction data can lead to biased results 
because it ignores the informational content of non-trading intervals. Transaction prices are 
subject to bid and ask bounces, a source of transitory volatility. In addition, quotes are 
regarded as active between revisions and can be updated in the absence of trade. On the 
other hand, because bid and ask can be picked up in response to new public information, 
there is a strong motivation in keeping them updated, hence, they reflect currently available 
information better than transaction prices (Hasbrouck, 2007). The other advantage of 
indicative quotes over transaction data is the comprehensiveness of them. Transaction data 
in the FX market are collected from the platforms that the transactions are conducted on; 
hence if there are any other transactions on any other platforms, they are not recorded in 
transaction data. However, although some of the dealers cannot be traded with on multi 





bank dealing platforms such as Thomson Reuters or EBS, they report their transaction to 
these platforms as an indicative quote. 
Based on the aforementioned reasons, a comprehensive set of quotes with the 
identity of their disseminators, is the most appropriate, available dataset to study the FX 
market, should the behaviour of individual dealers be the focus of the analysis. Since the aim 
of this thesis is to evaluate and study the impact of market participants on price discovery, a 
dataset with the identity of market participants allows for closer observation of market 
participants and their impact on the price discovery process.  
3.4. Data Collection Procedure 
As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, the datasets used in this thesis are 
unique in their kind. The uniqueness of these datasets are mainly due to the complex 
collection process. This section explains how the data collection process for quote and 
macroeconomic news datasets are designed and implemented. 
3.4.1. The Quote Data Collection Procedure 
The Quote Dataset is a live capture of ask and bid prices of EUR/GBP, EUR/JPY, 
EUR/USD, GBP/JPY, GBP/USD, and USD/JPY currency pairs from the Thomson 
Reuter Eikon platform. Although the quotes, with dealers’ identity, is streamed on the 
Thomson Reuter Eikon platform, collecting this data in a historical format from this 
platform is not possible. However, the quote data can be downloaded as they arrive to the 
Thomson Reuter Eikon platform via its Excel add-in. This is the reason that the data used 
in this thesis spans merely through a part of the life span of this research. The quote data 
collection procedure consists of 4 sections, streaming the quotes in an Excel sheet, capturing 
the quotes and storing them in the temporary database, sorting and organising quotes into 





an intermediary database, validating and cleaning the quotes and storing them in the final 
database.  
In order to capture the stream of quotes data from the Thomson Reuter Eikon 
platform, the live stream of quotes for each currency pair is streamed in a separate sheet via 
the Thomson Reuter Eikon Excel add-in. Each quote then is download into a temporary 
database, as soon as it arrives. The reason for streaming each currency pair in a separate sheet 
is that the download event in each sheet is triggered by the arrival of a new quote. Since 
different currency pairs have different frequency of quote arrival, capturing their stream in 
separate sheets prevents capture of redundant and repetitive quotes. For each quote, the 
name and location of the disseminating dealer, ask price, bid price, and the timestamp of the 
quote accurate to a millisecond is captured. While capturing each quote, after each refresh, 
the new quote is sent to a Database Management Software (DBMS) to be saved in an 
intermediary table. At the end of each week, when the market is not active, the saved quotes 
in the intermediary table are sorted by their date and time of their dissemination and saved 
in the final table. 
3.4.2. Macroeconomic News Dataset Collection Procedure 
The macroeconomic news database is collected from the Bloomberg platform and 
includes three sub-datasets, macroeconomic news announcements, economists’ forecasts, 
and geographical information of economists and firms. The macroeconomic news 
announcements are retrieved from ECO (Economic Calendar) page and geographical 
information on economists and firms are collected from BIO page (People Profile) and each 
firm description page, respectively. These two datasets are collected manually, however, 
manual collection of economists’ forecast is extremely time consuming and because it 
requires repetition of 6 steps for 3,321 times, it might induce some errors and inaccuracies 
in the final dataset. In order to explain the collection of economists’ forecasts, the procedure 





for manual collection of economists’ forecasts for one macroeconomic news item will be 
explained.  
As explained, the list of macroeconomic news is collected from the ECO page for 
the U.K., the U.S., Eurozone member countries, and Japan. The collection of economists’ 
forecasts for each of the macroeconomic news in this list starts from the ECOS (Economist 
Estimate) page in Bloomberg. On the top right hand side of the page the intended 
macroeconomic news identifier (ticker) is entered. Then the start and end date of the existing 
economists’ forecasts is entered. Then the export option from the page is selected to export 
the obtained economists’ forecasts into an excel file. In the pop-up excel export page, the 
option for downloading all the available economists’ forecasts is selected and the file is 
downloaded. The excel file downloaded regarding the macroeconomic news includes the 
name of the ticker, name of the economist and his/her firm, date of the forecast release, and 
the forecasts’ value18. The obtained excel file is transposed19 and imported into the DBMS. 
The automation of the economists’ forecasts download process, explained above, follows 
the same procedure, while the process is done by software developed for this research.  
3.5. The Quote Dataset Description and Summary Statistics 
3.5.1. Quote Dissemination 
The Quote Dataset includes quotes from EUR/GBP, EUR/JPY, EUR/USD, 
GBP/JPY, GBP/USD, and USD/JPY currency pairs. These six currency pairs are 
constructed from Euro (EUR), British Pound (GBP), U.S. Dollar (USD), and Japanese Yen 
(JPY) that account for 77.7% of the overall $5.3 trillion a day turnover in the FX market 
                                                 
18 Economists’ forecasts for each macroeconomic news item is downloadable only in separate files. Therefore, 
overall there are 3,321 excel files, one for each macroeconomic news item. 
19 The excel file presents the data in column format that is not an adequate format for merging this data with 
macroeconomic news dataset.  





(BIS, 2013). Table 3.1 reports the summary statistics of the average number of quotes per 
minute for each currency pair. The data presented here excludes Saturdays and Sundays.  
[Table 3.1 Here] 
EUR/GBP and GBP/JPY have the lowest and highest average number of quotes 
per minute and also total number of quotes. Overall, there are 236 days from April 22nd 2013 
to March 27th, 2014, 286 including Saturdays and Sundays, and 98,860,278 quotes in the 
Quote Dataset with 53.51 quote per currency per minute, on average. In other words, on 
average almost 321 new quotes have disseminated in these six currency pairs, per minute. 
These statistics demonstrate the high frequency nature of this dataset and the FX market. 
Figure 3.1 visualises this data that is also summarised in table 3.1. Similar to table statistics, 
GBP/JPY always has the highest number of quotes per minute within the six currency pairs. 
Although, on average, EUR/GBP has the lowest number of quotes, between 08:00 and 15:00 
its quote frequency passes that of USD/JPY.  
Figure 3.1. Average Number of Quotes per Minute 
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Figure 3.1 illustrates the market activity at different times of the day. There is a similar 
pattern between all currency pairs that is a significant increase from 08:00 and a considerable 
drop after 16:30. These are exactly the U.K. (London Stock Exchange) equity market 
working hours. This shows the importance of the U.K’s role in the FX market. The Foreign 
Exchange Joint Standing Committee of the Bank of England (2014) reports the average daily 
turnover of the U.K. foreign exchange market in October 2013 was $2.236 trillion that is 42% 
of the FX market average daily turnover reported by BIS in 201320. There is another peak 
around 14:30 which is consistent with the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) opening time 
and a considerable drop after NYSE closing at 21:00. The interesting point regarding this 
figure is the spikes at the beginning of every hour specifically the one at 16:00. The spike at 
every hour might be due to the release of WM/R fix at every hour (World Market Company, 
2015) and the biggest spike at 16:00 is the 4’o clock WM/R fixing that is the one of the most 
important benchmarks in the FX market and is studied in chapter 6. Furthermore, while after 
20:00 there is a downward trend in non-Japanese Yen currency pairs, an opposite trend is 
observed in Japanese Yen currency pairs. This is consistent with the opening of the Japanese 
financial markets.  
3.5.2. Dealers and their Geographical Distribution 
This section explains the geographical distribution of dealers and how they are spread 
around the world. In this thesis every dealer-location is identified as a separate market maker 
based on their name and location. For instance, the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) that is 
active in London and New York, each of its trading branches is identified as a distinct dealer. 
For each currency pair information on the number of dealers, locations, and dealer-locations 
                                                 
20 London’s traditional dominance in FX grew out of the United Kingdom’s worldwide economic dominance 
in the nineteenth century. It remains secure at the beginning of the twenty-first century because of its 
geographic location: London’s morning session overlaps with Asian trading and its afternoon session overlaps 
with New York trading. (King et al., 2011) 





are presented separately. The statistics presented here help to understand the global 
dispersion and decentralised nature of the FX market. 
 [Table 3.2 Here] 
Table 3.2 demonstrates the geographical dispersion of dealers in each currency pair. 
EUR/USD and GBP/USD currency pairs have the highest number of dealers’ concentration 
who are active in all six continents21. The lowest concentration of dealers and geographical 
dispersion is in the EUR/GBP currency pair, with only 44 dealer-locations in 22 countries. 
The highest concentration of dealer-locations is in Europe and Asia where 80% of market 
makers are located, while merely 8% of the market makers are located in South America, 
Africa, and Australia. Overall, in the Quote Dataset, there are 94 dealers active in 49 cities 
and 44 countries, from all the six continents, forming 109 dealer-locations. Since these six 
currency pairs are constructed from the four most traded currencies in the world, it should 
not come as a surprise that dealers all over the world are actively trading. In Africa, Asia, 
Europe, North and South America dealers are active in 2, 15, 21, 2, and 2 countries, 
respectively. 
The question that arises here is whether the quote distribution follows the same 
pattern of geographical dispersion. The last row of table 3.3 shows the average number of 
quotes per dealer in each continent. Table 3.3 shows that although the number of dealers in 
Europe is almost 5 times more than that of North America, dealers in Europe have 
disseminated almost 2 times more quote than dealers in North America. Dealers in North 
America, on average, have the highest quoting frequency followed by dealers in Africa and 
Europe. Based on information in tables 3.3 and 3.2 it is concluded that the quoting quantity 
is not perfectly correlated with the number of dealers. In other words, different dealers 
                                                 
21 In table 3.2, GFX (Global Foreign Exchange) is the locations code used by Thomson Reuter Eikon that 
refers to dealers who disseminate their quotes from multiple locations. 





exhibit different quoting frequency and sheer number of dealers cannot be used as the proxy 
for quantifying quote quantity.  
[Table 3.3 Here] 
3.6. Conclusion 
This chapter provided an over view of the data that is used in this thesis. It introduced 
the FX market and its characteristics, and explained the decentralised nature of the FX 
market and how this feature induces difficulties in collecting data. In order to address this 
issue, a unique quote dataset from the Thomson Reuter Eikon platform was collected. The 
main features of this dataset is that it included the identity and location of dealers and was 
accurate to milliseconds. These two features make this dataset an adequate data for studying 
the impact of high frequency trading on the FX market. The inclusion of identification and 
location of dealers in the Quote Dataset allows for the close observation of individual market 
participants on the price discovery process in the FX market.  
One of the contributions of this thesis to the market microstructure field is the 
construction of the Quote Dataset that allows the studying of the constantly changing FX 
market. Such a comprehensive database of this scale has never been used in any academic 
research. The last known similar dataset (much smaller in size) is the HFDF93, which has 
been used in academic research for the past two decades. HFDF93 contains data in three 
currency pairs, USD/DEM, USD/JPY, and DEM-JPY from 1992 to 1993 - see Peiers 
(1997); Herbst et al., (1997); Hafner (1998); Jong, et al (2001); Franke et al., (2004); Wu 






Table 3.1. Summary statistics of Number of Quotes per Minute 
This table reports the summary statistics of the captured quotes in the Quote Dataset per minute for each currency pair. Column N reports the number of minutes and the remaining statistics 
include the minimum (Min), first quartile (Q1), median, mean, third quartile (Q3), maximum (Max), and standard deviation (S.D.) for each currency pair per day. These statistics are calculated 
based on the average number of quotes in each minute from 00:0022 to 23:59. 
 
Currency N Total Min Q1 Median Mean Q3 Max S.D. 
EUR/GBP 1440 12,245,621 17.15 25.33 33.27 39.84 57.00 76.73 15.64 
EUR/JPY 1440 16,795,194 14.48 41.74 48.61 54.34 69.84 82.77 15.26 
EUR/USD 1440 15,593,208 25.91 34.31 46.29 50.70 67.17 87.31 16.49 
GBP/JPY 1440 22,340,181 20.66 57.71 65.81 72.72 90.62 104.99 17.96 
GBP/USD 1440 17,966,522 24.20 39.28 55.65 58.15 76.93 92.13 17.91 
USD/JPY 1440 13,919,552 17.18 38.19 42.66 45.31 53.32 76.75 10.18 
Total 8640 98,860,278 14.48 38.34 51.70 53.51 67.17 104.99 18.93 
 
                                                 





Table 3.2 Geographical Distribution of Dealers  
This table shows where dealers in each currency are located and illustrates their geographical dispersion. Column Dealer shows the distinct number of dealers in a currency pair without 
considering their location. Columns city and country depict the distinct number of cities and countries that dealers in each country are located in, respectively. Column Dealer-Location shows 
the total number of dealers identified based on their name and location. The rest of the columns show the name of the continents and total number of dealer-locations in those continents. 
GFX is the location code used by Thomson Reuter Eikon that refers to dealers who disseminate their quotes from multiple locations. 
 
Currency Dealer City Country 
Dealer –  
Location 





EUR/GBP 41 24 22 44 1 0 3 34 3 3 0 
EUR/JPY 46 25 23 50 0 7 2 34 3 4 0 
EUR/USD 77 45 42 88 2 26 3 42 4 9 2 
GBP/JPY 46 25 23 50 0 7 2 34 3 4 0 
GBP/USD 65 37 34 72 2 22 3 32 4 8 1 
USD/JPY 60 30 33 69 1 28 3 26 4 7 0 








Table 3.3 Geographical Distribution of Quotes 
This table depicts the geographical distribution of quotes in each continent for all the six currency pairs. Each column shows the name of the continent and the total number of quotes 
disseminated from that continent. The last row, average per dealer, shows the average number of quotes per dealer in each continent. 
 





EUR/GBP 0 37,823 110,270 9,011,184 57,754 3,028,590 0 
EUR/JPY 0 688,607 75,898 10,770,303 45,208 5,215,178 0 
EUR/USD 29,542 2,830,577 61,172 8,649,319 114,951 3,905,776 1,871 
GBP/JPY 0 927,621 97,013 13,943,370 55,772 7,316,405 0 
GBP/USD 3,572,450 2,173,100 67,660 7,457,973 48,070 4,620,395 26,874 
USD/JPY 171 2,731,906 73,086 6,830,225 12,560 4,271,604 0 
Total 3,602,163 9,389,634 485,099 56,662,374 334,315 28,357,948 28,745 
Average per Dealer 1,200,721 253,774 121,275 1,133,247 83,579 3,150,883 14,373 













The development of the financial markets is deeply influenced by and reliant on 
innovations in information technology. Over the past three decades high frequency traders 
(HFTs) have entered the financial markets and have been shown to improve price discovery 
and reduce transaction costs23. Nonetheless, there is heightened concern amongst financial 
organizations (see a survey of 700 organizations reviewed in the Financial Times by Shorter 
and Miller, 2014) and regulators that high frequency trading is having a negative effect on 
market efficiency24. Almost all the focus so far has been on equity and derivative markets as 
summarised in a congressional research report by Shorter and Miller (2014). However, the 
recent scandal concerning the manipulation of the FX benchmark rate has led to concerns 
as to the lack of regulatory oversight in the FX market. This chapter contributes to the extant 
debate on HFT and FX market regulation by analysing how the speed of dealers’ quotation 
updates affects their contribution to price discovery in the foreign exchange (FX) market.  
                                                 
23 Hagströmer and Norden (2013) conclude that HFTs mitigate intraday price volatility. Malinova et al., (2013) 
show that the reduction of HFTs’ message traffic causes an increase in spreads and an increase in the trading 
costs of retail and other traders. Brogaard et al., (2014) find that HFTs add to price discovery by trading in the 
direction of permanent price movement and in the opposite direction to transitory price errors. Chaboud et al., 
(2014) evaluate the effect of algorithm trades on quality measures of price discovery, autocorrelation and 
arbitrage opportunities in the FX market and find that algorithm trades add to price discovery quality. 
24 On June 5, 2014 the SEC’s chair Mary Jo White announced that in response to concerns over “aggressive, 
destabilizing trading strategies in vulnerable market conditions,” the agency was pursuing several HFT-related 
reform proposals, including requiring unregistered HFT firms to register with the agency (SEC, 2014). Similar 
requirement was introduced in Europe through the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II (MiFID II) 
in 2014. Firms will have to become authorised to continue to trade using a HFT technique. 





To examine the effect of speed on price discovery in the FX market, a subset of the 
Quote Dataset that was introduced in chapter 3 is used in this chapter. Overall, there are 
53,702,925 quotes between April 23, 2013 and March 11, 2014 from 92 dealers that are active 
in 6 continents, 42 countries and 49 cities, which yield the total number of 104 dealer-
locations25. Such a unique dataset allows addressing the question of whether the quoting 
frequency (Speed) of market participants contributes to the price discovery process. Dealers’ 
contribution to the price discovery process is calculated by the Barclay and Warner (1993) 
Weighted Price Contribution (WPC) model. It captures the accumulated percentage price 
movement generated by a given dealer’s quotes to the overall price movement in the 
measured time horizons. Price discovery is studied within two time horizons, one minute 
and daily, to examine whether speed plays a similar role in the price discovery of different 
horizons. 
The daily horizon is used to proxy for long-term price discovery, whereas the minute 
horizon is used to proxy for short-term price discovery. The fundamental (long term) value 
of an asset is defined as the value of the asset in the distant future. Distant future refers to a 
time horizon where there is a considerable number of transaction and quote changes 
(Lehmann, 2002). Given the large volume of transactions in the foreign exchange market, a 
daily time horizon meets the criterion of an adequate time interval for examining long-term 
price discovery. Long-term value is different from short-term value by the noise imbedded 
in the short-term value (Harris, 2003, p 223). Therefore, even if markets process information 
quickly (“information efficiency”) in the short term, the processed information may not be 
directly related to fundamental (long term) values (Cunningham, 1994).  
                                                 
25 Since in this chapter is a subset of the quote dataset and includes only the days that there has been no 
interruption in data capture, 2 dealers and 5 dealer-locations are omitted from the original quote dataset due to 
the implementation of continuity condition of data capture. See footnote 16 for further discussion. 





While this chapter’s findings show that dealers using higher frequency quotes are 
more successful in predicting short-term price movements (contributing to short-term 
market price discovery), no relationship between the speed of dealers and their impact on 
long-term price discovery is found. Furthermore, it will be shown that this discrepancy in 
the role of speed in short and long-term price discovery is reconciled by the fact that higher 
speed quotations increase the volatility of the dealers’ intraday price discovery and, therefore, 
undermine their contribution to long-term price discovery. The main results are robust to 
further controls of dealers’ quoting behaviour, including net buy-sell intention and quote 
aggressiveness.  
The contribution of this chapter to the existing literature is that it offers, to the best 
of my knowledge, the first investigation of the effect of High Frequency Quoting (HFQ) on 
price discovery in the FX market. Building on the existing literature, this chapter’s findings, 
regarding the impact of market participants’ speed on price discovery, strongly support short-
termism in the FX markets, with dealers focusing more on short-term rather than long-term 
value (Harris, 2003 p.286). Froot et al’s, (1992), theoretical model suggests that short-term 
investors concentrate on short-time information and pay less attention to fundamentals. 
Market participants concentrate on short-term rather than fundamental information, distort 
the price discovery process and cause market overreaction (Menkoff, 2001). Zhang (2010) 
argues that the practice of focusing on the short-term rather than fundamental information 
makes markets less efficient. He finds HFTs hinder price discovery, confirming Vives’ (1995) 
findings that short-term investors could impair information efficiency. Therefore, the results 
highlight the fact that while high frequency activities (either trading or quotation) contribute 
to very short-term price discovery, this is not the case across the longer term. 
This chapter’s findings also contribute to the regulatory debate on HFT activities. 
While this chapter’s findings lend support to the use of technology as a means to improve 
the prediction of short time price movements, the lack of association between speed and 





longer term price discovery raises important concerns about the potential downside of 
increasing speed in the FX market. The implication of these findings suggests that the arms 
race in trading technology is potentially a social waste. While the first movers who invest in 
the technology would benefit from their investment, these ‘technological innovations’ in the 
trading industry do not produce social benefit as they do not enhance the key function of 
financial markets: long term information discovery. Furthermore, the finding of the strong 
association between quote speed and price discovery volatility provides support to the 
criticism that HFT could exacerbate market volatility as highlighted in Shorter and Miller 
(2014).  
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 explains attributes of the 
Quote Dataset. Section 4.3 presents the key definitions of price discovery and quotation 
speed measurements. Section 4.4 presents the findings regarding the impact of HFQ on price 
discovery and section 4.5 offers conclusions. 
4.2. Data  
This chapter’s sample period spans from April 23, 2013 until March 11, 2014 and 
includes quotes from the Thomson Reuters’ platform in six currency pairs: EUR/GBP, 
EUR/JPY, EUR/USD, GBP/JPY, GBP/USD, and USD/JPY. Each record contains the 
identity and location of the dealer, bid and ask prices, and the time of the quote dissemination 
accurate to the millisecond. The Quote Dataset contains 92 dealers, bank and non-banks, 
from 6 continents, 42 countries, and 49 cities. The initial dataset of 286 days was reduced to 
236 days after removing holidays, Saturdays, Sundays, and after removing the days with 
problems in capturing the data this number reduced to 115 days26.  
                                                 
26 The quote dataset is the capture of the live stream of data from the Thomson Reuters FX screen. Due to the 
live nature of data capture activity there are some days in the dataset that have not been captured completely. 
Following Evans and Lyons, (2008) the Quote Dataset includes only the days where there is no interruption in 
the data collection. This is important because the price discovery process is a continuous process and the goal 
is to observe the impact of every single quote on overall price discovery. In order to avoid any discrepancies in 





Overall, there are 53,702,925 quotes from the 104 dealer-locations in the six currency 
pairs. The data on dealers, their location and the currencies that they are active in, can be 
seen in Appendix I. The location Global Forex (GFX) in Appendix I, refers to Global Forex 
dealers who are active from multiple locations throughout the globe. Dealers in EUR/GBP, 
EUR/JPY, and GBP/JPY are active in Asia, Australia, Europe, and North America, whereas 
dealers in USD/JPY are active in Australia, Europe, and North America. Dealers in 
EUR/USD and GBP/USD are active across all the six continents. In addition, GFX dealers 
are active in all six currency pairs.  
In order to study the impact of dealers on the price discovery process the repetitive 
quotes are removed since they do not contain new pricing information (see Dacorogna et al., 
2001, p86)27. After controlling for repetitive quotes the dataset contains 39,250,175 quotes 
for all the six currency pairs.  
 Table 4.1 reports the descriptive statistics of the dataset. EUR/USD has the highest 
concentration of dealers and is the most globally spread traded currency pair, whereas 
GBP/JPY has the highest number of quotes. In terms of the return characteristics, during 
this period the GBP strengthened against all currencies while the Euro was the second 
strongest. On the opposite side, the U.S. is the weakest against all currencies and the JPY is 
the second weakest. Regarding volatility, the USD/JPY has the highest volatility while the 
EUR/GBP has the lowest.  
[Table 4.1 here] 
                                                 
the data, these days have been removed from the sample. In the remaining days from Monday to Thursday all 
the 1440 minutes and on Fridays all the 1320 minutes of market activity are captured. On Fridays, the FX 
market is active for only 22 hours, from 00:00 to 22:00, GMT time (Mancini et al., 2013). In addition, following 
Chen and Gau (2014) Saturdays and Sundays are also removed “to prevent the empirical analysis confounding 
by thin trading activities” (pp. 196). 
27 Repetitive quotes are the quotes disseminated by a dealer that have the same ask and bid prices as their 
previous quote. 






4.3.1. Contribution to Price Discovery 
In order to calculate each dealer’s contribution to price discovery, the Barclay and 
Warner (1993) WPC model is used. The intuition behind the method is to capture the 
proportion of contribution to price discovery in a given horizon by measuring the cumulated 
price movement that is accompanied by a dealer’s quote in relation to the total price 
movement in the measurement horizon. For example, Madureira and Underwood (2008) use 
this model to study the contribution of NASDAQ market makers to price discovery. For the 
formal definition of WPC, Cai et al. (2015) starting with the following: 
 

















𝑊ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 ∆𝑃𝑖 =  𝐿𝑛(𝑃𝑖) − 𝐿𝑛(𝑃𝑖−1)  
(1) 
Where 𝑃𝐷𝑗,𝑡 is the contribution of dealer j at time t, 𝑁𝑡  is the number of quotes 
disseminated by all dealers at time t. 𝐷𝑗  is a dummy variable equal to 1 if price 𝑃𝑖  is 
disseminated by dealer j and zero otherwise. T is the total number of periods in the whole 
sample. The first fraction on the right hand side measures the distortion or contribution of 
an agent to price discovery in a sub period. The second fraction weights the first fraction 
relative to the total price movement in the whole sample period. The reason for the weighting 
is because when the price movement of a given period (∑ ∆𝑃𝑖
𝑁𝑡
𝑖=1 ) is close to zero, it would 
inflate the value of the contribution measure in the first fraction. To mitigate this problem, 
following Barclay and Warner (1993) the price discovery is weighted by the absolute total 
cumulative price change (|∑ ∆𝑃𝑖
𝑁𝑡
𝑖=1 |).  
The price discovery across two distinctly different time horizons are examined: by 
the minute and daily. Given the high liquidity and fast pace of the FX market, the view is 





taken that a one-minute price movement is a measure of short-term price discovery and a 
daily price movement is a measure of ‘long-term’ price discovery.  
In addition, the price discovery in bid and ask prices are studied separately due to the 
following reasons. Stoll (1978) points out that dealers use asymmetric bid and ask quotes to 
maintain their target inventory level. Indeed, Bessembinder (1994) shows that dealers’ quotes 
are sensitive to their inventory holding cost. Hasbrouck (1995) points out it is useful to 
analyse the bid and ask separately in order to model the buy-initiated and sell-initiated traders. 
Hasbrouck (2007, p.46) also argues that bid and ask prices are not set symmetrically around 
the efficient price. Harris (2003, p.284) explains that though dealers quote on both sides, the 
ones who want to trade merely on one-side use asymmetric aggressive bid and ask quotes. 
More recent studies also provide evidence pointing out the importance of recognizing such 
an asymmetry. In equity market research, Pascual and Pascual-Fuster (2014) study 10 years 
of data for 84 listed companies and find that ask and bid quotes are not equally informative 
in the short-run. They conclude that any assumption on equal informativeness for ask and 
bid quotes is not supportable and the use of mid-point prices might lead to a significant loss 
of information concerning the price discovery process. In studying the FX market between 
2004 and 2005, Chen and Gau (2014) find bid and ask quotes make different contributions 
to price discovery in EUR/USD.  
4.3.2. Measuring Quotation Speed 
In order to capture the quoting frequency of dealers, Speed measure is constructed 
based on the tick frequency measure proposed by Guillaume et al., (1997). They define tick 
frequency as the number of quotes disseminated in a time horizon and suggest calculation 
of tick frequency disaggregated by banks and their locations. The main issue of this method 
is the assumption of equal activity time of market participants; dealers’ active time matters 
especially when the intention is to differentiate dealers who disseminate quotes at a much 





higher speed than others. Based on this assumption, two dealers who disseminated the same 
amount of quotes have the same tick frequency. For instance, assuming an extreme scenario 
that two dealers have disseminated a total 25 non-repetitive quotes in one-minute 
measurement period, then they would have the same tick-frequency. However, suppose 
further that one dealer has disseminated all quotes in 1 second and another dealer in 60 
seconds, the tick-frequency defined above fails to distinguish their difference in quotation 
speeds.  
This issue of tick frequency is addressed by embedding the activity time of a dealer 
in a time horizon, into its definition and to call this measure, Speed. Speed is defined as the 
number of quotes divided by the total activity time. Therefore, for any given minute, the 
speed of a dealer is defined as the average normalised number of quotes disseminated during 
a dealer’s active time and its unit of measurement is quotes per minute. The speed measure is 
intentionally designed to capture high-speed traders who may not be active for a long period. 
This measure is formulated as below,  
 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡 = {
60000
𝑆𝑖,𝑡
 × 𝑁{𝑥(τ𝑘)|τ𝑘  ∈ [𝑆𝑖,𝑡𝑠 , 𝑆𝑖,𝑡𝑓]}, 𝑁{𝑥(τ𝑘)} > 1
1, 𝑁{𝑥(τ𝑘)} = 1
  (2) 
 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑆𝑖,𝑡𝑓 − 𝑆𝑖,𝑡𝑠  (3) 
Where {𝜏𝑘} is the sequence of the tick recording times that is unequally spaced, 
𝑥(𝜏𝑘) is the price at time 𝜏𝑘. 𝑁({𝑥(𝜏𝑘)}) is the counting function that captures the number 
of quotes disseminated by dealer i at time 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 . Where 𝑆𝑖,𝑡  is the activity time, the time 
difference between the last and first quote disseminated by dealer i, measured in milliseconds, 
in minute t. 𝑆𝑖,𝑡𝑓  and 𝑆𝑖,𝑡𝑠 are the clock time of the last and first quotes disseminated by dealer 
i in the minute t, respectively. The multiplier of 60,000 is used to normalise the speed measure 





to per minute28. Since 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 of the speed formula will be zero for the dealers with merely one 
quote in a minute, in order to include these observations in the analysis, their activity time as 
the whole one minute, 60000 milliseconds, is assumed that yields the speed of 1 for these 
dealers in those minutes. In a sense, the speed measures capture the upper limit of the 
number of quotes (maximum number of quotes) a dealer could have disseminated, should 
the dealer have been active for the whole one minute.  
4.3.3. Additional Quotation Characteristics  
In order to analyse the impact of dealers’ speed on price discovery, other 
characteristics that need to be controlled for are discussed below.  
4.3.3.1. Dealers’ Observable Intention 
 A dealer must accommodate the random arrival of buy and sell orders that are 
sensitive to his posted quotes, in a way to maintain his/her inventory target level. As a result, 
after every trade, the dealer updates his/her beliefs and posts new quotes (Hasbrouck, 2007, 
p.47). Dealers actively control their inventory by setting prices to induce movement toward 
desired inventory levels (Madhavan and Smidt, 1993). In the event of excess inventory, a 
dealer increases his/her ask and bid prices and vice versa in the case of inventory shortage 
(Manaster and Mann, 1996). A dealer’s intention to long or short the base currency is tried 
to be deduced from the quote updates. Dealers can update their quotes in a number of 
combinations that affect only bid, ask or both sides. Table 4.2 reports the eight possible 
combinations of a dealer’s actions in comparison with his/her latest quotes.  
A dealer’s intention is indicated by B and S for Buying and Selling the base currency, 
respectively. Dealers use the strategy of keeping the ask or bid price static and moving the 
other, when they want only one side of their quotes to be hit (Harris, 2003, p280). For 
                                                 
28 There are 60,000 milliseconds in 1 minute 





example, with an intention to buy, a dealer can post a more competitive bid (B↑) and/or a 
less competitive ask (A↑) and vice versa (Muller and Sgier, 1992 as cited in Guillaume et al., 
1997). 
[Table 4.2 here] 
Love and Payne (2008) show that differentiating buyer-initiated from seller-initiated 
trading interest explains price variations better than the difference between buy and sell 
quantities. Following their method, a buy-sell trading interest measure is constructed by 
subtracting the number of sell-initiated quotes from buy-initiated quotes for a given dealer 
in the time horizon.  
 𝐵𝑆𝑗,𝑡 =  ∑  (𝐷𝐵𝑖
𝑁𝑄𝑗,𝑡
𝑖=2
−  𝐷𝑆𝑖) 
(4) 
Where BSj,t is the net buy-sell interests for dealer j at time t, DB and DS are dummy 
variables equal to one when the intention of the dealer for disseminating quote i is to buy 
and sell the base currency, respectively. The reason that the sigma index starts at 2 is that in 
order to calculate a dealer’s intention, quote i should be compared to quote i-1, hence, no 
intention can be interpreted from a dealer’s first quote in a day. A positive sign of BS shows 
that the dealer was an intended net buyer in time t and a negative sign means the dealer was 
an intended net seller in time t.  
In Table 4.2, W represents the time that a dealer widens his/her spread by reducing 
the bid and increasing the ask price. This is mainly driven by the increased uncertainty of the 
market’s condition or any other reason that the dealer is not willing to trade. N represents 
that the dealer wants to return to the market and signals this to their customers by narrowing 
their bid-ask spread. Although there is no direct observable intention from these two types 
of quotes, they do capture the dealer’s willingness to do business. Therefore, a measure is 
constructed by counting the net number of times the dealer increases the bid-ask spread as  





 𝑊𝑁𝑗,𝑡 =  ∑  (𝐷𝑊𝑖
𝑁𝑄𝑗,𝑡
𝑖=2
−  𝐷𝑁𝑖) 
(5) 
Where WNj,t is the net number of times that the dealer j increases his bid-ask spread 
at time t, DN and DW are dummy variables equal to one when the dealer increases or decreases 
the spread in quote i, respectively. A higher value for this measure, the less willing is the 
dealer to provide liquidity.  
4.3.3.2. Quote Aggressiveness Measure 
 When dealers update their quotes, in addition to the direction, they also have a 
choice of the size of the changes. A larger size in the change of their quotes signifies a more 
aggressive attitude in their quotation. Therefore, quotation aggressiveness is quantified by 
the portion of a dealer’s quotes that has been changed by more than one pip with the 
exception of EUR/JPY and GBP/JPY for which two and three pips are used, respectively. 
These thresholds of aggressiveness are chosen because, on average, more than 70% of ask 
and bid price movements are realised within these price movements.  
Accordingly, a dealer’s quotation update, the change in the price of the latest quote 
in comparison to the previous quote, is categorised into five groups: very negative, negative, 
unchanged, positive and very positive. The reason that ask or bid prices may be unchanged 
is that the dealer only updates one side of his/her quotes.  
 𝑝𝑣𝑝𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑁({𝛥𝑝𝑖,𝑡 | 𝛥𝑝𝑖,𝑡 > 𝐴𝐺𝑇}) (6) 
 𝑝𝑣𝑛𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑁({𝛥𝑝𝑖,𝑡 | 𝛥𝑝𝑖,𝑡 < 𝐴𝐺𝑇 × −1}) (7) 
 𝑊ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝛥𝑝𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑝𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1 (8) 
Where 𝑝𝑣𝑝𝑖,𝑡  and 𝑝𝑣𝑛𝑖,𝑡  are the number of times that dealer i has increased and 
decreased his/her quotes more than aggressiveness, respectively. For ask and bid p is replaced 





with a and b, respectively. N is the total number of quotes disseminated in time t and 𝐴𝐺𝑇 is 
the aggressiveness threshold. 𝑝𝑖,𝑡 is the ask or bid price disseminated by dealer i at time t. 
The point that should be mentioned here is that 𝛥𝑝𝑖,𝑡 is calculated continuously throughout 
the day and not every minute. In other words, in order to calculate each price change, 𝛥𝑝𝑖,𝑡, 
each price is compared to the previous price, from the beginning to the end of a day. The 
aggressiveness measure is defined separately for bid and ask, as follows: 
 𝐴𝐺𝐴𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 =  
𝑎𝑣𝑝 𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑎𝑣𝑛 𝑖,𝑡
𝑁{𝑥(τ𝑘)|τ𝑘  ∈ [𝑆𝑖,𝑡𝑠 , 𝑆𝑖,𝑡𝑓]}
 (9) 
 𝐴𝐺𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡 =  
𝑏𝑣𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏𝑣𝑛𝑖,𝑡
𝑁{𝑥(τ𝑘)|τ𝑘  ∈ [𝑆𝑖,𝑡𝑠 , 𝑆𝑖,𝑡𝑓]}
 (10) 
Where AGAsk and AGBid are the aggressiveness measures of ask and bid of dealer i in 
time t, respectively. The higher the measure, the more aggressive the dealer is in moving 
his/her quotes. 
4.4. Results and Discussion 
In this section, the results of this chapter’s empirical analysis on the impact of speed 
on price discovery are presented.  
4.4.1. Summary Statistics 
In this section, the basic summary statistics of the speed and other quoting 
characteristic measures is reported. For the speed measure, Table 4.3 Panel A reports the 
summary statistics by dealer-minute. It illustrates a similarity in the mean and standard 
deviation of all currency pairs, except for the GBP/JPY, demonstrating the analogousness 
of market participants’ speed characteristic. On average, the number of quotations for dealers 
in one minute is approximately 5 to 6 quotes. There are large extremes in dealer-minutes as 





shown in the Max column. These speeds lend support to the high frequency nature of dealers 
in the FX market. 
  When speed measures are considered at the dealer level, in Panel B, the 
different speed characteristic of market participants in GBP/JPY is observable via their 
average speed of 46.1 quotes per minute in comparison to those of other currency pairs 
varying between 4.76 and 5.69. These figures report a significantly higher speed of GBP/JPY 
market participants than those of other currency pairs29 . Furthermore, even the lowest 
average speed of 4.76 quotes per minute by a dealer, in EUR/GBP, considering the number 
of dealers, 42, in that currency pair, is further evidence of the high frequency nature of the 
currency market. The fastest Dealers’ average speed in all currency pairs varies from 16 up 
to 344 quotes per minute, demonstrated by the maximum column in Table 4.3.  
[Table 4.3 here] 
The nature of the aggressive quoting behaviour among market participants is 
illustrated in Table 4.4. The use of aggressive quoting averages from 19% to 33% across the 
different currency pairs. Although there is a consonant homogeny between the bid and ask 
aggressive quoting of all currency pairs, GBP/JPY, again, is an exception, with a six 
percentage difference between bid and ask aggressive quoting, re-demonstrating the 
difference in the nature of this currency pair in the quoting characteristics of its market 
participants.  
[Table 4.4 here] 
In terms of dealers’ buy-sell intention of trades, Table 4.5 reports the proportions of 
quote updates, on currency level, in each of the eight categories of bid and ask tick 
                                                 
29 This difference in market participants’ speed characteristic is due to the extremely active and volatile nature 
of GBP/JPY currency pair - in some cases its price can change up to 350 pips in a single trading day (FXDD, 
2013). 





movement, defined in Table 4.2. With the exception of GBP/JPY, the most frequent 
techniques of price movement are those with simultaneous and unidirectional movements 
of ask and bid (i.e. A↑B↑ and A↓B↓ cells). Using these classifications, measure of Buy–Sell 
intention (BS) can be further derived. Table 4.6, panel A, shows that the majority of the 
differences between buy and sell intended quotes are negligible. Zero medians and 
symmetries in the first and third quartiles are consistent with the overall symmetrical pattern 
of the B and S cells in Table 4.5. This suggests that, in general, dealers are interested in market 
making and completing their round trip. However, there are some extreme values at the two 
tails of the distribution, demonstrated by maximum and minimum values. These extreme 
values are caused by large imbalances in buy-sell orders and consequently push the prices up 
or down, thus are of great prominence in the price discovery process. In some cases, large 
imbalances in buy-sell orders are driven by news such as macroeconomic news 
announcement30. The relationship between these order imbalances and price discovery will 
help with understanding how dealers adjust them to facilitate price discovery.  
[Tables 4.5 and 4.6 here] 
Another set of statistics that can be derived from the Table 4.5 classification is the 
net number of times that dealers widen their spreads (WN), measured by subtraction of W 
cell value from N cell value. The results in Table 4.6 panel B depict that the imbalance 
between W and N only exists in less than half of the dealer-minute observations (the 
imbalance measure is zero in the first and third quartiles). A lower range and variance in 
panel B, than those in panel A, in conjunction with the results in Table 4.5, is further evidence 
                                                 
30 Market and stock returns are significantly affected by order imbalance size (Chordia et al., 2002; Chan and 
Fong, 2000; Blume Et al., 1989). Berger et al., (2008) report a substantial association between interdealer order 
flow and exchange rate returns at horizons ranging from 1 min to two weeks. Evans and Lyons (2008) argue 
that macroeconomic news can affect currency prices directly and indirectly via order flow. They find that 
macroeconomic news announcements account for 30% of daily price movements.  





of the dominance of Buy and Sell initiated quotes over widening and narrowing spread 
quotes.  
4.4.2. Regression Analysis  
 In this section, the effect of dealers’ speed on their contribution to price discovery 
after controlling for other quotation characteristics is evaluated with the following 
specification.  
PD𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐴𝐺𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝐺𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐵𝑆𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽5𝑊𝑁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀  
(11) 
Where PDi,t is the price discovery contribution of dealer i in time t, Speedi,t, AGi,t, 
BSi,t, WNi,t, and ATi,t are quote speed measure, measure of aggressiveness, net buying 
intention, net number of times that the dealer increased his/her spread and activity time 
(measured in seconds) of dealer i at time t, respectively. For ask and bid minute regressions, 
models 1 and 2 (Ask-Minute and Bid-Minute models) in table 4.7, each of these variables are 
calculated for each dealer in each minute31, however for bid and ask daily regressions, models 
3 and 4 (Ask-Day and Bid-Day models) in table 4.7, independent variables, for each dealer, 
are calculated as the daily average of minute independent variables32. . How often and how 
much a quote changes are the two choices that dealers make that will affect how quick and 
aggressive their quote will be. In this chapter’s analysis, the possible interaction between these 
two measures is further examined (Speed and AG).  
                                                 
31 This means that on a minute basis independent variables vary from one minute to another and consequently 
the same holds for independent variables on a daily basis. 
32 The correlation matrixes of model 11 for ask and bid price discovery on a minute and daily basis are reported 
in tables 4.10 and 4.11, respectively. The magnitude of correlation coefficients in table 4.11 shows that regarding 
models 3 and 4 in table 4.7 there are no concerns regarding the existence of multicollinearity and its impact on 
the results except the correlation between AT and BS. In order to address this issue, first, the Variance Inflation 
Factor (VIF) of models 3 and 4 is examined and the correlation between AT and BS does not raise any issue 
in this sense. Second, models 3 and 4 are re-run once without AT, once without BS and the results are consistent 
with the results reported for models 3 and 4 in table 4.7. However, the results are not reported here.  





In model (11), it is recognised that not all dealers are homogenous specifically in 
relation to their size that might affect their speed and order flow. However, it is not possible 
to control for dealers’ size, since many of the dealers in the Quote Dataset are private 
companies and no information could be collected regarding their sizes. However, this 
concern is addressed in model (11) by controlling for BS (as the proxy for order flow) and 
Speed.  
The other point that should be mentioned here is regarding the use of panel data for 
model (11). Although the data structure is similar to that of a panel data, due to two 
limitations panel data analysis cannot be used here. First, the data does not meet the 
condition of a panel data structure that requires the same dealer to be present in most of the 
time periods (Pindado, 2014). The structure of the data is extremely unbalanced, in the sense 
that the presence of dealers in each time period is neither continuous nor consistent. For 
instance, a dealer might be active for a while and then stop his activity for a period and then 
continue his trading activity again and so on. Second, the other element of the data that is 
not consistent with panel data structure is the number of dealers and time periods. For the 
GMM model to work N (number of dealers) should be large relative to T (time) (Smith and 
Fuertes, 2016), while it is the opposite in this case. For EUR/GBP, EUR/JPY, EUR/USD, 
GBP/JPY, GBP/USD, and USD/JPY there are 42, 48, 81, 48, 66, and 63 dealer-locations 
in this chapter’s quote dataset, respectively. While the number of time periods for these 
currency pairs and dealer-locations are 162412, 162917, 162669, 162683, 162919, and 162550, 
respectively. Due to these two reasons the use of panel data for model (11) is not appropriate.  
Table 4.7 presents the pool regression results for all currencies and Table 4.8 reports 
the breakdown of each currency.33 For the short-term price discovery, Models 1 and 2 (Ask-
                                                 
33 As the basic statistics show the average statistics of speed varies significantly from one currency to another. 
In order to ensure comparability in the pool regressions, the speed measure is normalised in each currency pair 
by dividing each observation’s speed to the average speed of the currency pair, realised by averaging the speed 





Minute and Bid-Minute models) in table 4.7 demonstrate that speeds are significantly and 
positively associated with the contribution to price discovery. This finding is consistent with 
the findings in the HFT literature regarding equity (Brogaard et al., 2014 and algorithmic 
trading in the FX markets Chaboud et al., 2014) that HFT can predict short-term price 
movements more than the other types of dealers.  
Interestingly, it shows that an increase in aggressive quoting reduces dealers’ 
contribution to price discovery. In other words, quotes with a larger tick size are normally in 
the wrong direction in terms of the overall price movement within a minute time horizon. 
Furthermore, the coefficients for the interaction term between Speed and AG show that 
when speed is combined with aggressive quotes it reduces the contribution to price 
discovery. Therefore, it further confirms the negative effect of aggressiveness on short-term 
price discovery. 
[Table 4.7 Here] 
Regarding the other quotation characteristics, dealers’ net buying intentions have 
asymmetric effects on ask and bid price discovery. Specifically, dealers’ net buying intention 
reduces their quotes’ contributions to the ask (sell) price discovery, while it increases their 
contributions to the bid (buy) price discovery. In other words, this finding suggests that 
dealers focus on one side of the market and make a better price discovery contribution on 
the side they intended to do business with.  
In general, quotations that increase spreads make the quotes less informative; this is 
shown by the negative signs for the WN coefficients, it is significant in the case of the ask 
regression (Model 1). This is consistent with dealers widening their spreads to reflect 
uncertainty in the market (Mcinish and Wood, 1992). Finally, the regression controls for the 
                                                 
of all market participants in a currency pair. Doing so makes different currency pairs’ speed comparable by 
converting the mean speed of each currency pair to one. 





length of time that a dealer is active during those minutes and shows that the activity time’s 
coefficients are positive and highly significant.  
Now the price discovery in the longer term with a daily measure of price discovery 
in Models 3 and 4 (Ask-Day and Bid-Day models) are presented. In this regression, the 
dependent variables are dealers’ contribution to daily price discovery. For the independent 
variables, the daily average of the minute measures are used to capture dealers’ quotation 
characteristics34. Table 4.7 shows that dealers’ quotation characteristics bear little relationship 
with their contribution to the long-term price discovery. In general, none of the quoting 
characteristics and speed coefficients are statistically significant, thus, it is concluded that 
there is no relationship between the speed of a market participant and his/her contribution 
to the long-term price discovery of a currency pair. Overall, the regression analysis 
demonstrates that dealers with higher quotation speeds contribute significantly to the short-
term price discovery but not to the long-term price discovery.  
In order to explore the potential differences among the currency pairs, separate 
regressions for each currency pair is run and reported in Table 4.8 (minute data).35 In Table 
4.8, the same model as in Table 4.7 is estimated for each currency. In this context, the speed 
measure is the raw unstandardized measure. It can be seen that the main results hold for all 
currency pairs; specifically, the speed coefficients are all positive and significant.  
[Table 4.8 Here] 
                                                 
34 This construction of the daily variable is to maintain comparability of dealers’ characteristics across the 
minute and daily regressions. In other words, a dealer that is characterised as HFQ in minute data will also be 
placed in a similar relative position in terms of quote speed. For other quotation characteristics such as 
aggressiveness, buy intention and increase in spread (WN), calculating them on a daily basis is also explored. 
The difference of these measures to the minute average is that it takes a whole day of data as a session of 
calculation. Some of the intraday differences will be smoothed out in these calculations. Nevertheless, the daily 
analysis with variables that are constructed at a daily level is run and the main results are consistent with the 
finding presented here.  
35 Since the daily regression results for each currency are consistent with the pool regression in table 4.7, they 
are not reported.  





Overall, the finding of speed increasing the short-term contribution to price 
discovery is consistent with Brogaard et al., (2014) who show that HFT plays a role in price 
discovery across very short time intervals. However, it is found that a dealer’s speed does not 
play any role in longer-term price discovery, which contrasts with the Brogaard et al., (2014) 
finding regarding the positive role of HFTs in the fundamental price discovery in equity 
markets. This presents an interesting puzzle in terms of reconciling the role of speed in short 
and long-term price discovery; how a dealer with a high-speed quotation can positively 
contribute to minute price discovery but not to a daily overall price discovery? The answer 
lies in that the minute price movement is not always in line with the daily price movement. 
Therefore, correctly predicting movements by the minute will not automatically lead to a 
correct prediction of daily price movements. The high-speed dealer’s ability to predict a 
short-term price movement is likely to be transitional in the daily context and, therefore, 
higher speed dealing will be associated with higher price discovery volatility.  
[Table 4.9 Here] 
Table 4.9 reports the regression of the speed measure and intraday price discovery 
volatility. The volatility of price discovery is measured by the standard deviation of the 
minute price discovery measure for each dealer daily. The other variables are defined in a 
similar manner to the daily regression in Table 4.7. The results in Table 4.9 demonstrate a 
strong contrast to those in Table 4.7. It shows that dealers’ quoting characteristics affect the 
volatility of their contribution to price discovery. Higher speed dealers will have larger 
intraday volatility in their price discovery. It confirms that this increased volatility in the 
intraday price discovery could be the reason for the weak association between speed and 
longer-term price discovery. 





4.5. Conclusions  
This chapter studies the effect of speed on price discovery in the FX market. While 
there is a large amount of emerging literature on high frequency trading in equity markets, 
less attention has been given to the effect of increasing speed in the FX market. A unique 
dataset is utilised containing quotes from 92 dealers and 42 countries around the globe time 
stamped to a millisecond. Using the Weighted Price Contribution (WPC) model of Barclay 
and Warner (1993) the contribution of HFQs on price discovery is studied in the short-term 
(by the minute) and across longer-term horizons (daily), while controlling for their quoting 
behaviour. The findings demonstrate that an increase in a dealer’s speed is associated with 
an increase in their contribution to short-term price discovery, while speed does not play a 
role in longer-term price discovery.  
This study provides further evidence to the literature regarding the relationship 
between speed and price discovery in the context of the FX market. The finding of the overall 
lack of speed’s connection with longer-term price discovery echoes the concerns in the 
literature and by regulators regarding the high frequency traders’ negative potential impact 














Table 4.1 Dataset Descriptive Statistics 
This table reports the descriptive statistics of the Quote Dataset. The Dealer-location column depicts the 
number of active dealer-locations in each currency pair. The Number of Quotes column shows the number of 
non-repetitive quotes in each currency pair. The Countries and Cities columns report the number of countries 
and cities that a dealer in a respective currency pair are active in. Return Mean and Return Volatility are the 
average return and return volatility of each currency pair on a daily basis, respectively, throughout the whole 
sample period between April 22nd, 2013 and March 11th, 2014. These values are calculated by using mid-point 












EUR/GBP 42 4,368,448 18 24 -0.97 38.78 
EUR/JPY 48 6,678,068 20 25 4.35 59.30 
EUR/USD 81 5,903,200 36 42 2.63 40.89 
GBP/JPY 48 9,695,802 20 26 5.43 63.57 
GBP/USD 66 7,386,862 29 35 3.70 44.74 
USD/JPY 63 5,143,583 26 29 1.84 65.91 























Table 4.2 Observable Intention of a Dealer 
This table demonstrates how a dealer’s observable intention is calculated. In order to calculate this measure, 
every quote from a dealer is compared with their last quote. A=, A↓, and A↑, represent no, upward, and 
downward movement in the ask price, respectively, and B=, B↓, and B↑ are defined similarly for the bid price. 
Based on the movement of the dealer’s ask or bid price and following the table, the intention of the dealer is 
defined. B and S demonstrate whether the dealer’s intention is to buy or sell the base currency, respectively. W 
represents the time that the dealer increases his/her spread by reducing bid and increasing ask. N represents 
















B↑ B↓ B= 
A↑ B W B 
A↓ N S S 
A= B S  





Table 4.3 Speed Summary Statistics 
This table represents the summary statistics of speed by dealer-minute (Panel A) and by dealers’ average speed 
(Panel B) in each currency pair. Mean is the average of the average speed measured in the minute interval, Q1, 
median, and Q3 represent the first, second, and third quartiles of the average speed of dealers. STD is the 
standard deviation of the distribution and Obs is number of observations in each currency pair.  
 
Panel A. dealer-minute 
Currency Mean Min Q1 Median Q3 Max SD Obs 
EUR/GBP 5.5307 1 1 3.5232 6.0226 12000 49.7393 1,830,167 
EUR/JPY 5.7237 1 1 4.0917 6.3093 8000 32.4979 2,374,201 
EUR/USD 5.7051 1 1 3.7572 6.1000 12000 45.8481 2,370,469 
GBP/JPY 25.9290 1 2.9873 5.9653 9.6192 24000 131.0243 2,509,818 
GBP/USD 5.7064 1 1 4.0001 6.5271 4000 12.3898 2,386,649 
JPY/USD 5.4993 1 1 3.9650 6.0309 12000 43.3301 2,130,738 
Panel B. dealer average 
Currency Mean Min Q1 Median Q3 Max SD Obs 
EUR/GBP 4.7605 1 1.9323 3.5183 5.6376 27.0725 4.6206 42 
EUR/JPY 5.6938 1 1.9037 3.7281 5.7848 47.6894 7.9272 48 
EUR/USD 5.5309 1 1.6373 4.0899 7.8516 41.7500 5.9437 81 
GBP/JPY 46.1040 9.4998 16.9577 31.4674 56.7749 344.1269 52.8312 48 
GBP/USD 4.8180 1 1.5529 3.6427 7.0006 16.2247 4.0204 66 
USD/JPY 4.9503 1 1.2177 3.2597 6.5363 27.7658 5.0306 63 


















Table 4.4 Dealers’ Aggressiveness 
Panel A and B report the aggressiveness measure of ask and bid, respectively. It measures the proportion of 
quotes that move in steps that are larger than the aggressive thresholds (for EUR/GBP, EUR/USD, 
GBP/USD, and USD/JPY is 1 pip, for EUR/JPY and GBP/JPY are 2 and 3 pips, respectively). The table 
reports the summary statistics of dealer-minute observations for each currency. 
Panel A. Ask Aggressiveness 
Currency Mean Min Q1 Median Q3 Max STD Obs 
EUR/GBP 0.1957 0 0 0 0.3333 1 0.3492 1,830,167 
EUR/JPY 0.1963 0 0 0 0.3333 1 0.3406 2,374,201 
EUR/USD 0.2517 0 0 0 0.5000 1 0.3809 2,370,469 
GBP/JPY 0.2849 0 0 0.1667 0.5000 1 0.3380 2,509,818 
GBP/USD 0.3288 0 0 0.1111 0.5333 1 0.3958 2,386,649 
USD/JPY 0.2592 0 0 0 0.5000 1 0.3830 2,130,738 
Panel B. Bid Aggressiveness 
Currency Mean Min Q1 Median Q3 Max STD Obs 
EUR/GBP 0.1963 0 0 0 0.3333 1 0.3496 1,830,167 
EUR/JPY 0.1873 0 0 0 0.2857 1 0.3344 2,374,201 
EUR/USD 0.2462 0 0 0 0.5000 1 0.3782 2,370,469 
GBP/JPY 0.2262 0 0 0 0.4000 1 0.3166 2,509,818 
GBP/USD 0.3226 0 0 0.0435 0.5000 1 0.3950 2,386,649 









Table 4.5 Dealers’ Quoting Intention 
This table reports the mean of dealers quoting behaviour measures classified by the way they update their 
quotes. B and S demonstrate whether the dealer’s intention is to buy or sell the base currency, respectively. W 
represents the time that dealers increase their spreads by reducing bid and increasing ask. N represent the times 
that dealers reduce their spreads by reducing the ask price and increasing the bid price. The sample period is 





























































































































Table 4.6 Buy-Sell Intention and Widen Spread 
Buy intention is the net buying intention of the dealer calculated as the number of long minus the number of 
short quotations (B-S in Table 4.2 classifications). Widen spread is the number of times when dealers increase 




























Panel A. Buy-Sell Intention 
Currency Mean Min Q1 Median Q3 Max STD Obs 
EUR/GBP -0.0149 -23 -1 0 1 19 1.1701 1,830,167 
EUR/JPY -0.0106 -17 -1 0 1 18 1.4111 2,374,201 
EUR/USD -0.0039 -18 -1 0 1 18 1.3131 2,370,469 
GBP/JPY -0.0058 -13 -1 0 1 11 1.3131 2,509,818 
GBP/USD -0.0023 -17 -1 0 1 16 1.3560 2,386,649 
USD/JPY 0.0068 -15 -1 0 1 13 1.3415 2,130,738 
Panel B. Widen Spread 
Currency Mean Min Q1 Median Q3 Max STD Obs 
EUR/GBP 0.0040 -7 0 0 0 20 0.3051 1,830,167 
EUR/JPY -0.0008 -4 0 0 0 5 0.2676 2,374,201 
EUR/USD 0.0014 -4 0 0 0 4 0.2373 2,370,469 
GBP/JPY 0.0054 -8 0 0 0 7 0.7689 2,509,818 
GBP/USD 0.0003 -7 0 0 0 7 0.3791 2,386,649 
USD/JPY -0.0007 -4 0 0 0 4 0.2063 2,130,738 





Table 4.7 Speed Measure and Price Discovery across Short and Long Term 
Horizons 
This table reports the results of the following regression analyses: 
𝑃𝐷 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑 + 𝛽2𝐴𝐺 +  𝛽3𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑 ∗ 𝐴𝐺 + 𝛽4𝐵𝑆 + 𝛽5𝑊𝑁 + 𝛽6𝐴𝑇 + 𝜀 
Where PD is the price discovery measure for ask and bid; the price discovery measures are measured for each 
dealer in minute intervals for models 1 and 2 and in daily intervals for models 3 and 4. The pool regression for 
all six currency pairs is reported. Speed is the average speed of quotation update for a given dealer and is 
normalised by dividing by the average speed in each currency pair. BS is the net buying intention of the dealer; 
WN is net number of times when dealers increase their spread; AG is the measure of aggressiveness that 
measures the proportion of quotes that move in steps that are larger than the aggressive thresholds; AT is the 
active time measured in seconds. Number of observations reports the number of dealer-minutes or dealer days 
in the sample. All of these quotation characteristics are calculated in minute intervals and in the daily regression 
the average of all minute observations in a day for a given dealer is used. ***, ** and * indicate statistical 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
 
  Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
VARIABLES Ask-Minute Bid-Minute Ask-Day Bid-Day 
Speed 0.0001*** 0.000104*** 8.639 4.238 
 (6.96e-06) (7.21e-06) (28.08) (27.56) 
AG -0.00195*** -0.00250*** -111.4 22.03 
 (8.10e-05) (7.30e-05) (141.5) (86.30) 
Speed*AG -0.000118*** -0.000156*** -7.155 -5.974 
 (1.32e-05) (1.49e-05) (46.94) (46.15) 
BS -0.00176*** 0.00183*** -10.99 0.614 
 (3.94e-05) (3.47e-05) (47.19) (41.18) 
WN -0.000633*** 4.14e-05 -48.86 31.99 
 (9.37e-05) (8.51e-05) (137.9) (83.37) 
AT 0.000187*** 0.000161*** -0.784 -0.00341 
 (2.29e-06) (1.90e-06) (4.924) (2.466) 
Constant 0.00183*** 0.00258*** 68.09 -12.11 
 (4.41e-05) (3.93e-05) (81.31) (57.79) 
     
Observations 10,966,743 10,883,018 22,436 22,374 
R-squared 0.001 0.002   









Table 4.8 Speed Measure and Price Discovery of Ask and Bid on a Minute Basis by 
Currency 
This table reports the results of the following regression analyses: 
𝑃𝐷 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑 + 𝛽2𝐴𝐺 +  𝛽3𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑 ∗ 𝐴𝐺 + 𝛽4𝐵𝑆 + 𝛽5𝑊𝑁 + 𝛽6𝐴𝑇 + 𝜀 
where PD is the price discovery measure for ask and bid for Panels A and B respectively; Speed is the average 
speed of quotation updates for a given dealer; BS is the net buying intention of the dealer; WN is net number 
of times when dealers increase their spread; AG is the measure of aggressiveness that measures the proportion 
of quotes that move in steps that are larger than the aggressive thresholds; AT is the active time measured in 
seconds. Number of observations reports the number of dealer-minutes in the sample. ***, ** and * indicate 
statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
 
Panel A Ask Price Discovery 
Variables EUR/GBP EUR/JPY EUR/USD GBP/JPY GBP/USD USD/JPY 
Speed 9.63e-06*** 1.68e-05*** 1.90e-05*** 6.31e-06*** 0.000103*** 1.41e-05*** 
 
(1.92e-06) (2.53e-06) (2.82e-06) (4.01e-07) (7.60e-06) (2.44e-06) 
AG -0.00244*** -0.000490** -0.00345*** 0.000334** -0.00194*** -0.00168*** 
 
(0.000367) (0.000230) (0.000171) (0.000143) (0.000167) (0.000172) 
Speed*AG -9.98e-06** -8.41e-06 -3.35e-05*** -1.95e-07 -0.000462*** -1.60e-05*** 
 
(4.30e-06) (6.09e-06) (5.70e-06) (1.48e-06) (2.85e-05) (3.73e-06) 
BS -0.00439*** -0.000194* -0.00206*** -0.00104*** -0.000611*** -0.00402*** 
 
(0.000180) (9.99e-05) (0.000104) (5.04e-05) (8.45e-05) (8.59e-05) 
WN -0.00213*** -0.00167*** -0.00149*** -0.000180** -0.000819*** -0.00187*** 
 
(0.000792) (0.000432) (0.000319) (9.10e-05) (0.000262) (0.000368) 
AT 0.000243*** 0.000209*** 0.000197*** 0.000213*** 0.000127*** 0.000217*** 
 
(1.07e-05) (6.55e-06) (5.59e-06) (3.03e-06) (4.35e-06) (5.28e-06) 
Constant 0.00301*** -8.68e-05 0.00265*** -0.00115*** 0.00341*** 0.00212*** 
 
(0.000150) (0.000125) (9.40e-05) (7.23e-05) (9.98e-05) (9.83e-05) 
Observations 1,410,555 2,045,277 1,776,238 2,182,885 1,879,238 1,672,550 
R-squared 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.004 
Panel B. Bid Price Discovery 
Variables EUR/GBP EUR/JPY EUR/USD GBP/JPY GBP/USD USD/JPY 
Speed 7.89e-06*** 1.80e-05*** 1.94e-05*** 6.64e-06*** 8.94e-05*** 1.79e-05*** 
 
(1.84e-06) (2.82e-06) (2.69e-06) (4.06e-07) (6.83e-06) (3.11e-06) 
AG -0.00568*** -0.00109*** -0.00321*** -0.000942*** -0.00136*** -0.00225*** 
 
(0.000300) (0.000187) (0.000163) (0.000139) (0.000157) (0.000165) 
Speed*AG -1.58e-05*** -3.07e-5*** -2.18e-05*** -4.48e-06*** -0.000433*** -2.34e-05*** 
 
(4.30e-06) (6.85e-06) (5.52e-06) (1.54e-06) (2.75e-05) (5.12e-06) 
BS 0.00473*** 0.00150*** 0.00131*** 0.000451*** 0.000938*** 0.00367*** 
 
(0.000160) (7.82e-05) (9.75e-05) (4.37e-05) (7.89e-05) (7.97e-05) 
WN 0.00115* 0.00421*** -0.00172*** -0.000167** -0.000889*** -0.00191*** 
 
(0.000688) (0.000404) (0.000316) (8.14e-05) (0.000256) (0.000358) 
AT 0.000181*** 0.000139*** 0.000182*** 0.000210*** 0.000127*** 0.000197*** 
 
(8.51e-06) (4.81e-06) (4.92e-06) (2.71e-06) (4.04e-06) (4.83e-06) 
Constant 0.00496*** 0.00178*** 0.00288*** -0.000706*** 0.00327*** 0.00260*** 
 
(0.000124) (0.000101) (8.74e-05) (6.45e-05) (9.33e-05) (9.58e-05) 
Observations 1,407,722 2,016,780 1,765,786 2,163,922 1,859,611 1,669,197 
R-squared 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.004 





Table 4.9 Speed Measure and Intraday Price Discovery Volatility 
This table reports the results of the following regression analyses: 
𝑆𝐷𝑃𝐷 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑 + 𝛽2𝐴𝐺 +  𝛽3𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑 ∗ 𝐴𝐺 + 𝛽4𝐵𝑆 + 𝛽5𝑊𝑁 + 𝛽6𝐴𝑇 + 𝜀 
Where SDPD is the daily standard deviation of the price discovery measure at minutely interval for ask and 
bid. The pool regression for all six currency pairs is reported. Speed is the average speed of quotation update 
for a given dealer and is normalised via dividing by the average speed in each currency pair. BS is the net buying 
intention of the dealer; WN is net number of times when dealers increase their spread; AG is the measure of 
aggressiveness that measures the proportion of quotes that move in steps that are larger than the aggressive 
thresholds; AT is the active time measured in seconds. Number of observations reports the number of dealer 
days in the sample. All of these quotation characteristics are the average of all minute observations in a day for 
a given dealer. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Robust standard 
errors are reported in parentheses.  
 
   
Variables SD - PDA SD - PDB 
Speed 0.00866*** 0.00831*** 
 (0.00103) (0.000727) 
AG 0.0406*** 0.00713*** 
 (0.00414) (0.00168) 
Speed*AG -0.00891** -0.0133*** 
 (0.00398) (0.00131) 
BS 0.00703*** 0.0120*** 
 (0.000820) (0.000713) 
WN -0.0641*** -0.0321*** 
 (0.00266) (0.00156) 
AT 0.00277*** 0.00129*** 
 (7.92e-05) (4.22e-05) 
Constant 0.0192*** 0.0344*** 
 (0.00158) (0.000919) 
   
Observations 22,409 22,347 












Table 4.10 Correlation Matrix of Table 4.7 Regressions (Models 1 and 2) 
This table reports the correlation matrix of models 1 and 2 in table 4.7 to address the concerns regarding the 
existence of high correlations and possible consequent multicollinearity. The magnitude of correlation 
coefficients in table 4.10 shows that regarding models 1 and 2 in table 4.7 there are no concerns regarding the 
existence of multicollinearity and its impact on the results. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 
5% and 10% respectively. 
 
Panel A. Correlation Matrix from Model 1 in Table 4.7 
 
PDA Speed AG BS WN AT 
PDA 1 
     
Speed 0.0033*** 1 
    
AG -0.0096*** -0.0184*** 1 
   
BS -0.0196*** -0.0015*** 0.0004 1 
  
WN -0.002*** 0.0013*** 0.0041*** -0.0079*** 1 
 
AT 0.0306*** -0.0036*** -0.115*** -0.0062*** 0.0031*** 1 
Panel B. Correlation Matrix from Model 2 in Table 4.7 
 
PDB Speed AG BS WN AT 
PDB 1 
     
Speed 0.0035*** 1 
    
AG -0.0129*** -0.0205*** 1 
   
BS 0.0233*** -0.0017*** -0.0002 1 
  
WN 0 0.0016*** 0.0028*** -0.0098*** 1 
 




















Table 4.11 Correlation Matrix of Table 4.7 Regressions (Models 3 and 4) 
This table reports the correlation matrix of models 3 and 4 in table 4.7 to address the concerns regarding the 
existence of high correlations and possible consequent multicollinearity. The magnitude of correlation 
coefficients in table 4.11 shows that regarding models 3 and 4 in table 4.7 there are no concerns regarding the 
existence of multicollinearity and its impact on the results except the correlation between AT and BS. In order 
to address this issue, first the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) of models 3 and 4 is examined and the correlation 
between AT and BS does not raise any issue this sense. Second, the models 3 and 4 are re-run once without 
AT, once without BS and the results are consistent with results reported from models 3 and 4 in table 4.7. 
However, the results are not reported here. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively. 
 
Panel A. Correlation Matrix from Model 3 in Table 4.7 
 
PDA Speed AG BS WN AT 
PDA 1 
     
Speed 0.0016 1 
    
AG -0.0044 -0.1647*** 1 
   
BS -0.0021 0.2761*** -0.4052*** 1 
  
WN -0.0052 0.065*** -0.0431*** 0.1943*** 1 
 
AT -0.0028 0.2054*** -0.4857*** 0.7138*** 0.4524*** 1 
Panel B. Correlation Matrix from Model 4 in Table 4.7 
 
PDB Speed AG BS WN AT 
PDB 1 
     
Speed 0.0009 1 
    
AG 0.0003 -0.1637*** 1 
   
BS 0.0007 0.2754*** -0.4043*** 1 
  
WN 0.0029 0.0654*** -0.0434*** 0.1953*** 1 
 

















This table depicts the active dealers in each continent and the currency pair that they are active in. A blank cell in front of 
each dealer’s name means the dealer is not active in the respective currency pair. Check mark in the cells in front of a 
dealer’s name shows that the dealer is active in the respective currency pair. The location GFX refers to Global Forex and 
is used for the dealers who conduct their market activities from multiple location throughout the globe. 
Panel A. Active Dealers in Africa 
Name Country City €/£ €/¥ €/$ £/¥ £/$ $/¥ 
ABSA BANK SOUTH AFRICA JOHANNESBURG 
  
√ 
   
NEDBANK SOUTH AFRICA JOHANNESBURG 




Panel B. Active Dealers in Asia 
Name Country City €/£ €/¥ €/$ £/¥ £/$ $/¥ 


















AM BANK MALAYSIA KUALA LUMPUR 
     
√ 

















BANK OF CHINA 
INTERNATIONAL LTD 





BANK OF COMMUNICATION CHINA SHANGHAI √ √ 
 
√ √ √ 




√ √ √ √ √ 
BANK OF TOKYO-MITSUBISHI 
UFJ 
MALAYSIA KUALA LUMPUR 
     
√ 










HONG KONG HONG KONG 
    
√ √ 
DBS BANK HONG KONG HONG KONG   √   √ 
ESKAN BANK BAHRAIN MANAMA 
     
√ 
INDUSTRIAL AND 
COMMERCIAL BANK OF 
CHINA 





ING BANK TURKEY ISTANBUL 
    
√ 
 





KUWAIT FINANCE HOUSE KUWAIT SAFAT 
    
√ √ 
MIZUHO CORPORATE BANK SINGAPORE SINGAPORE 
 
√ √ √ 
 
√ 
MIZUHO CORPORATE BANK HONG KONG HONG KONG 
 
√ √ √ 
 
√ 


























NORTHERN TRUST SINGAPORE SINGAPORE 
  
√ 
   





PROMSVYAZ BANK RUSSIA MOSCOW 
  
√ 
   
QATAR ISLAMIC BANK QATAR DOHA 
  
√ 










STANDARD CHARTED BANK MALAYSIA KUALA LUMPUR 
     
√ 
TOKYO FOREX JAPAN TOKYO 
 
















YAPI KREDI BANK TURKEY ISTANBUL 
    
√ 
 
Panel C. Active Dealers in Australia 
Name Country City €/£ €/¥ €/$ £/¥ £/$ $/¥ 
LLOYDS BANK AUSTRALIA SYDNEY √ 
     
NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK AUSTRALIA MELBOURNE √ √ √ √ √ √ 
WESTPAC BANK AUSTRALIA SYDNEY √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Panel D. Active Dealers in Europe 
Name Country City €/£ €/¥ €/$ £/¥ £/$ $/¥ 
ALLIED IRISH IRELAND DUBLIN √ √ √ √ √ √ 
BANCA AKROS ITALY MILAN √ √ √ √ √ √ 
BANCA MONTE DEI PASCHI DI 
SIENA 
ITALY MILAN √ √ √ √ 
  






BANCO DE SABADELL SPAIN SABADELL √ √ √ √ 
  
BANCO POPOLARE ITALY BERGAMO √ √ √ √ √ 
 
BANCPOST SA ROMANIA BUCHAREST 
    
√ 
 





CAIXA GERAL DE DEPOSITOS PORTUGAL LISBON √ √ √ √ √ 
 
CANADIAN IMPERIAL BANK 
OF COMMERCE CIBC 








   
COMMERZBANK GERMANY FRANKFURT √ √ √ √ √ √ 





     
√ 
DANSKE BANK DENMARK COPENHAGEN K √ √ √ √ √ √ 





















I.C.M. INVESTMENTBANK AG ITALY MILAN 
  
√ 
   
INDUSTRIAL AND 







   
ING BANK UKRAINE KIEV 
  
√ 
   





INTESA SANPAOLO BANK ITALY MILAN √ √ √ √ √ 
 
INTESA SANPAOLO BANK ALBANIA TIRANA 
  
√ 
   
LANDESBANK BADEN-
WÜRTTEMBERG 
GERMANY STUTTGART √ √ √ √ √ 
 




NORDEA BANK DENMARK COPENHAGEN C √ √ √ √ √ √ 
OSCHAD BANK UKRAINE KIEV 
    
√ 
 




PIRAEUS BANK GREECE ATHENS √ √ √ √ 
  
PRAVEXBANK UKRAINE KIEV 
  
√ 
   











   
RAIFFEISEN BANK ALBANIA TIRANA 
  
√ 




LONDON √ √ √ √ √ √ 






SWEDEN STOCKHOLM √ √ √ √ √ √ 
SOCIETE GENERALE FRANCE PARIS √ √ √ √ 
 
√ 





UBS SWITZERLAND ZURICH √ √ √ √ √ √ 
WGZ BANK GERMANY DÜSSELDORF √ √ √ √ √ 
 
WINDSOR BROKERS CYPRUS LIMASSOL √ √ √ √ √ √ 
ZUERCHER KANTONALBANK SWITZERLAND ZURICH √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Panel E. Active Dealers in Global Forex 
Name Country City €/£ €/¥ €/$ £/¥ £/$ $/¥ 
AUSTRALIA AND NEW 
ZEALAND BANKING GROUP 
Australia GLOBAL FOREX √ √ √ √ √ √ 
BANQUE INTERNATIONALE A 
LUXEMBOURG 
Luxembourg GLOBAL FOREX √ √ √ √ √ √ 
BARCLAYS United Kingdom GLOBAL FOREX √ √  √ √ √ 
DEUTSCHE BANK Germany GLOBAL FOREX √ √ √ √ √ √ 
GOLDMAN SACHS U.K. United Kingdom GLOBAL FOREX √ √ √ √ √ √ 
HSBC United Kingdom GLOBAL FOREX √ √ √ √ √ √ 
HSBC NEW YORK United States GLOBAL FOREX √ √ √ √ √ √ 
KBC  Belgium GLOBAL FOREX √ √ √ √ √ √ 










SOCIETE GENERALE France GLOBAL FOREX √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Panel F. Active Dealers in North America 







√ √ √ √ √ 


















√ √ √ √ √ 














NEW YORK √ √ √ √ √ √ 
ROYAL BANK OF CANADA CANADA TORONTO 
  
√ 






















Panel G. Active Dealers in South America 
Name Country City €/£ €/¥ €/$ £/¥ £/$ $/¥ 





   































This chapter, for the first time, investigates the impact of economist affiliation, 
geographical proximity, and speed on price discovery of market makers in the foreign 
exchange (FX) market. Prior literature provides some evidence on the importance of access 
to analyst research and its consequent information advantage in equity markets. Schultz (2003) 
finds that the knowledge embedded in a research division is valuable to the market making 
section of the same bank. Li and Heidle (2004), Michaely and Womack (1999), and Chung 
and Cho (2005) show information share between affiliated market makers and their analysts. 
Chung and Cho (2005) show that analysts and market makers work as a team to benefit the 
company36. The collaboration between market makers and analysts is expected to increase 
information and competitive advantages of market makers due to the access of analysts to 
management of a firm, connection with a firm’s representative, observation of a firms’ input 
and output, the ability to speak with clients, customers, or employees (Berger et al., 2009; 
Bae et al., 2008; Green et al., 2014). This expectation is consistent with Green’s (2006) 
findings which provide evidence on the value of early access to stock recommendation and 
incorporation of analysts’ recommendations to market makers’ trading activities. Madureira 
and Underwood (2008) demonstrate the information advantage of market makers because 
                                                 
36  Chung and Cho state that analysts are hired by Brokerage firms to track and make buy and sell 
recommendations. See Li and Heidle (2004) and Michaely and Womack (1999) for the collaboration between 
affiliated analysts and market makers.  





of their affiliation with analysts and show that affiliated market makers contribute more to 
price discovery and are more likely to be informed than are market makers without analyst 
affiliation. However, due to fundamental differences in the information transparency, 
information distribution medium, and scope of macroeconomic and firm specific news, the 
role of analysts and economists exhibits fundamental differences. Therefore, an expansion 
of the findings on the impact of an analyst’s affiliation on market makers’ activities in equity 
markets to the impact of economists’ affiliation on dealers in FX market requires more 
critical examination. 
The differences in the informational transparency and information distribution 
mediums between the FX and equity markets originate from the difference in the nature of 
private information and structure of these markets, respectively. The information advantage 
of analysts in equity markets is found to be, partially, due to private information, access to 
different sets of information, and access to management by analysts following a company 
(Chen and Matsomoto, 2006; Alford and Berger, 1999; Chen and Jiang, 2006; Green et al., 
2014). However, no such private and privileged information access is reported regarding 
macroeconomic news of a country. This is the reason for the statement above regarding the 
difference in information transparency between firm specific and macroeconomic news 
announcements. In addition, equity markets are centralised exchange traded markets while 
the FX market is a geographically dispersed, decentralised, quote driven, and primarily over 
the counter market (FSB, 2014). There is also a considerable difference between the scope 
and scale of firm specific news and macroeconomic news. Firm specific news is only 
regarding a firm and mainly concerns its future cash flow while macroeconomic news is is 
regarding the whole economy state of a country and concerns every aspect of a country’s 
economy. These differences between the equity and the FX market create two structurally 
different information distribution mediums between the two markets.  





This chapter builds on the existing literature on analyst affiliation with market makers 
in equity markets and expands it to economists’ affiliation with market makers in the FX 
market. It is examined whether affiliated economists create an information advantage for 
their dealer organisation. An affiliated economist is defined as an economist who is employed 
in a dealer market making arm or any of the dealer’s subsidiaries. A dealers’ contribution to 
price discovery is measured by the Weighted Price Contribution (WPC) model of Barclays 
and Warner (1993) within a four-minute window around macroeconomic news 
announcements and it is examined as to whether affiliated dealers systematically exhibit a 
higher contribution to price discovery. However, nowadays with the increase in the presence 
of algorithmic and high frequency traders in the FX markets (Rime and Schrimpf, 2013), 
their contribution to price discovery around macroeconomic news announcements 
(Brogaard et al., 2014), the ability of machines in reading and interpreting macroeconomic 
news announcements (Groß-Klußmann and Hautsch, 2011) reacting to news before humans 
(Scholtus et al., 2014; Biais et al., 2015; Martinez and Rosu, 2013), and even the early access 
of HFT to some of the macroeconomic news announcements 37  (Mullins et al., 2013; 
Goldstein et al., 2014), a dealers quoting speed is also studied.  
The dataset that is used for this chapter’s empirical work consists of four sections: 
quotes obtained from Thomson Reuters, macroeconomic news announcements, economists’ 
forecasts, and economists’ personal information obtained from Bloomberg. The Quote 
Dataset that is used here is a subset of the Quote Dataset38 explained in chapter 3 and 
includes merely the days that there has been no interruption in the collection of data39. The 
                                                 
37 A new industry has emerged to deliver machine readable news and financial information to hedge funds, 
ATs, and HFTs within milliseconds such as Reuters NewsScope Sentiment Engine (Chordia et al., 2015; Groß-
Klußmann and Hautsch, 2011). This has gone even further by controversial practices such as selling early 
access, by 2 seconds, to University of Michigan’s Consumer Sentiment Index, by Reuters, to HFTs (Mullins et 
al., 2013; Goldstein et al., 2014). However, despite the legality of this practice Reuters agreed to end selling this 
early access upon the request of the New York attorney general (Chordia et al., 2015).  
38 Although the quote dataset that is used here is a subset of the quote dataset, explained in chapter 3, in this 
chapter it is referred to, as quote dataset.  
39 Similar to chapter 4, Saturdays and Sundays are removed. 





Quote Dataset spans from April 23rd, 2013 to March 11th, 2014. The most prominent feature 
of this dataset is that it includes the name and the location of quote disseminators, which 
allows this research to construct the link between dealers and their affiliated economists. The 
macroeconomic news announcements dataset includes all the macroeconomic news 
announcements from the United Kingdom, the United States, Japan, Eurozone, and 
Eurozone countries. Economists’ forecast and economist information datasets include all 
the existing forecasts for the all the released macroeconomic news and geographical locations 
of all forecasters, respectively. 
The empirical results show, despite the illustrated differences between the FX and 
equity markets, that the empirical analysis results are analogous to those regarding the analyst 
affiliation in equity markets. The results show that dealers with affiliated economists have a 
higher contribution to price discovery that supports the information advantage hypothesis 
created by affiliated economists. However, as mentioned above, there is a difference in the 
scope of firm specific and macroeconomic news that is also reflected in the results. This 
chapter’s findings depict that the scope of affiliated economists’ research is more important 
than merely having affiliated economists. The results show that the increase in the number 
of forecasts by a dealer’s affiliated economists increases the dealer’s contribution to the price 
discovery. This finding shows that the collection of information regarding the wider aspect 
of a country’s economic condition creates a higher information advantage for affiliated 
dealers. Since the definition of affiliated economists includes economists who are employed 
in a dealer market making arm or any of the dealer’s subsidiaries, this finding shows that 
different sections of a dealer organisation work as a team to benefit the market making 
activities of a dealer’s organisation. This chapter’s findings, in conjunction with the prior 
findings in equity markets, is consistent with the positive impact of information collection 
sources on the market makers’ information quality and information advantage is independent 
of the information medium transparency and market structure. 





Studies in equity markets show that the analyst’s benefit is not limited to their 
affiliated organisation and expands to benefiting the rest of the market. Bernnan et al. (1993) 
find the increase in the number of analysts following a stock coincides with a faster reaction 
of the stock to common information, which means an increase in the pace of the price 
discovery process. Following Bernnan et al.’s (1993) findings in equity markets, the existence 
of the same relationship in the FX market is also examined between the total numbers of 
forecasts, by affiliated and non-affiliated economists, and the information distribution quality 
and price discovery process in the market. This is done to isolate the impact of the economist 
affiliation and control for the possible impact of all economists’ forecasts on a dealer’s 
contribution to the price discovery. The results show that the total number of forecasts 
regarding a set of macroeconomic news has no impact on the information quality of market 
participants or the price discovery process. This is one of the other differences between the 
price discovery process in equity and the FX market that illustrates the difference in 
information distribution mechanisms between the two markets. 
The findings regarding the impact of market makers’ quoting speed on their 
contribution to price discovery depict a positive and significant role of speed in dealers’ 
contribution to price discovery. Having a quoting speed which is equivalent to an average 
speed of the market participants in a currency pair increases a dealer’s contribution to a price 
discovery of ask and bid by 2.7 and 2.1 times more than an increase of 1 affiliated forecast, 
respectively. This finding depicts the importance and significance of market makers quoting 
speed on their information advantage, which is supported by the arguments that the higher 
speed of market participants allows them to react faster to public information and 
consequently have a higher contribution to price discovery (Biais et al., 2015; Martinez and 
Rosu, 2013). However, the significant impact of speed on market participants’ information 
advantage in conjunction with early access of HFTs to some of the macroeconomic news 





announcements raises a concern regarding the negative impact that it could have on the 
fairness of the FX market and the costs that it could impose on slower market participants. 
Although an analyst’s affiliation creates an information advantage, not all analysts 
create the same level of information advantage for their dealers. One of the factors that is 
found to have a prominent impact on analysts’ performance is their geographical proximity. 
The geographical proximity of analysts to a firm is expected to increase their forecast quality 
due to similarities in culture, language, and closeness to local market conditions in which 
firms operate (Berger et al., 2009). In addition, Bae et al., (2008) find that local analysts, on 
average, have followed a firm for half a year longer, thus it is expected their higher experience 
regarding a firm increases their forecasting quality. These expectations are consistent with 
Malloy’s (2005) finding that geographically proximate analysts have a higher forecast accuracy 
than their distant counterparts. He argues that abnormal returns around large forecast 
revisions by local analysts demonstrates the higher impact of them on stock prices. Bae et al., 
(2008) by studying the sample of 32 countries, find that local analysts are more accurate and 
call this a local analyst advantage. Orpurt (2002) as cited in Malloy (2005) finds that analysts 
located in Germany outperform foreign analysts in forecasting earnings of German firms. 
Chang (2002) as cited in Malloy (2005) studies Taiwanese markets and finds that foreign 
analysts with a research group in the country outperform both local and other foreign 
analysts without such arrangements. Kedia and Zhou (2011) and Anand et al., (2011) find 
that local market makers possess information advantages. These findings show that an 
analyst’s performance and a market maker’s information, as a result of locality is influenced 
by geographical tripartite proximity of analysts, market makers, and the firm’s headquarter’s 
country.  
This chapter further evaluates the validity of these findings in the FX and examines 
whether the location of the market makers, economists, and the macroeconomic news 
releasing countries have any impact on a dealer’s information advantage. One of the 





innovative approaches of this chapter is the division of the geographical proximity factor 
into three subsections and studying their interaction with each other at the same time. the 
geographical proximity factor is divided into the geographical proximity of a dealer and his 
affiliated economists to the country of the macroeconomic news origin, and the geographical 
proximity of a dealer to his affiliated economists. The geographical proximity of a dealer to 
the country of news origin is the only location factor that is common between affiliated and 
non-affiliated dealers. The findings suggest that the geographical proximity of the dealers 
and the country of macroeconomic news origin has a significant impact on dealers’ 
contribution to price discovery and information advantage40 and this impact is up to 15 times 
more than the effect of the affiliated economist forecast.  
For dealers with affiliated economists, the geographical proximity of their affiliated 
economists to the country of macroeconomic news origin also has a positive impact on a 
dealer’s contribution to the price discovery. An increase in the number of news items that 
are released from the same country that affiliated economists of a dealer are located, increases 
a dealer’s contribution to price discovery. The results also show that dealers or affiliated 
economists who are local to macroeconomic news sources are significantly more informed 
than dealers or affiliated economists who are not local to macroeconomic news sources. 
These findings suggest that the geographical proximity of an economist to the country of 
macroeconomic news origin is an important factor in the quality of his forecast and 
consequently in the quality of information that the economist generates for his dealer. 
Interestingly, the findings in this chapter also illustrate that the information set that is 
collected by dealers and their affiliated economists, who are located in the same geographical 
location, has a lower impact on dealers information advantage than the dealers and affiliated 
economists who are positioned in different locations. This is independent of the quality of 
                                                 
40 This finding is not new in the FX market. Previous studies in the FX market have also found the importance 
of region-specific information advantage. For further discussion, see section 5.5.1. 





the information set. However, in the presence of the information transfer medium that have 
reached the speed of light, one could expect that the geographical distance plays no role in 
the information transfer rate. Similar to the findings in the equity markets, these results are 
interpreted not only as the prominent role of geographical proximity, but also as the 
familiarity of the economist with the economy of the countries that they are located in, and 
the collection of information that is not accessible by non-local economists or dealers.  
This chapter’s contribution to the literature is threefold. First, it demonstrates that 
the information collection sources, such as analysts or economists, create information 
advantages for their affiliated market makers and this added value is independent of the 
market structure or the information medium transparency. The geographical proximity of 
dealers, economists, and the macroeconomic news source, to each other and their 
interactions, were also found to have an important impact on the dealers’ contribution to 
price discovery. Second, it is shown that the benefit of the information advantage of 
economists’ forecasts is merely limited to their affiliated dealers and the increase in the 
number of economists following macroeconomic news does not benefit the price discovery 
process in the market. This finding illustrates the difference in the information distribution 
mechanism between FX and equity markets. In this sense the FX market is different from 
equity markets. Third, the results show the positive and the significant role of quoting speeds 
on the market participants’ information advantage around macroeconomic news 
announcements. This finding has an important regulatory implication that selling early access 
of macroeconomic news announcements to HFTs creates an unfair market environment and 
can be costly for slower traders. In addition, since the results show that dealers’ information 
content is directly affected by the scope of their economists’ research and because there is 
no privileged access to public information, the imposition of a regulation similar to the 
Regulation Fair Disclosure is not necessary in this context. 





The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 discusses the dealers, 
macroeconomic news, economists’ forecast, and economists’ information datasets that are 
used in this research. Section 5.3 explains the methodology and variables construction. 
Section 5.4 presents and discusses the results of the empirical analyses and section 5.5 
concludes. 
5.2. Data  
In this section the dataset that facilitates this research, it characteristics, properties, 
and statistics are presented. This chapter’s dataset consists of four sections, quote data, 
macroeconomic news announcements, economists’ forecasts, and economists’ location. The 
quote database is a live capture of the multi-contributor tick-by-tick ask and bid quotes that 
contains the names and location of the disseminator dealers, which allows construction of 
the link between economists, dealers, and macroeconomic news announcements. The Quote 
database includes the six cross rates of four currencies, Euro, British Pound, Japanese Yen, 
and the U.S. Dollar. These four currencies form EUR/GBP, EUR/JPY, EUR/USD, 
GBP/JPY, GBP/USD, and USD/JPY currency pairs.  
The macroeconomic news announcements, economist forecasts, and economist 
locations are collected from Bloomberg. Since the six currency pairs are constructed from 
four zones, the macroeconomic news announcements from these zones on the existing days 
in the quote database are collected. Each macroeconomic news announcement contains the 
country, date and time41 of release, news identifier ticker, the actual value of the news, and 
the Relevance Index (henceforth R-Index). The economist forecast dataset includes the name 
of the economists, if available, forecaster organisation, forecasted value, and forecasted news 
ticker. Overall, there are 3255 news announcements from the U.S., the U.K., the Eurozone, 
                                                 
41 Macroeconomic news announcement dataset is merely accurate to a minute. 





and Japan (651, 419, 1714, and 471 macroeconomic news announcements, respectively). 
Following Madureira and Underwood (2008) only the macroeconomic news that at least one 
dealer with an affiliated economist who has been active in trading within the 4-minute 
window are studied42. Any macroeconomic news announcements that do not meet this 
condition are removed. There are 1571 news announcements that meet this criteria, 298 from 
the U.K., 466 from the U.S., 186 from Japan, and 621 from the Eurozone and Eurozone 
member countries. Out of 18 Eurozone members between 2013 and 2014 43 , the 
macroeconomic news from Austria, Cyprus, Malta, Portugal, Netherlands, and Slovakia, with 
38, 31, 6, 89, 98, and 97 news items, respectively, have not been forecasted by any of the 
affiliated economists44. 
The final piece of the dataset is the information of economists which contains 
information on their location and their employer. In some cases, the name of the economist 
or the group of economists who forecasted a piece of news is not reported and merely the 
name of the organisation is reported. The piece of news that does not contain the economist’ 
name have been released without the economist’s name for as long as the forecast series 
existed. These forecasts are therefore institutional forecasts rather than an individual 
economist forecast. In these cases, the location of the economists is assumed to be the 
location of the forecasting organisation.  
 
 
                                                 
42 Madureira and Underwood (2008) limit their dataset to the stocks that are covered by at least one affiliated 
and at least one non-affiliated market maker. However, in this dataset all the news that have at least one affiliated 
market maker have more than one non-affiliated market maker. That is the reason that the condition of at least 
one non-affiliated economist is not emphasised. 
43 Although there are 19 Eurozone member states, Lithuania joined the Eurozone in 2015 that is after the scope 
of this study. This is the reason for mentioning 18 Eurozone members rather than 19. 
44 In the rest of this chapter macroeconomic news refers to the macroeconomic news that have been forecasted 
by at least one affiliated economist, unless stated otherwise. 





5.2.1. Macroeconomic News Announcements and Coverage by Economists  
[Table 5.1 here] 
Table 5.1 reports the summary statistics for macroeconomic news announcements 
by individual countries45 in each zone, and their coverage by dealers and economists. There 
are 15 countries, 12 from the Eurozone in addition to the U.K., the U.S. and Japan. Column 
News depicts the number of distinct macroeconomic news types that are covered with at 
least one affiliated economist from each country. The numbers after “/” in this column 
shows the total number of news items that exists in the database but do not meet the 
requirement of having at least one affiliated economist. A similar interpretation of numbers 
after “/” holds for other columns. Column #MENA depicts the total number of 
macroeconomic news announcements from each country which are forecasted by at least 
one affiliated economist.  
Columns News and MENA show the prominence of macroeconomic news, 
regarding a country and the influence of that country’s economy on the exchange rate 
fluctuation for a dealer’s perspective. These columns show how often and how many types 
of macroeconomic news items are covered by affiliated economists. Column News shows 
that for the U.S., U.K., and Japan that are the sole countries affecting their currencies, 83%, 
69%, and 61% of the news types are covered by at least one affiliated economist. However, 
the story is both similar and different regarding the Eurozone countries. 82%, 77%, 76%, 
65%, 53%, 42% of the news regarding the most important countries in Eurozone, namely 
France, Eurozone46 , Germany, Finland, Italy, and Greece47 are covered by at least one 
affiliate economists, respectively. While these numbers for smaller and less influential 
                                                 
45 The complete list of macroeconomic news from each country is reported in appendix III. 
46 Eurozone news are the macroeconomic news that are released by EU organisations, regarding the whole 
Eurozone economy. 
47 Although Greece has one of the smallest economies in the Eurozone, its financial instability and debt 
problems have significantly influenced the Euro (€). 





countries in the Euro varies from 7% to 28%. Similarly, column MENA shows the number 
of news announcements and the same interpretation that was mentioned for column News 
holds for this column. 
Columns Events and Days show the number of news announcement sessions and 
days, respectively. The combination of these two columns with column MENA demonstrate 
the density and frequency of news announcements. The number of days divided by events 
shows the average number of different sessions of news announcements that existed on each 
day. The number of events divided by MENA depicts how many news were released, on 
average, per event. For instance, on average, there are almost two sessions of news 
announcements regarding the U.S. economy, that on average around 2.5 news items are 
released in each event. Numbers after “/” show that on average there are almost 3 events 
per day, however, affiliated economists whose affiliated dealers are trading around these news 
items, are not interested in forecasting all of them.  
The column TF demonstrates the total number of forecasts regarding a country and 
column AF shows how many of the existing forecasts are estimated by affiliated economists. 
Columns LAF shows how many of the forecasts in column AF are estimated by the 
economists who are located in the country. Overall, there are 42,087 forecasts regarding these 
15 countries, 7,197 (17.10%) of them are from affiliated economists. Interestingly, 3,974 
(55.22%) of affiliated forecasts are estimated by economists or organisations that are located 
in the country for which they forecast its macroeconomic news. These numbers demonstrate, 
that although the usage of affiliated economists by dealers is not considerable, a considerable 
portion of affiliated economists’ forecasts are estimated by affiliated economists who are 
located in the country in which they forecast news. In other words, these numbers show that 
more than half of the affiliated forecasts are estimated by local affiliated economists. This 
suggests that dealers who have economist affiliation are aware of the importance of locality. 





The Dealer column demonstrates the number of dealers in affected currency pairs, 
who have been active around the news announcements of the country, out of the total 
number of dealers in the affected currency pairs. For instance, Belgium news (Belgium is a 
member of the Eurozone) affects EUR/GBP, EUR/JPY, and EUR/USD. In these three 
currency pairs, out of 74 distinct dealer-locations active, 50 of them have been active around 
the Belgium news announcements. In table 5.1, column FDelaer (11th column) shows the 
number of dealer-locations whom their affiliated economists have forecasted the country’s 
news and LDealer show how many of those dealer-locations are located in the countries that 
their affiliated economists have forecasted their news. A point that should be mentioned here 
is that LDealer and #LAF are independent and the locality of a dealer does not mean that 
his affiliated economists are local, and vice versa.  
Overall, there are 349 macroeconomic news types48 by these 15 countries that are 
released in 640 sessions of news announcement and 113 days, which are forecasted by at 
least one affiliated economist. The news announcements span from 00:05 to 23:50 GMT.  
5.2.2. Events, Quotes, News, and Dealer Coverage 
Each macroeconomic news announcement from each country affects three currency 
pairs, from the studied currency pairs, while at the same time these three currency pairs are 
also affected by a news release from the opposite currencies, if any. For instance, a new 
announcement from the U.K. affects EUR/GBP, GBP/JPY, and GBP/USD if there is any 
news announcement from Eurozone, Japan, and/or the U.S., at the same time of the day, 
these currency pairs would also react to that news. Therefore, in order to accommodate these 
circumstances an event, for a currency pair, is defined as a time frame that includes news 
from one or both of the quote and base currencies at the same date and time. Therefore, the 
                                                 
48  The same macroeconomic news in different countries are considered different. For instance, GDP 
announcement in the UK and Japan are counted as two different types of news. 





number of events in a currency pair is always smaller or equal to the number of events in its 
constructing zones. For instance, in table 5.2, panel A shows that there are 149 events 
affecting the GBP/JPY currency pair that is exactly equal to the summation of events (shown 
in table 5.1 by column Event) in the U.K. and Japan, which shows none of the events in 
these two zones were simultaneous. On the other hand, there are 356 events in the 
EUR/GBP which is less than the summation of events in the U.K. and Eurozone, 
demonstrating that in 24 cases the news announcements in the Eurozone, the U.K., or both 
were simultaneous. For instance, in the case of the EUR/GBP, 24 of the events within the 
Eurozone member countries were simultaneous.  
[Table 5.2 Here] 
Table 5.2, panel A reports the summary statistics of quotes, dealers, and news. There 
are 83 distinct dealers active around macroeconomic news announcements in these six 
currency pairs with the EUR/USD having the highest number of active dealers, 61, and the 
EUR/GBP with the lowest number of active dealers, 39. On average the GBP/USD and the 
USD/JPY have the highest and lowest average number of quotes around macroeconomic 
news announcements, with 291 and 191 quotes in the 4-minute period, respectively. Even 
the lowest quoting frequency average of 191 quotes in the 4-minute period demonstrates the 
high frequency nature of the Quote Dataset. There are 115 days from April 23, 2013 to 
March 11, 2014 in the quote database. Overall, within the 4-minute window, there are 
427,971 non-repetitive 49quotes in the quote database from 72 dealers who are active in 6 
continents, 35 countries and 41 cities, which yields the total number of 83 dealer-locations. 
The reason for the difference between number of dealers and locations between this 
chapter’s dataset and the original Quote Dataset, explained in chapter 3, is due to two 
conditions that are imposed on this chapter’s dataset. First, as explained in chapter 4 section 
                                                 
49 Repetitive quotes of a dealer are removed, since they do not contain any new information.  





2, only the days that there has been no interruption in capturing the dataset are studied. 
Second, this chapter only examines a four-minute window around macroeconomic news 
announcements and not all dealers have been active within this four-minute time frame. See 
appendix I for further information on dealers, their location, and the currencies that they are 
active in, around macroeconomic news announcements. 
The reason for choosing to study a 4-minute time frame around macroeconomic 
news announcements is to achieve the longest time frame possible while being able to isolate 
dealers’ responses to individual events. The length of the time frame is important because if 
it is too short, the slower market players who cannot react and adjust their quotes to 
macroeconomic news quickly will be omitted from the sample study. This induces a sample 
bias that affects the accuracy of the study’s result. If the length of the time is too long, the 
time frames that the impact of macroeconomic news are studied will overlap with each other. 
This overlap does not allow us to study the isolated impact of a news announcement. For 
instance, consider that the time frame of study is 10 minutes and there are two 
macroeconomic news announcements that are 4 minutes apart. The time frame of study for 
the first (second) macroeconomic news would include the second (first) news announcement. 
In this situation, it will not be possible to distinguish a dealer’s response to the different news 
items. The 4-minute time frame is the longest time frame that none of 1571 macroeconomic 
news study windows overlap. The question that arises here is whether a 4-minute time frame 
windows is enough for the macroeconomic news to be incorporated into prices. As the 
review of empirical studies in section 2.5 illustrated, the incorporation of macroeconomic 
news into prices in the current FX market speed is almost instantaneous.  
Panel B in table 5.2, depicts the summary statistics of macroeconomic news 
announcements and dealers with affiliated economists per event. There are 1842 events 
affecting theses six currency pairs. EUR/USD is affected by the highest number of events, 
462, and GBP/JPY is affected by the lowest, 149. EUR/USD is affected by the highest 





number of macroeconomic news announcements, 1087, and GBP/JPY is affected by the 
lowest number of news announcements, 187. On average, there are close to 3 
macroeconomic news announcements per event, in each of the currency pairs with the 
maximum of 13 news announcements per event. 
The right hand side of panel B shows the summary statistics of the percentage of 
dealers with affiliated economists per event. On average, in these six currency pairs, 20% of 
the dealers in each event have affiliated economists, with dealers in EUR/JPY and 
GBP/USD having the lowest (13.37%) and highest (24.10%) percentage of dealers with an 
economist affiliation. Overall, the distribution of dealers with affiliated economists in each 
event is similar for all the six currency pairs.  
5.3. Methodology  
The construction and calculation of models and variables that are used for the 
empirical analysis of this chapter will be explained.  
5.3.1. Event 
As mentioned before, an event is the unit of measurement for price discovery around 
macroeconomic news announcements. For instance, considering that the GBP/USD 
currency pair is affected by news from its two constructing zones, zone 1 that is the U.K. 
and zone 2 that is the U.S. Assume that at 13:30 (GMT) there has been some macroeconomic 
news announcements regarding the U.K. and the U.S. economy. In this situation, the 
GBP/USD currency pair is affected by all the news items at exactly the same time. The set 
of these news items at the same time is called an event and the price discovery within its time 
frame is calculated. In other words, an event is a 4-minute window that there can be one or 
more news items from one or both of the constructing zones of a currency pair at exactly the 
same time. All the variables that are listed below, except the price discovery contribution, are 





calculated assuming that the news and forecasts are regarding merely one of the constructing 
zones of a currency pair. Subsequently, the construction of the variables for events where 
there is a news item from both constructing zones of a currency pair is explained. 
5.3.2. Contribution to Price Discovery and Quoting Speed and Behaviour 
The contribution of dealers to the price discovery process and their quoting 
behaviour (BS, AG, WN, and AT) are calculated similarly to section 4.2. The only difference 
is that in chapter 4 the time frame of study was in 1 minute or 1 day while in this chapter the 
time frame of study is a 4-minute window around macroeconomic news announcements. 
The 4-minute window is constructed from 90 seconds before the macroeconomic news 
announcement, 60 seconds of the macroeconomic news minute, and 90 seconds after the 
macroeconomic news announcement. The reason that a symmetric 2-minute window around 
the announcement time is not assumed is that the macroeconomic news dataset is accurate 
merely to a minute. Therefore, a 90-second symmetric window around the macroeconomic 
news time is assumed. Assuming the time frame as such induces an imbalance in the time 
frame before and after announcements, the news announcement is not exactly centred in the 
middle of the time frame. However, because of the limitation of macroeconomic 
announcement data that is reported only to the minute, this issue cannot be addressed 
directly except through the construction of a time frame of study as long as possible to 
accommodate the maximum participation of market participants in the time frame of study. 
The only point that should be recalled here is that since the speed in different 
currency pairs has different characteristics (as was mentioned section 4.3.2.) in order to 
ensure comparability in the pool regressions, the speed measure in each currency pair is 
normalised by dividing each observation’s speed by the average speed of the currency pair, 
realised by averaging the speed of all market participants in a currency pair. Doing so makes 





different currency pairs’ speeds comparable by converting the mean speed of each currency 
pair to one. 
5.3.3. Affiliated Forecasts – AF  
Affiliated Forecasts (AF) is the number of forecasts that are estimated by a dealer’s 
affiliated economists in an event. This number is not necessarily equal to the number of 
macroeconomic news forecasted or the number of economists. The reason is that on some 
occasions, one macroeconomic news item is forecasted by more than one affiliated 
economist, or more than one economist forecasted a macroeconomic news item as a group. 
AF is calculated on the total number of forecasts estimated by affiliated economists of a 
dealer in an event. Therefore, affiliated forecasts can be formulated as below. 
 
 




Where AFi,j,z1 is the number of affiliated forecasts by the dealer i's affiliated 
economists regarding the macroeconomic news announcements in event j regarding the 
constructing zone 1 of the currency pair. Nj,z1 is the total number of forecasts released by all 
economists for the news in event j regarding the first constructing zone of the currency pair. 
Dn is the dummy variable equal to 1 if forecast n belongs to dealer i and zero otherwise. In 
the event that a dealer’s affiliated economists have forecasted news items regarding both 
constructing zones of a currency pair, AF is calculated as the summation of AF for each 
constructing zone and formulated as follows. 
 
 
𝐴𝐹𝑖,𝑗 = 𝐴𝐹𝑗,𝑖,𝑧1 +  𝐴𝐹𝑗,𝑖,𝑧2 (2) 





5.3.4. Geographical Proximity of Dealers, Economists, and News Sources  
In all the three measures of distance, DN, EN, and DE, the aim for quantifying the 
geographical proximity of dealers, economist, and news sources is more than just a physical 
and geographical distance. The geographical proximity of dealers, economist, and news 
sources, in addition to physical distance also demonstrates the locality and familiarity of them. 
For instance, these location variables allows us to observe whether there is any difference 
between a dealer who is located in Germany and a dealer who is located in France, regarding 
a news item that is released in Germany. Similarly, it can be observed whether the location 
of an affiliated economist in Germany and forecasting German related economic news adds 
more to his affiliated dealer than that of an affiliated economist in France, forecasting the 
same news. 
The point that should be mentioned here is that since Eurozone macroeconomic 
news announcements are regarding all 18 member states50, no market maker or economist is 
assumed to be local. The robustness of this assumption is addressed in section 5.4.4. 
5.3.4.1. Geographical Proximity of Dealers to News Source (DN) 
DN quantifies the geographical proximity of a dealer’s location and that of news 
sources. DN quantifies what percentage of the macroeconomic news that is announced in 
an event is disseminated from the country that the dealer is located in. This variable is 
calculated for all the dealers, since it is independent of having an affiliated economist. Since 
there can be more than one news item in an event, the DN variable is the percentage of the 
news items which are disseminated from the same country that the dealer is located in. DN 
is quantified as follows. 
                                                 
50 The number of Eurozone member states in 2014. In 2015 it reached 19 when Lithuania joined Eurozone.  














Where DNi,j,z1 is the percentage of the news item, regarding the construction zone 1 
of the currency pair, which are released from the same country as that of dealer i in event j. 
Nj,z1 is the number of news items in event j constructing zone 1 of the currency pair. NSk and 
Di are the locations of macroeconomic news source k and dealer i, and D (Di, NSk) is a 
function that returns 1 if the macroeconomic news source k and dealer i are located in the 
same country and zero if the macroeconomic news source k and dealer i are located in 
different countries. In an event where there is macroeconomic news from both constructing 











5.3.4.2. The Geographical Proximity of Economists to News Sources (EN) 
EN quantifies the geographical proximity of a dealer’s affiliated economists’ locations 
and the news source locations. However, as is obvious from its definition, this variable is 
exclusive only for dealers with an affiliated economist. Since there can be more than one 
news item in an event or more than one affiliated economist that could forecast the same 















Where ENi,j,z1 is the percentage of the news items that are released from the same 
geographical proximity of the affiliated economists of dealer i who forecasted the news in 
event j, regarding the constructing zone 1 of the currency pair. Ni,j,z1 is the number of 





forecasts by dealer i's affiliated economists. Ln is the distinct number of locations of dealer i's 
affiliated economists who have estimated forecast n regarding constructing zone 1 of the 
currency pair. Lk is the kth member of affiliated economists array of distinct location of 
dealer i who estimated forecast n. NSn
 is the macroeconomic news source for the forecast n. 
D (Lk, NSn) is a function that returns 1 if the macroeconomic news source n and kth location 
are located in the same country and zero otherwise. 
The reason for considering the distinct locations of economists is to eliminate double 
calculation. For instance, consider a group of 3 economists, two of them are located in the 
U.S. and one of them is located in the U.K. In this scenario, economists are located in two 
countries not three. In the case of a news release from both constructing zones of a currency 
pair and the forecast of news by a dealer’s affiliated economist, EN value for a dealer in an 
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5.3.4.3. The Geographical Proximity of Dealers to Economists (DE) 
DE is the geographical proximity of an affiliated economist to his dealer. In each 
event, there could be more than one news announcement. In addition, for every news 
announcement there could be forecasts from more than one economist. Therefore, DE is 
formulated as follows. In this formula all the variables are the same as DN, with the only 
difference being that a news source is replaced by the dealer. In other words, DE calculates 
the percentage of the news forecasts by a dealer’s affiliated economists who are located in 
the same country as that of the dealer.  



















In the case of news announcements from both constructing zones of a currency pair 
and the forecast of both constructing zone news by a dealer’s affiliated economists, DR for 
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5.3.5. R-Index – R  
R-Index or Relevance Score, as stated by Bloomberg is “the number of alerts that 
are set for the corresponding economic event relative to all alerts set for all events in the 
selected country/alert type, with each bar indicating a higher percentile range”. In other 
words, R-Index demonstrates the relative popularity of events in the selected calendar 
(Bloomberg Terminal Documentation51). Since there could be more than one news item in 
an event, the average value of the R-Index of all released news in that event is considered as 










Where Rj,z1 is the corresponding R-Index for event j regarding the constructing zone 
1 of the currency pair, Nj,z1 is the total number of news, and R is the relative score for news 
n. Since, in an event there can be more than one macroeconomic news from one or both 
constructing zones of a currency pair, R is defined for such an event as the weighted average 
                                                 
51 This documentation is only accessible via Bloomberg Terminals. 





of Rs for each constructing zone of the currency pair and is formulated as follows, where Rj 











5.4. Results and Discussion 
In this section the results of the empirical analysis on the impact of economist 
affiliation, geographical proximity, and speed on the information advantage of market makers 
are presented. First, the results of univariate tests and subsequently the results of the 
regression analysis are reported.  
5.4.1. Economist Affiliation, Local Market Makers, Speed, and Price Discovery 
[Table 5.3 Here] 
5.4.1.1. Univariate Tests 
Table 5.3 panel A, depicts the result of the T-Test on dealers’ price discovery and 
quoting behaviour between affiliated and non-affiliated dealers. These results show the 
differences in five categories of speed, buy-sell intention, activity time, number of quotes, 
and contribution to price discovery 52 . On average, the speed of dealers with affiliated 
economists is 10.5% higher than the average speed of all dealers and that of dealers without 
an affiliated economist is 2.6% lower. In other words, dealers with affiliated economists, on 
average, have a significantly higher speed than dealers without affiliated economists and this 
difference is statically significant.  
                                                 
52 The terms Speed, NQ, AG, BS, AT, and PD, used in table 5.3, are the same as defined and used in chapter 
4. 





The Activity Time (AT) of dealers with affiliated economists is two seconds shorter 
than dealers with no affiliated economists. This shortage of activity time does not translate 
to a lower number of quotes, because dealers with affiliated economists have a higher quoting 
speed that compensates this shortage in activity time. Dealers with an affiliated economist 
disseminate almost 2 quotes more than that of dealers without an affiliated economist. In 
addition, the lower activity time of dealers with economist affiliation could be due to their 
higher information advantage and faster reaction to news (speed) that allows them to bring 
their price to an efficient level quicker than dealers without an economist affiliation.  
The other significant difference between dealers with and without affiliated 
economists is their intention to buy or sell. The intention of dealers with an affiliated 
economist for disseminating quotes on average is to buy while that of dealers with no 
affiliated economists is to sell. The point here is not whether the buy or sell intention is 
correct. This difference in the quoting intentions of dealers with and without economist 
affiliation illustrates their different perception of market movement direction.  
The univariate test of the contribution to price discovery shows that dealers with 
affiliated economists have a higher contribution to the price discovery of ask than dealers 
with no economist affiliation. However, their contribution to the price discovery of bids, 
although higher, is not statistically different. This point, as mentioned in chapter 4, further 
lends support to the different behaviour of ask and bid price discovery and the factors that 
affect them. The reason and interpretation of the significant (insignificant) difference of the 
price discovery of ask (bid) is explained in the next section, section 5.4.1.2, in conjunction 
with the regression results. Finally, the aggressiveness of dealers for both bid and ask prices 
are considerably similar, which shows having or not having affiliation with an economist 
does not affect a dealer’s aggressiveness quoting.  





Results of univariate tests in this section demonstrated different behaviour 
characteristics between dealers with and without affiliated economists. The next section 
shows how these differences impact on the dealers’ information quality.  
5.4.1.2. Regression Results 
This section reports the findings of evaluating the impact of the economist affiliation 
and the geographical proximity of the dealers to the macroeconomic news sources on the 
price discovery of dealers while controlling for the total number of economists, dealers’ 
quoting speed and behaviour, and macroeconomic news popularity as specified below.  
𝑃𝐷 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐴𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑇𝐹𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐴𝐺𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑊𝑁𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽9𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀 
(11) 
Where PD is the contribution of a dealer to the price discovery of bid and ask 
separately. AF is the number of forecasts estimated by the dealer’s affiliated economists in 
an event, TF is the total number of forecasts by all economists in the market in an event. 
Speed, AG, BS, WN, and AT are measures to quantify quoting characteristic of the dealer 
exactly as explained in section 4.2, and R is the relative index that demonstrates the popularity 
of the released news in an event. DN is the geographical proximity of the Dealer’s location 
to the macroeconomic news sources53.  
Table 5.3, panel B, reports the regression results of model (11) for the price discovery 
of the ask and bid for all currency pairs. The first observation from these results is the 
different behaviour of the price discovery of ask and bids that leads to the different impacts 
of the independent variables on them. The systematic difference between the ask and bid 
quotes informativeness is also reported by Pascual and Pascual-Fuster, (2014) who show that 
                                                 
53 The correlation matrixes of model 11 for ask and bid price discovery is reported in table 5.6. The magnitude 
of correlation coefficients in table 5.6 shows that regarding model 11 there are no concerns regarding the 
existence of multicollinearity and its impact on the results It should also be added here that the reason for not 
using panel data model rather than OLS regression for model 11 is exactly similar to the reason mentioned in 
section 4.4.2. 





the ask and bid in the short-run might not be equally informative. The authors explain that 
in the presence of a substantial order imbalance the ask and bid prices have different 
behaviour54.  
5.4.1.2.1 Market Makers’ Affiliation with Economists 
 The first variable that is examined in model (11) is AF that measures the impact of 
the number of forecasts by affiliated economists of a dealer on his contribution to price 
discovery (information advantage hypothesis). Positive and statistically significant 
coefficients of AF for both price discoveries of ask and bid shows that the increase in the 
number of forecasts by dealers’ affiliated economists, if any, increases a dealer’s contribution 
to price discovery. This impact is almost equal for the ask and bid price discovery. AF shows 
that the widening of the research scope of a dealers’ affiliated economists regarding the 
macroeconomic news affecting a currency pair, increases the dealer’s information advantage 
relative to other dealers with no or a lower number of forecasts. The results in the previous 
section showed that there is no statistically significant difference between the bid price 
discovery of dealers with and without affiliated economists. The insignificant difference in a 
univariate test in conjunction with the significance of AF for the price discovery of both the 
bid and ask show that it is not the sheer factor of having an affiliated economist that impacts 
on the dealer’s contribution to price discovery. The scope of a dealer’s affiliated economists’ 
focus on a country’s macroeconomic conditions is more important that only having affiliated 
economists. The finding also has a regulatory implication. This finding shows that the 
economist affiliation and scope of the economists’ research creates an information advantage 
for dealers. Since there is no private and privileged access to macroeconomic news, there is 
no necessity for the imposition of regulations analogous to the regulation Fair Disclosure 
                                                 
54 Macroeconomic news announcements could induce extreme price changes to the prices that are the result or 
cause of excessive buy or sell pressure on the market.  





(Regulation FD) in the FX market. In other words, the regulatory implication of this finding 
is no regulation.  
The significant impact of the economist affiliation, AF, on the price discovery is 
consistent with Madureira and Underwood, (2008) and Schultz, (2003) findings that market 
makers with an analyst affiliation contribute more to the price discovery and have an 
information advantage over market makers without an analyst affiliation. Madureira and 
Underwood (2008) state that, however, the unaffiliated market makers should not be 
assumed uninformed since they “could obtain valuable information about future prices from 
observing the order flow of their customers” (p. 110). The authors argue that therefore 
market makers for a given stock consist of some “relatively informed” and some “relatively 
uninformed” market makers. The same argument holds in the context of FX market and 
currency. Therefore, it can be concluded that market makers with analyst affiliation are 
relatively more informed than unaffiliated market makers and this by no means suggests that 
unaffiliated market makers are uninformed, since the order flow information could give them 
valuable information about future price movements.  
This result also illustrates the existence of the similar relationship between market 
makers, in the FX, and their affiliated economists that exists in equity markets. In the equity 
markets, it is found that market makers and their affiliated economists share information to 
benefit the company (Li and Heidle, 2004; Michaely and Womack, 1999; Chung and Cho, 
2005) and this information is incorporated in market makers’ trading activity (Green, 2006). 
The significant impact of affiliated forecasts, AF, on a dealer’s contribution to the price 
discovery is consistent with marker makers in the FX and their affiliated economists sharing 
information and this information being incorporated in the market makers’ quotes. Overall, 
the result regarding the impact of AF on a dealer’s contribution to price discovery 
demonstrates that information collection sources create an information advantage for their 
market makers and this impact is independent of the market structure and the information 





transfer medium. However, the difference between economists and analysts’ research is the 
scope of their research and information collection. Vividly a country economy scale and 
scope is larger than that of a firm. Therefore, the information advantage creation of 
economists for their affiliated market maker is affected by the scope and scale of their 
research. 
5.4.1.2.2. The Locality of Market Makers 
The other factor that impacts on a dealer’s contribution to the price discovery which 
is examined is the role of the geographical proximity of market makers to the macroeconomic 
news sources. Model (11) evaluates whether a dealer’s geographical proximity to the sources 
of the macroeconomic news announcements play any role in their contribution to price 
discovery. This is measured by the DN variable in model (11) that measures the percentage 
of the macroeconomic news that is announced from the country where a dealer is located. 
On average only 10% of the dealer-events are local to the sources of macroeconomic news 
announcements, as reported in panel C of table 5.3. The value of zero for the third quartile 
of the DN variable shows that more than 75% of the dealer-events are not located (even 
partially) in the countries of the macroeconomic news sources. To be exact only 9.83% of 
dealer-events are partially or fully located in the countries of the macroeconomic news source. 
The impact of the location variable (DN) on the price discovery of ask and bid is 
different in both impact size and significance. While the geographical proximity is 
significantly positive for the price discovery of ask, it does not play a significant role on price 
discovery of bid. The DN variable shows that the geographical proximity of dealers to the 
news source increases their information advantage significantly. In other words, local dealers 
know more about the economic condition of the country they are located in, than non-local 
dealers. The impact of the complete locality of a dealer to the macroeconomic news source 
(DN equal to 100%) on his information advantage is almost 15 times more than the increase 





of one forecast by their affiliated economists. These results illustrate the significant and 
important impact of the geographical proximity of dealers to sources of macroeconomic 
news announcements, however, the location of a dealer in a country is random while having 
an affiliated economist is not. This finding further lends support to the existence of region-
specific private information in the FX market (Gençay and Gradojevic, 2013) such as price 
leadership of German and Japanese banks in DM/USD and USD/JPY, respectively (Peiers, 
1997; Ito, 1998). The locality of market makers is also found to be a source of information 
advantage in equity markets (Annand et al., 2011; Bolliger, 2004; Schultz, 2003). Gençay and 
Gradojevic, (2013) explain that any region-specific information advantage of FX traders 
might be due to local knowledge that non-local traders are not able to access.  
5.4.1.2.3. Quoting Speed  
The other important element that is of the interest in this chapter is market makers’ 
quoting speed, and its impact on a dealer’s contribution to price discovery. This is a 
prominent factor because quoting speed of a dealer could affect his ability in adjusting his 
quotes in times whenthey are on the wrong side of the market before anyone can capitalise 
on it or when new information emerges in the market. On the other hand, nowadays 
macroeconomic news is released in formats that are understandable for computers (Groß-
Klußmann and Hautsch, 2011) and some macroeconomic news items are released to HFTs 
before other market participants (Mullins et al., 2013; Goldstein et al., 2014). Clearly, if news 
is read by algorithms, they are reacted on, by algorithms. A speed variable examines whether 
there is any relationship between market participants quoting speed and their ability in 
reacting to macroeconomic news announcements and incorporating news information into 
their quotes.  
Positive, significant, and considerably larger than affiliated forecasts impact of the 
speed variable on the dealers’ contribution to price discovery demonstrates the prominent 





impact of speed on dealers’ information advantage. Having a speed equal to the average 
speed of all market participants has 2.7 and 2.1 times higher impact on the dealer’s 
contribution to the price discovery of ask and bid, respectively, than an increase of 1 affiliated 
forecast. However, in interpreting the speed result a point should be mentioned regarding 
the impact of speed on a dealer’s contribution to the price discovery. As panel C of table 5.3 
shows the quoting speed of half of the market participants is almost 33% lower than the 
average quoting speed. The reason, as can be deduced from the third quartile and the 
maximum value of the speed, is the existence of the some market participants with extreme 
quoting speeds that are up to 125 times faster than the average speed. In other words, 
although the results demonstrated the significantly positive impact of an economist affiliation 
on market makers’ information advantage and contribution to price discovery, its impact on 
the dealers’ information advantage is minute relative to that of speed.  
This result illustrates the importance of quoting frequency and information 
interpretation speed on a dealers’ contribution to price discovery. In other words, although 
economist affiliation improves a dealer’s contribution to price discovery, high frequency 
traders do it better. This finding follows Biais et al’s., (2015) and Martinez and Rosu’s (2013) 
arguments about speed advantage of ATs, over humans, that allows them to react more 
quickly to public information (such as macroeconomic news) and thus contributes to price 
discovery. However, this finding also has an important policy implication. The significant 
contribution of quoting speed of market participants on the contribution to price discovery 
demonstrates that early access of HFTs to some of the macroeconomic news 
announcements creates an unfair market environment for slower market participants and 
can impose a significant adverse selection cost on them.  





5.4.1.2.4. Other Variables 
Now the effect of all economists’ forecasts on the contribution of all dealers to the 
price discovery is considered. This impact is quantified by variable TF in model (11). 
Macroeconomic news is forecasted by different entities such as banks, financial analysis and 
research companies, broker-dealers, investment managements firms, FX trading platforms, 
universities and many others. The question here is whether the release of these forecasts to 
the market adds to the contribution of all dealers to the price discovery of affected currency 
pairs. The answer is that it does not. The increase in the number of economists following 
macroeconomic news does not have any impact on information distribution and the price 
discovery process in the market. This is one of the differences between the findings of this 
chapter and findings in equity markets (Bernnan et al., 1993) that further magnifies the 
difference between an information transfer medium and information distribution mechanism 
in equity and FX markets.  
In studying a dealer’s contribution to price discovery and the affecting factors on his 
information advantage, the popularity of news by market participants was also controlled for. 
This was done by using the Bloomberg Relative Index, demonstrated by variable R in model 
(11). The assumption behind the use of R was to evaluate whether the interest of market 
participants to a specific set of news impacts a dealer’s contribution to price discovery. In 
other words, the question here is whether the interest of market participants to a set of news 
will affect a dealer’s information collection and consequently his information advantage. 
Table 5.3 panel B shows that the popularity of news plays no role in a dealer’s contribution 
to price discovery. Therefore, it can be concluded that after controlling for other variables, 
the popularity of news does not have any impact on the information collection and the 
information quality of dealers. The rest of the control variables, AG, BS, WN, and AT are as 
expected and reported in chapter 4. 





5.4.2. Location, and Affiliation on Quoting Behaviour and Information Content 
The geographical proximity of dealers and analysts on their information advantage is 
well documented in equity markets. In this section the results of the analysis regarding the 
impact of affiliated economist’s geographical proximity to dealers and news sources on the 
dealers’ contribution to price discovery via model (12) is reported. 
 𝑃𝐷 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐴𝐹 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑁 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑁 + 𝛽4𝐷𝐸 + 𝛽5𝑅 + 𝜀 (12) 
In model (12), PD is replaced by the dealers’ contribution to the price discovery of 
ask and bid, AF is the number of forecasts by the dealer’s affiliated economists. EN (DE) is 
the geographical proximity of economists (dealers) to the news source (economist). The 
results of these analyses are reported in table 5.4 panel A. It should be stressed here that 
model (12) is conducted only on dealers with affiliated economists. Therefore, all the results 
presented and explained in this section only concern dealers with affiliated economists. It 
means the analysis presented in this section explores the impact of studied factors on the 
information advantage creation of dealers with economist affiliation. 
[Table 5.4 Here] 
The geographical proximity of a dealer’s affiliated economists and dealers to each 
other and to the macroeconomic news sources play a prominent role in their quotes’ 
information content. These three points, EN, DE, and DNs, can be positioned in three 
formations. First, when they are completely apart from each other (i.e., all are located in 
different countries). Second, when two of them are overlapping and one is separate from the 
other two (i.e., two points in one country and one in another country). Third, when these 
three points completely overlap on each other in the same country. The question that will be 
addressed here is how the location and position of these three geographical factors, 
economists, dealers, and news sources interact with each other and what the impact of this 
interaction is on a dealer’s information advantage. In order to address this question, first EN 





and DN variables are separately examined and subsequently their interaction with each other 
via DE, is explained.  
5.4.2.1. The Locality of Economists to Macroeconomic News Sources  
The first element of geographical proximity that is studied is EN, which quantifies 
the geographical proximity of a dealer’s affiliated economists’ locations and the news source. 
EN measures what percentage of news that affiliated economists of a dealer have forecasted 
are released from the same country that they are located in. The results show that the increase 
in EN significantly increases the dealers’ contribution to the price discovery of ask and bid. 
In other words, EN shows that the dealers with affiliated economists who are local to the 
source of a news release have a higher information advantage than dealers with non-local 
affiliated economists. This finding is similar to the information advantage of analysts due to 
their locality in the equity markets where it is found that local analysts have higher forecasting 
accuracy than that of non-local analysts (Malloy, 2005; Bae et al., 2008). The importance of 
locality also holds for forecasting monetary policies (Berger et al., 2009).  
The geographical proximity of dealers to macroeconomic news sources was shown 
to have a significant impact on their contribution to price discoveries. Similarly, the 
geographical proximity of a dealer’s affiliated economists has also considerable impact on 
the dealer’s contribution to price discovery and this impact is considerably higher than the 
impact of an affiliated economist’s research scope. Although the physical location of a market 
maker can be assumed random, the positioning of affiliated economists is not. This finding 
has an implication for market makers in positioning their affiliated economists in the country 
in which they research their macroeconomic news announcements. Although the summary 
statistics of EN in table 5.4 panel B shows on average 42% of the dealers’ affiliated 
economists are located in the country that they research its macroeconomic news, EN’s 





summary statistics show that this average is extremely influenced by the left skewness of the 
EN distribution.  
An interesting question is the reasons behind analysts’ information advantage due to 
their locality. Four reasons are found from the literature, however, testing these reason in 
this context is not possible either due to the short time period of this study or inapplicability 
of these reason to the FX market. First it is found that quality of information disclosure by 
firms affects analyst performance (Bae et al., 2008). However, since the countries for which 
macroeconomic news are studied here are amongst the most developed and open economies, 
this reason seems unlikely to be the force behind local advantage for forecasting 
macroeconomic news. Second, access to management of a firm, connection with a firm’s 
representative, observation of a firms’ input and output, the ability to speak with clients, 
customers, or employees are also found to be an important information advantage source 
for local analysts (Berger et al., 2009; Bae et al., 2008; Green et al., 2014). There is no need 
to explain that none of these factor is valid regarding a country’s macroeconomic news.  
Third, Berger et al., (2009) argues that financial analysts benefit from geographical 
proximity due to similarities in culture, language, and closeness to local market condition in 
which firms operate. Fourth, Bae et al., (2008) find that local analysts, on average, have 
followed a firm for half a year longer55. These last two argument are very probably scenarios 
that seem valid in the context of a country’s macroeconomic news. It can be argued that local 
analysts and economists learn how to interpret the news and data based on their familiarity 
and experience with the local environment. Familiarity and experience of an economist might 
affect his ability in interpreting public information that is found to be the source of 
information asymmetry around public information announcements (Ito et al., 1998; Kim and 
Verrecchia, 1994 and 1997). 
                                                 
55 This research dataset merely contains 113 days of data for macroeconomic news announcement that makes 
it extremely short for testing this hypothesis.  





5.4.2.2. Locality of Dealers to Macroeconomic News Sources and its Implication 
The second element of geographical proximity that is evaluated in model (12) is the 
locality of dealers and macroeconomic news sources. Model (11)’s results showed that the 
increase in the number of news released from a dealer’s country of location, increases their 
contribution to price discovery of ask. The same result is found here, however, in this case, 
it is significant for both price discoveries of ask and bid, however, with different magnitude. 
Interestingly, the locality of a dealer’s impact on his contribution to bid (ask) price discovery 
is larger (smaller) than that of the locality of their affiliated economists to macroeconomic 
news source. This finding shows that the geographical proximity of a dealer or affiliated 
economist to a news source are neither superior nor inferior to each other in terms of the 
information advantage creation that has implications for market makers. Model (11)’s results 
showed that the location of the market maker has a considerably important impact on their 
information advantage. The results here show that although a dealer’s location is fixed, 
dealers can create almost the same level of information advantage by hiring local economists.  
5.4.2.3. The Locality of Dealers and Their Affiliated Economists  
Until now, it was shown that the location of dealers and affiliated economists in the 
country of the macroeconomic news origin, increases the dealers information advantage. The 
question that arises here is how these two geographical proximities interact with each other 
and the news source location. For instance, do the dealers and their affiliated economists 
which are located in the same country as the news source have dramatically higher 
information advantages than others? Do the dealers and their affiliated economists who are 
located in the same country, which is not the country of the news origin, have a different 
information set than dealers and affiliated economists who are located in different countries? 
These questions can be answered by studying DN, EN, and DE, side-by-side. DE shows 





that the location of dealers and their affiliated economists in the same country reduces a 
dealer’s contribution to the price discovery.  
However, the interpretation of DE becomes meaningful when it is done side by side 
with EN and DN. The negative sign of DE for the price discovery of ask and bid means, 
although there is an increase in DN and/or EN, increase in a dealer’s information quality, 
location of both economists and the dealer in the country of news origin does not yield a 
higher contribution to price discovery, equal to the linear summation of their coefficients. 
Variable DE states that the benefit or caveats of a dealer’s geographical proximity on price 
discovery is non-linear relationship. This nonlinear relationship shows that there is a limit on 
the quality of the information that can be collected by dealers or their affiliated economists 
from the same location. In other words, although the locality of dealers and economists 
enables them to collect and interpret higher quality information than non-local dealers and 
economists, there is a limit on the quality of information, even if this information is the best 
available. The explanation of DE, until now, was concerned with the locality of dealers 
and/or their affiliated economist to news sources, and the impact of the location of both of 
them in the news source country. However, as table 5.4 panel B shows, this is not always the 
case. Only 16% of dealers and 42% of affiliated economists are local to the news that are 
released and they forecast, respectively. The question that arises here is whether the location 
of economists and dealers in the same country, where it is not the country of news origin, 
has any impact on a dealer’s information quality. The short answer is yes. Although the 
position of a dealer and/or his affiliated economists who are in locations other than that of 
the news source reduces a dealer’s information quality, relative to local dealers, in the case 
that a dealer and his economists are in different locations, they will have access to a different 
set of information. Again, the same principal of information quality limitation, holds here. 
When a dealer and his affiliated economists are not located in the country of the 
macroeconomic news origin but in the same country, there is a certain amount of 





information that they can collect. Their location in different countries, even if not the country 
of the news origin, allows them to have access to different and a wider set of information. 
In other words, there is a limit on the quality of information that can be accessed from the 
same location. The best set of information can be collected when a dealer and his affiliated 
economists are located in the country of news origin, and the lower quality set of information 
is collected when a dealer and his affiliated economists are located in the same country that 
is not the country of news origin. 
The combination of these three variables, EN, DN, and DE, illustrates that dealers 
and their affiliated economists which are both located in the same country as that of 
macroeconomic news sources, have the highest contribution to price discovery. While 
dealers who neither they nor their affiliated economists are located in the news source 
geographical proximity and they are both located in the same country, have the lowest 
contribution to price discovery, within dealers with affiliated economists.  
5.4.3. Contradiction to Previous Findings in Chapter 4? 
This chapter showed that speed has an important and significant impact on the 
contribution of dealers to price discovery around macroeconomic news announcements. In 
addition, in the introduction and literature review chapter (section 2.5), it was argued that 
macroeconomic news is one of the main driving forces behind price changes and are linked 
to fundamental information regarding exchange rates. The question that arises here is are 
these findings in contradiction to the findings in chapter 4 that “increase in a dealer’s speed is 
associated with increase in their contribution to short-term price discovery, while speed does not play a role in 
fundamental, longer-term, price discovery”? The simple answer is NO. Although it was explained 
that macroeconomic news announcements and price changes as a result of them are linked 
to fundamental information, they do not explain ALL the variation in price changes. Evan 
and Lyons (2008) show that macroeconomic news announcements account for around 30% 





of the DM/USD exchange rate variation. Ito et al., (1998) argue that the view that the FX 
traders’ exclusive source of information is public information should be relaxed. If 
macroeconomic news announcements were to be the only force behind the exchange rate 
variations or the only source of information in the FX, and because the incorporation of 
macroeconomic news in prices is almost instantaneous, one should have observed no price 
change (i.e., a flat line) between macroeconomic news announcements. Therefore, the 
findings in this chapter are not contrary to the findings of chapter 4.  
5.4.4. Locality to The Eurozone 
The final point that should be clarified here is the way that locality is considered 
regarding the Eurozone macroeconomic news. Eurozone macroeconomic news 
announcements are regarding the whole dispersed Eurozone member states’ economic 
condition and not a single country. Because this news is regarding all 18 countries, no market 
maker or economists are assumed local. However, the question that arises here is the 
robustness of this assumption. In order to address this concern, the same analysis is repeated. 
If the assumption of the locality of market makers and economists located in the Eurozone 
as non-local is wrong, an increase in explanatory power of the model and the coefficient of 
the locality variables should be observed. However, as table 5.5 depicts it is not the case in 
any of the models and in all the cases there is a reduction in size and significance of all the 
location variables. Therefore, these results are consistent with the alternative assumption that 
is the non-locality of economists and market makers to the Eurozone macroeconomic news  . 
 [Table 5.5 Here] 
The point that should be considered here is, when market makers and economists 
who are located in the Eurozone member state countries are assumed local to the Eurozone 
macroeconomic news, they are also local to each other if they are both located in Eurozone 
member state countries.  






This chapter examined the impact of the economist affiliation, geographical 
proximity, and quoting speed of the market participants on their contribution to price 
discoveries of ask and bid. Although these factor are extensively studied in equity markets, 
due to the differences in the information transfer medium, information distribution 
mechanism, and the scope of macroeconomic and firm specific news, the expansion of 
findings in the equity market to the FX market requires further verification. Despite the 
overall similarities in findings regarding the impact of the economists’ affiliation and 
geographical proximity in the FX market to those of the equity markets, some differences 
exist in the findings. Analogous to equity markets, the results show that the market makers 
with economist affiliation have a higher contribution to price discovery than market makers 
without economist affiliation. This finding suggests that a positive impact of information 
collection sources on their affiliated market maker is independent of the market structure 
and information transparency medium. The difference between the findings in this chapter 
and similar studies in the equity market is that the level of information advantage of market 
makers, with affiliated economists, is significantly affected by the scope of affiliated 
economists’ research regarding a country’s macroeconomic news. The regulatory implication 
of this finding is that since the information content of market makers is influenced by the 
scope of the affiliated economists’ research scope and there is no private access to 
macroeconomic news, no regulatory action similar to Reg FD is required in the context of 
macroeconomic news, at least in the FX markets. 
The findings regarding the quotation speed of market makers are exhaustively similar 
to those of the equity markets. The results demonstrate that high speed market participants 
have a higher contribution to price discovery and the impact of a dealers’ quoting speed on 
the price discovery is considerably higher than that of economist affiliation. This finding also 





has a regulatory implication. Considering the importance of market participants quoting 
speed on their price discovery and importance of macroeconomic news in the FX market, 
allowing HFQs to have early access to macroeconomic news announcements could impose 
adverse selection costs on slower traders. 
Finally, this chapter examines the impact of the geographical proximity of market 
makers, affiliated economists, and macroeconomic news sources to each other. The findings 
depict the significant and positive impact of the geographical proximity of market makers 
and their affiliated economists to macroeconomic news sources on market makers’ 
information quality. Interestingly, the examination of the geographical proximity of market 
makers and their affiliated economists to each other revealed the position of the market 
makers and their affiliated economists in the same location imposes limitations on the quality 







Table 5.1 Countries Macroeconomic News Announcements and Coverage by Dealers and Economists 
This table demonstrates the summary statistics about countries macroeconomic news announcement, that is covered by at least one affiliated economist, and dealers and economists activity 
around them. Columns Country and Zone show the country that macroeconomic news has been released from and the currency zone, respectively. #News column depicts the number of 
distinct macroeconomic news from each country (/the total number of distinct news). It is also known as the ticker of the macroeconomic news. #MENA is the total number of 
macroeconomic news announcement released by the corresponding country (/the total number of announcement). #Events and #Days columns show the number of the announcement 
sessions and days (/the total number of distinct announcement days and session), respectively. #TF, #AF, and #LAF show the total number of forecasts in the whole market, number of 
affiliated forecasts, and number of local affiliated forecasts, respectively. #Dealers depicts the number of dealers (/all the dealers) who traded around the news announcements in the affected 
currencies. #Fdealer (#LDealer) refers to number of dealers (local dealers) who them or their subsidiaries have forecasted the news regarding a country and have been active in trading 
around those macroeconomic news announcements. **The number of local economists for the Eurozone is calculated based on the number of economists who are located in the Eurozone 
countries, however, in empirical analysis no economist or dealer is assumed to be local to Eurozone macroeconomic news. 












Belgium 1/9 6/41 6/35 6/33 81 10 0 50/74 2 0 
Estonia 3/17 10/73 8/41 8/29 40 19 10 44/74 4 0 
Eurozone** 30/39 147/205 65/87 53/66 4,192 717 248 64/74 25 9 
Finland 13/17 36/74 28/50 27/48 84 38 36 57/74 2 0 
France 28/34 117/163 58/69 52/60 1,456 326 0 67/74 11 2 
Germany 35/54 184/246 74/92 64/68 4,252 784 291 67/74 16 4 
Greece 3/7 6/34 5/30 5/29 21 7 6 49/74 2 1 
Ireland 4/21 4/89 1/32 1/30 10 6 4 36/74 2 1 
Italy 18/34 72/161 41/87 37/63 779 167 33 63/74 7 1 
Latvia 4/19 7/78 3/49 3/42 32 13 3 44/74 3 0 
Slovenia 1/13 1/63 1/33 1/33 5 1 0 29/74 2 0 
Spain 8/28 31/128 10/68 10/54 314 76 0 52/74 7 0 
U.K. U.K. 59/85 298/419 80/136 68/89 5,691 1,461 1,152 62/66 21 6 
Japan Japan 46/75 186/471 69/189 56/95 3,867 384 197 44/62 9 1 
U.S. U.S. 96/116 466/651 191/285 100/104 21,263 3,188 1,994 65/77 19 1 






Table 5.2 Quoting and News Summary Statistics 
This table reports the quotes and news summary statistics of all currency pairs. Panel A reports the summary statistics of number of quotes in the 4 minute windows, 90 seconds before, 60 
seconds within, and 90 seconds after each event. #Events demonstrates the number of macroeconomic news announcements affecting each currency pair and is the number of news release 
session, based on the intersection of the news release time, in the base and quote currency. #Dealers columns depicts the number of dealers in each currency pair that have traded within 
the sample window. Column Total depicts the total number of quotes in each currency pair within the 4-minute time frame of study. Panel B reports the summary statistics of news 
announcements affecting each currency pair from both base and quote currency zones, calculated based on the number of news per event. #News is the total number of distinct news, also 
known as news ticker, affecting the currency pair, from both base and quote currency zones. #MENA is the number of macroeconomic news announcements affecting the currency pair. 
Right hand side table in panel B reports the summary statistics of percentage of dealers with affiliated economists per event for each currency pair.  
Panel A. Quotes Summary Statistics per Event 
Currency #Events #Dealers Min Median Mean Max S.D. Total 
EUR/GBP 356 39 33 193.5 195.38 347 62.55 69,554 
EUR/JPY 344 44 36 230.5 218.58 340 63.61 75,192 
EUR/USD 462 61 32 247 242.17 457 67.77 111,881 
GBP/JPY 149 41 36 292 285.99 452 87.54 42,612 
GBP/USD 271 52 70 295 291.38 475 62.25 78,963 
JPY/USD 260 46 26 201.5 191.42 369 71.2 49,769 
Total 1,842 83      427,971 
Panel B. News Summary Statistics per Event 
News  % of Dealers with Affiliated Economists 
Currency #Events #News #MENA Min Median Mean Max S.D.  Min Median Mean Max S.D. 
EUR/GBP 356 207 919 1 2 2.58 13 2.12  4% 18.18% 20.08% 59.09% 11.41% 
EUR/JPY 344 194 807 1 2 2.35 11 1.62  3.70% 11.76% 13.37% 55.00% 8.11% 
EUR/USD 462 244 1087 1 2 2.35 12 1.81  3.33% 18.78% 21.32% 54.55% 12.43% 
GBP/JPY 149 105 484 1 2 3.25 13 2.76  4.17% 14.81% 15.81% 50.00% 9.18% 
GBP/USD 271 155 764 1 2 2.82 13 2.59  3.45% 25.00% 24.10% 46.43% 10.38% 
JPY/USD 260 142 652 1 2 2.51 12 2.1  4.35% 20.42% 20.36% 47.06% 11.02% 





Table 5.3 Information Advantage and Economist Affiliation 
This table illustrates the relationship between economist affiliation and dealers’ information advantage. Panel A reports the univariate mean comparison test of affiliated and non-affiliated dealers. Speed is 
quoting frequency of dealers per minute. AT is the average activity time of dealers, measured in milliseconds and presented in seconds. NQ is the number of quotes disseminated by dealers. AGA and AGB are 
the percentage of aggressiveness quoting of ask and bid, respectively. BS is the buy-sell intention of a dealer and WN is the number of times that a dealer has increased his spread by moving ask and bid in 
opposite directions minus the number of times that they have reduced their spread by tightening both bid and ask. PDA and PDB are the price discovery of ask and bid, respectively, and are magnified by 
100,000. Panel B reports the results of the regression on the impact of economic affiliation on price discovery. AF is the number of forecasts released by a dealer’s affiliated economists, if any, and TF is the 
total number of forecast released by all the economist in the market. DN is the percentage of the news in an event that are released from the same country of the dealer’s location. R is the average of the relevance 
index, a measure of relative popularity calculated by Bloomberg for each ticker news, in each event, presented in percentage. Panel C depicts the summary statistics of variables in panel B. Numbers in parentheses 
are robust standard errors. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Panel A. Price Discovery, Quoting Behaviour, Characteristic, and Economist Affiliation 
 Speed AT NQ AGA AGB BS PDA PDB Obs 
Non-Affiliated 0.974 164.811 10.080 62.822% 62.519% -0.042 12.671 14.363 32,781 
Affiliated 1.105 162.831 11.970 63.477% 63.12% 0.015 29.011 22.493 8,130 
Difference -0.131*** 1.98** -1.890*** -0.655% -0.6% -0.057* -16.34* -8.13  
Panel B. Price Discovery and Number of Forecasts 
 AF TF DN R Speed AT AG BS WN Constant Obs R2 
PDA 3.590* 0.0381 0.533*** 0.010 10.024*** 0.118*** 0.024 -1.559 8.160 -26.05* 37,711 0.002 
 (1.907) (0.036) (0.136) (0.163) (3.123) (0.043) (0.103) (1.954) (8.084) (14.76)   
PDB 3.378* 0.0462 0.142 -0.001 7.631*** 0.160*** -0.032 3.556** -12.36* -22.50** 37,646 0.002 
 (1.889) (0.028) (0.100) (0.118) (2.573) (0.030) (0.079) (1.447) (6.967) (10.56)   
Panel C. Summary Statistics of Variables 
 Obs Min Q1 Median Mean Q3 Max S.D. 
PDA 37,711 -8473.094 -175.250 0 15.973 187.621 8786.611 694.695 
PDB 37,646 -5108.985 -152.420 0 15.996 173.468 8094.004 508.745 
#AF 8,130 1 1 2 2.826 3 33 2.718 
#TF 1,842 1 16 29 33.783 45 101 23.393 
Speed 40,911 0.087 0.425 0.675 1.000 1.124 125.171 1.759 
AGA 40,911 0 33.333% 66.667% 62.952% 100% 100% 36.208% 
AGB 40,911 0 33.333% 66.667% 62.639% 100% 100% 36.225% 
AT 40,911 0 120.869 185.625 164.417 217.800 239.951 68.903 
R 1,842 0 41.18% 68.59% 57.44% 81.25% 98.41% 30.52% 





Table 5.4 Affiliated Economist Characteristics and Dealers’ Quoting Behaviour 
This table illustrates the impact of geographical proximity of dealers, affiliated economists, and news origins on information advantage and quoting behaviour of dealers. Panel A reports the 
results of regression analysis based on model 12 and panel B reports the summary statistics of the variables. PDA and PDB are the price discovery of ask and bid, respectively. AGA and 
AGB are the percentage of aggressiveness quoting of ask and bid, respectively. Speed is quoting frequency of dealers per minute. AT is the average activity time of dealers, measured in 
milliseconds and presented in seconds. AF is the number of forecasts by affiliated economists of a dealer. DN is the percentage of the news in an event that are released from the country 
that the dealer is located in. EN is the percentage of the news that are released from the country that the affiliated economist is located in and the affiliated economist has forecasted the 
news. DE is the percentage of the times that the affiliated economists who forecasted the news in an event are located in the same country as that of their dealer. R is the average of relevance 
index, a measure of relative popularity calculated by Bloomberg for each ticker news, in each event, presented in percentage. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard error. ***, ** and * 
indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Panel A. Affiliated Economist Characteristic and Price Discovery 
 #AF DN EN DE R Constant Obs R2 
PDA 3.039 0.689** 0.751*** -0.533** 0.526 -42.27 7,620 0.005 
 (2.418) (0.275) (0.182) (0.253) (0.382) (29.24)   
         
PDB 5.501** 0.464** 0.257* -0.312* -0.125 6.807 7,561 0.003 
 (2.586) (0.211) (0.140) (0.180) (0.321) (25.13) 
  
Panel B. Summary Statistics of Variables 
 Obs Min Q1 Median Mean Q3 Max S.D. 
PDA 7,620 -8473.094 -151.365 0 29.011 186.054 6936.200 715.816 
PDB 7,561 -5108.985 -166.425 0 22.493 169.596 8094.004 557.961 
DN 8,130 0 0 0 15.547% 0 100% 35.777% 
EN 8,130 0 0 7.692% 41.606% 100% 100% 45.137% 






Table 5.5 Robustness Test of Locality of Economists and Dealers to Eurozone 
This table replicates the results of table 5.3 panel B and Table 5.4 panel A and reports them in Panels A and B, respectively, however, with the assumption that economists and market 
makers who are located in Eurozone member state countries are local to Eurozone macroeconomic news announcements. AF is the number of forecasts released by a dealer’s affiliated 
economists, if any, and TF is the total number of forecast released by all the economist in the market. DN is the percentage of the news in an event that are released from the same country 
of the dealer’s location. R-Index is the average of relevance index, a measure of relative popularity calculated by Bloomberg for each ticker news, in each event, presented in percentage. 
Speed is quoting frequency of dealers per minute. AT is the average activity time of dealers, measured in milliseconds and presented in seconds. AG is the percentage of aggressiveness 
quoting of ask and bid. BS is the buy-sell intention of dealers and WN is the number of times that a dealer has increased his spread by moving ask and bid in opposite directions minus the 
number of times that they have reduced their spread by tightening both bid and ask. PDA and PDB are the price discovery of ask and bid, respectively, and are magnified by 100,000. 
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard error. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
Panel A. Price Discovery and Number of Forecasts 
 
AF TF DN R Speed AT AG BS WN Constant Obs R2 
PDA 3.610* 0.041 0.357*** -0.018 10.245*** 0.122*** 0.018 -1.568 8.061 -24.77* 37,711 0.002 
 
(1.923) (0.036) (0.122) (0.163) (3.149) (0.043) (0.103) (1.955) (8.086) (14.80) 
 
 
PDB 3.525* 0.047 0.003 -0.002 7.803*** 0.162*** -0.035 3.552** -12.388* -21.60* 37,646 0.002 
 
(1.897) (0.028) (0.083) (0.118) (2.603) (0.030) (0.079) (1.447) (6.966) (10.55) 
  
Panel B. Affiliated Economist Characteristic and Price Discovery 
 #AF DN EN DE R Constant Obs R2 
PDA 3.360 0.498** 0.644*** -0.607** 0.426 -32.13 7,620 0.004 
 (2.408) (0.227) (0.178) (0.253) (0.380) (29.02)   
         
PDB 5.379** 0.203 0.430** -0.236 -0.163 10.80 7,561 0.003 






Table 5.6 Correlation Matrix of Table 5.3 Regression Model 11 
This table reports the correlation matrix of model 11 in table 5.3 to address the concerns regarding the existence of high correlations and possible consequent multicollinearity. The magnitude 
of correlation coefficients in table 5.6 shows that regarding model 11 there are no concerns regarding the existence of multicollinearity and its impact on the results. ***, ** and * indicate 
statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
Panel A. Correlation Matrix from Model 11 in Table 5.3 for Price Discovery of Ask (PDA) 
 
PDA AF TF DN R Speed AT AGA BS WN 
PDA 1 
         
AF 0.0135*** 1 
        
TF 0.0099* 0.3708*** 1 
       
DN 0.026*** 0.0732*** 0.0463*** 1 
      
R 0.001 -0.008 0.0036 -0.0019 1 
     
Speed 0.0294*** 0.038*** 0.0183*** 0.0793*** 0.0157*** 1 
    
AT 0.0159*** 0.0315*** 0.0362*** 0.0518*** 0.0255*** 0.1033*** 1 
   
AGA -0.0028 0.0225*** 0.1053*** -0.0384*** 0.0008 -0.1036*** -0.0936*** 1 
  
BS 0.2347 0.0135*** 0.0381*** -0.0018 -0.0165*** -0.0018 -0.0091* 0.021*** 1 
 
WN 0.1765 0.004 0.0234*** -0.0047 0.0012 -0.007 0.003 0.0062 -0.0105** 1 
Panel B. Correlation Matrix from Model 11 in Table 5.3 for Price Discovery of Bid (PDB) 
 
PDB AF TF DN R Speed AT AGB BS WN 
PDB 1 
         
AF 0.0166*** 1 
        
TF 0.0137*** 0.3714*** 1 
       
DN 0.0128** 0.0738*** 0.0458*** 1 
      
R 0.0006 -0.0081 0.0026 -0.0025 1 
     
Speed 0.03*** 0.0402*** 0.0197*** 0.0835*** 0.0176*** 1 
    
AT 0.0254*** 0.0314*** 0.036*** 0.0516*** 0.0312*** 0.1113*** 1 
   
AGB -0.0061 0.0217*** 0.1012*** -0.0377*** 0.0128 -0.108*** -0.1004*** 1 
  
BS 0.0195*** 0.0151*** 0.041*** -0.0013 -0.0187*** -0.0022 -0.0102** 0.0222*** 1 
 
WN -0.0144*** 0.0056 0.0235*** -0.0032 -0.0011 -0.0056 0.0039 0.0061 -0.0112** 1 






This appendix lists the geographical information of dealers who have been active around macroeconomic news 
announcements and the currency pairs that they have been active in. 
Panel A. Africa 








Global Forex   √  √ √ 
         
Panel B. Asia 
Contributor Country City €/£ €/¥ €/$ £/¥ £/$ $/¥ 
ADIB U.A.E Abu Dhabi   √    
AHLI BK OMAN Oman Muscat   √    
BANK ASYA Turkey Istanbul   √  √  
BANK DHOFAR Oman Muscat   √    
BANK MUSCAT Oman Muscat   √  √  
BANK OF COMM 
Hong 
Kong 
Hong Kong √ √  √ √ √ 
BK OF CHINA 
Hong 
Kong 
Hong Kong   √  √ √ 
BTM Japan Tokyo  √ √ √ √ √ 




HONG KONG   √   √ 




Hong Kong   √  √ √ 












Singapore  √  √  √ 
MIZUHO Japan Tokyo      √ 
NAT BK OMAN Oman Muscat   √  √ √ 
NOMURA SEC Japan Tokyo  √     
PROMSVYAZ BK Russia Moscow   √    




Singapore  √  √  √ 




Hong Kong      √ 
YAPI KREDI Turkey Istanbul     √  
         





Panel C. Australia 
Contributor Country City €/£ €/¥ €/$ £/¥ £/$ $/¥ 
ANZ Australia Global Forex √ √ √ √ √ √ 
LLOYDS Australia Sydney √      
NAB Australia Global Forex   √   √ 
WESTPAC Australia Sydney √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Panel D. Europe 
Contributor Country City €/£ €/¥ €/$ £/¥ £/$ $/¥ 
ALLIED IRISH Ireland Dublin √ √ √ √ √ √ 
BANCA AKROS Italy Milan √ √ √ √ √ √ 
BANCPOST Romania Bucharest     √  
BANK BPH Poland Warsaw √  √  √ √ 
BARCLAYS United Kingdom 
Global 
Forex 
√ √  √ √ √ 
BCOPOPOLARE Italy Bergamo √ √ √ √ √  
BCP Portugal Lisbon  √  √   
CAIXA GERAL Portugal Lisbon √ √ √ √ √  
CBA United Kingdom London      √ 
CIBC Canada Toronto √ √ √ √ √  
CITIBANK Czech Republic Prague   √    
Commerzbank Germany Frankfurt √ √ √ √ √ √ 
DANSKE BANK Denmark 
Copenhage
n 










√ √ √  √ √ 
DNB BANK Norway Oslo     √ √ 
ERSTE BANK Austria Vienna   √   √ 
GSUK United Kingdom 
Global 
Forex 
√ √ √ √ √ √ 
HSBC United Kingdom 
Global 
Forex 
√ √ √ √ √ √ 
HSBC United Kingdom London   √  √  
ICBC United Kingdom London   √    
ICM Italy Milan   √    
ING BANK Ukraine Kiev   √    




√ √ √ √ √ √ 
LBBW Germany Stuttgart √ √ √ √ √  
MONTE PASCHI Italy Milan √ √ √ √   




√ √ √ √ √ √ 
PIRAEUS BANK Greece Athens √ √ √ √   
RABOBANK United Kingdom London √ √ √ √ √ √ 
RBS United Kingdom London √ √ √ √ √ √ 





SABADELL Spain Sabadell √ √ √ √   
SANTANDER Spain Madrid √ √  √ √  
SEB Sweden Stockholm √ √  √  √ 
SOC GENERALE France 
Global 
Forex 
√ √ √ √ √ √ 
SOC GENERALE France Paris √ √ √ √  √ 
TATRA BANKA Slovakia Bratislava √ √     
UBS Switzerland Zurich √ √ √ √ √ √ 
WGZ BANK Germany Düsseldorf √ √ √ √ √  
ZUERCHER KB Switzerland Zurich √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Panel E. America 
Contributor Country City €/£ €/¥ €/$ £/¥ £/$ $/¥ 
BK MONTREAL Canada Montreal   √  √ √ 
BNY Mellon United States New York   √  √ √ 
BROWN BROS United States New York  √ √ √ √ √ 
CBA United States New York   √  √ √ 
HSBC United States Global Forex √ √ √ √ √  
RADA FOREX United States New York     √ √ 
RBS United States New York √ √ √ √ √ √ 
SEB United States New York √    √  





















This table reports dealers and the countries that they have affiliated economists regarding their macroeconomic 
news. The countries’ abbreviations are as follows, Belgium BEL, Estonia EST, Finland FIN, France FRA, 
Germany DEU, Greece GRC, Ireland IRL, Italy ITA, Japan JPN, Latvia LVA, Slovenia SVN, Spain ESP, 
United Kingdom UK, and United States of America USA. 
 
Dealer BEL EST EU FIN FRA DEU GRC IRL IT JPN LVA SVN ESP UK USA Total 
Allied Irish   √     √      √  3 
Barclays   √  √ √ √ √ √ √   √ √ √ 10 
Citibank   √  √ √   √    √  √ 6 
Commerzbank √  √   √        √ √ 5 
Danske Bank  √ √ √ √ √   √  √  √ √ √ 10 
DBS   √             1 
Deutsche Bank   √   √   √     √ √ 5 
Goldman Sachs   √       √   √ √ √ 5 
HSBC   √  √ √    √    √ √ 6 
ING Bank              √ √ 2 
Intesa √  √  √ √   √    √ √ √ 8 
LBBW   √   √        √ √ 4 
Lloyds   √   √        √  3 
Mizuho          √     √ 2 
N.B. of GREECE   √             1 
Nomura Security      √          1 
Nordea  √ √ √       √     4 
Piraeus Bank       √         1 
Rabobank   √  √         √  3 
RBS   √  √     √  √  √ √ 6 
Santander      √        √ √ 3 
SEB  √ √        √   √  4 
Societe Generale   √  √ √   √ √   √ √ √ 8 
UBS   √       √    √ √ 4 
Westpac   √   √        √ √ 4 
WGZ   √   √          2 




















This paper, for the first time, proposes a method for monitoring the behaviour of 
market participants in the foreign exchange (FX) market around the WMR fixing window. 
The FX market is a decentralised market with dealers spread across the globe conducting 
trades 24 hours a day. The around the clock trading poses a challenge to determining a daily 
closing price. Such a concept is needed for any entity that holds multi-currency portfolios in 
order to evaluate the value and performance of their holdings. The World Market Company 
(WM) in conjunction with Thomson Reuters launched the Closing Spot Rate Service, also 
known as the WMR Fix Rate or London Close, in January 1994. The WMR Fix Rate “has 
become a de facto standard for the closing spot rate” (FCA, 2014b, p.27). Given the 
importance of this fix rate for a whole range of financial instruments and contracts, it has 
been a shock to the financial system and regulators to find out that the fix rate has been 
subject to manipulation56. The widespread scandal concerning the manipulation has led to 
                                                 
56 On June 12, 2013, Bloomberg news reported that traders in five banks manipulated the fix rate affecting 
$3,600,000,000,000 assets “in funds including pension and savings accounts that track global indexes” (Vaughan 
et al., 2013; http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-06-11/traders-said-to-rig-currency-rates-to-
profit-off-clients). The breaking of this news triggered 20 investigations in 10 countries and the European 
Union resulting in $9,900,000,000 fines as of May 20, 2015 (Bloomberg Visual Data, 2015). 





heightened concerns as to the lack of regulatory oversight and weaknesses in the design of 
the FX market. 
Given the manipulation issue and the near impossibility of switching the FX market 
to a regulated exchange in the near future, the priority is to understand what has gone wrong 
with the current system and how regulators can act in a more timely and informed manner 
as suggested in the Financial Stability Board 2014 report. To date the focus of the regulatory 
investigations and media attention has been on tracking trading activities for potential 
manipulation and collusive behaviour (FCA, 2014a; 2014b; 2014c; 2014d; Finch and 
Vaughan, 2014). It is, however, costly for regulators to investigate and, therefore, effectively 
identifying potential investigation targets is itself an important task. Given the rise of 
algorithmic and high-frequency trading within this market57, the challenge facing regulators 
is the design of a method that can monitor such trading activities in a cost effective manner 
and provide a timely warning signal that prompts further investigation. This chapter aims to fill 
this void by exploring the possibility of developing a monitoring system that can detect 
abnormal market behaviour. 
The FX market is predominantly a quote driven market58. Understanding the quoting 
behaviour of dealers is essential for examining the price discovery process of the market. 
Practically monitoring traders’ transaction behaviour through publicly available data is 
extremely difficult given that transaction data are disclosed without any identity information. 
It is even more difficult for the FX market given its decentralised nature causes a dispersion 
of trades across different platforms and markets. In contrast, dealers’ quotes are disseminated 
in real time (with identity) across a relatively few, large platforms. Among these platforms, 
                                                 
57 The Bank for International Settlement’s estimates the share of automated spot trading in the FX market is 
24.7% of $4.124 billion (BIS, 2011). Rime and Schrimpf (2013) report that “EBS estimates that around 30%-
35% of volume on its trading platform is HFT-driven.” Page 40. 
58 See section 6.2.1 for further discussion of the quote driven nature of the FX market.  





Thomson Reuters is by far the largest and most comprehensive59. This chapter accordingly 
collects and constructs a unique tick-by-tick dataset from the Thomson Reuters platform 
that contains dealers’ high frequency bid and ask quotes. The most prominent feature of this 
dataset is that the identity and location of the quote disseminators are recorded that allows 
close observation of how individual dealers contribute to price discovery around the WMR 
fixing at 4 o’clock (henceforth the Fix). The final dataset spans from 22nd April 2013 to 27th 
March 2014 and contains 109,474 quotes from EUR/GBP, EUR/JPY, EUR/USD, 
GBP/JPY, GBP/USD, and USD/JPY. These currencies are the most traded, liquid, and 
important currency pairs in the FX market, forming 77.7% of the $5.3 trillion a day FX trades 
(BIS, 2013). 
The analysis of the abnormal behaviour of dealers is started by understanding their 
“manipulative” objective functions when participating in the fixing process. The WMR 
benchmark fixing process is based on the median of the trade/quote prices within one 
minute centred at 4pm London time. The fix price, calculated by WM, is the outcome of the 
median of the snapshots of ask and bid prices, independently. Over the fixing window the 
actual trades executed, and the bid and offer rates are sampled every second by WM. Where 
trade data are available, they will be used to generate bid and ask prices by applying the bid-
ask spread at the time of the trade captured. For example, a public buy trade will be traded 
at the ask price; this trade price minus the bid-ask spread will produce the bid price at the 
time of the captured trade. The captured market data are subject to currency specific 
systematic tolerance checks that will identify outlying data. When the trade data are not 
sufficient or unavailable, quoted bid and ask data are used in the pool of calculation. After 
the finalization of the data capture, the medians of bid and ask prices are calculated and 
                                                 
59 Although the Electronic Broker System (EBS) is known as the main venue for the price discovery of the 
Euro and Yen (Cabrera et al., 2009), Thomson Reuters matches all the venues that are providing liquidity in 
the EBS (Thomson Reuters, 2014). Therefore, this dataset contains all the disseminated quotes from all the 
liquidity providers from Thomson Reuters and EBS. 





subsequently the mid-rate is formed based on these bid and ask medians. Finally, to obtain 
the bid and offer price from the mid-rate, a minimum standard spread is applied to the mid-
rate to calculate the new bid and ask price (World Market Company, 2015). Therefore, these 
medians are the most prominent and fundamental elements in constructing the fix price. 
This chapter conjectures that the manipulation of these medians is likely to lead to the 
manipulation of the fix price.  
One of the reasons for the emergence and attractiveness of manipulating the fix rate 
is the process, at which trading at the fix price occurs, that allows firms to front-run their 
clients’ orders. Prior to the determination of the fix rate, clients place orders (with a 
predetermined currency, volume and direction) with a firm. The firm, by agreeing to transact 
with clients at the fix rate, that is yet to be determined, exposes itself to price movements at 
the fix. “A firm with net client orders to buy currency at the fix rate will make a profit if the 
average rate at which the firm buys the currency in the market is lower than the fix rate at 
which it sells to its clients. Similarly, a firm with net client orders to sell currency at the fix 
rate will make a profit if the average rate at which it sells the currency in the market is higher 
than the fix rate at which it buys from its clients” (FCA, 2015, p.7).  
Receiving a client order before 4 p.m. gives banks a window of opportunity to adjust 
their positions and manipulate the fix rate to boost their profits. In order to manipulate the 
fix rate, traders concentrate their orders moments before and during the fixing window, and 
this allows them to push the rate in their desired direction. When traders received a large 
order they adjusted their positions with the knowledge that their clients’ trade could move 
the market, otherwise they may have lost money for their banks. For instance, when a trader 
with more than a decade of experience received an order at 3:30 p.m. to sell €1 billion and 
buy Swiss francs he stated he had two objectives - first to sell his own euros at a higher price, 
and second to move the rate lower so as to enable the buying of euros more cheaply from 





his client. A simple 2 basis points movement in the fix price would lead to a 200,000 francs 
($216,000) profit (Vaughan et al., 2013). In addition, since the fix rate is calculated on the 
median of trades during the fixing window, placing a number of small trades has a higher 
impact than a large one. Therefore, in order to maximise their profits, traders break their 
transactions into smaller trades in order to put the highest possible pressure on the fix rate 
(Vaughan et al., 2013)60.  
The procedure of capturing potential manipulation behaviour is achieved in two 
phases. First, in the identification phase, those quotes updates that are strategically and 
systematically contributing to moving the current median (the median before the quote) 
towards the final median (the realised median of the quotes during the fixing period) are 
identified. The idea is that before every quote update, a dealer examines the distribution of 
the quotes posted since the fixing window started and makes a decision of a quote update so 
that it will move the median in the intended direction61. The number of such identified quote 
actions are counted for each dealer and create a daily measure that is referred to as the ManIx 
(the method is described in detail in Section 6.3).  
The second phase is statistical verification. The ManIx measure is, therefore, 
intended to capture a specific type of quoting behaviour that is in line with the manipulation 
motive. However, it is possible that a dealer has a high ManIx by a random coincidence of 
when they post their quotes. In order to determine that the ManIx score for individual banks 
is capturing the strategic and systematic behaviour of dealers, the significance of the ManIx 
score through bootstrap simulations is examined. In simulations, for a given fixing period, 
only one aspect of the dealers’ quotes, the timing, is changed. In other words, all dealers’ 
                                                 
60  Although no direct evidence of increases in transactions during the fixing exists, from the Quotation 
Database, it can be seen that the numbers of quotes during the one minute of the fixing window are about 40% 
to 90% more than other non-fixing minute averages for the six currency pairs. 
61 It is difficult to observe dealers’ real intentions. In practice, this chapter uses the observed final median as a 
measure of dealers’ manipulation targets. This design captures only successful manipulative attempts. In other 
words, this approach is a conservative estimate of the true manipulation in the market. 





number of quotes and the quote movements, relative to the previous quote in the fixing 
window, are maintained while randomizing the sequence of their quotes in the fixing window. 
Such a design randomises the dealers’ quotes with respect to the current median. If dealers’ 
quotes are not conditional on the median of the quotes before their quotes, their ManIx 
measured from their realised quote should not be significantly different from the mean 
ManIx measure constructed from these bootstrap simulations62. A significant realised ManIx 
compared to the bootstrap distribution would suggest that the realised ManIx is most likely 
to be due to systematic and strategic behaviour.  
17 out of 69 dealer-locations in the Quote Dataset are identified that have at least 
one realised ManIx score that is significant at the 5% level when compared to the simulated 
scores. In order to verify the effectiveness of this model in capturing realised manipulation, 
an extensive search of regulatory investigations and press releases for a full list of banks that 
have been investigated, is conducted. This is a full survey of the FX fixing scandal. The 
findings show that by mid December 2015, there are nine banks that have been investigated 
or sued by their investors and many cases are still on going. These investigations have led to 
a total of more than $11.8 billion of fines across the globe – the scale of these fines imposed 
by regulatory sanction and investor class actions is unprecedented. In addition, more than 40 
traders have been fired, suspended, put on leave, or resigned since the start of the 
investigations (see section 6.4.2 for detailed discussions).  
 When the identified list with the investigation list is compared, it is found that eight 
dealer-locations among the top identified banks sorted by the number of significant ManIx, 
have been either fined by regulators or have internal investigations. Among these banks, four 
banks that have been heavily fined by regulators are identified that account for 68% ($8 
                                                 
62 Such a bootstrap design also has the important benefit of controlling for a size effect as is discussed later in 
the methodology session.  





billion) of the total fines imposed by regulators and through court settlements. This confirms 
the power of the ManIx in capturing the abnormal behaviour of banks that is of interest to 
regulators.  
One interesting question to ask is what has happened to the quotation behaviour of 
dealers after the breakout of the sandal and especially the regulatory investigations. To this 
end, an out of sample test is performed by applying the ManIx model to March 2016 when 
the new longer fixing window has been implemented by WM. The results show that ManIx 
demonstrates a decrease in its frequency of occurrence by more than 4 times on average 
compared to the 2013-14 period, which suggests an overall improvement in the quality of 
the ‘fixing environment’ after the investigations. Nevertheless, there are still some signs of 
significant ManIx that may be worth close monitoring by regulators. 
One of the important insights of the regulatory investigations is that the manipulators 
are not acting alone and collude via the sharing of information through chat rooms (Finch 
and Vaughan, 2014; Ahmed, 2014). Directly detecting and investigating such networks 
requires special access to information that is deemed to be private and confidential. Although 
ManIx is designed to capture the abnormal behaviour of individual dealers, it is possible to 
use it to infer potential collusion through coordinated manipulation. To quantify the 
potential extent of collusion, the coincidences of banks that have abnormal behaviour in the 
same fixing period is mapped. In other words, by counting the number of days that two 
banks have a significant ManIx score in the same currency pairs, it is possible to identify 
potential collusion networks. The analysis identifies that some networks exist that are of 
potential interest to regulators - there is, of course, a lack of public information to verify 
these findings at this stage. This analysis illustrates the potential application of ManIx in a 
network analysis context.  





This research contributes to the regulatory framework and academic literature in the 
following ways. First, the challenge of monitoring the unregulated FX market through an 
algorithm that can serve as an automated timely warning system to regulators and banks is 
addressed. Warning systems are usually methods for forecasting crises (Geng et al., 2015; 
Savona, 2014; Sevim et al., 2014). These warning systems are designed to predict undesirable 
events in the future. However, such a philosophy does not hold for regulatory investigation 
purposes. This is because misconduct cannot be accused before such behaviour has occurred. 
The FX fix scandals have sparked not only the need for closer regulatory oversight but also 
more internal controls. The ManIx approach provides an important toolkit to regulators and 
banks to monitor the activities during such a key trading period – the Fix price period63.  
 Second, and more generally, this study contributes to the new debate on the 
response of regulators to the rapid changes in financial technology. The availability of big-
data and high speed computing could create a new generation of regulatory technology; 
referred to as RegTech in a report by the UK Government (Government Office for Science, 
2015). This chapter demonstrates, in the context of the FX market, that it is feasible to design 
an automated early warning/monitoring system 64 . This study also provides a first 
demonstration that by reverse engineering, it is possible to design a monitoring system for a 
fixing price process.  
Finally, this study highlights the potential of quote data in demonstrating potential 
misbehaviour in the FX market. This chapter shows how market monitoring is 
implementable by using quote data. Dealers who have manipulation intentions should have 
                                                 
63 Although this chapter takes great comfort that the banks identified via its methodology are close to the 
regulatory investigations’ findings, it recognises that there may be false positives in its test. Not all of the 
identified banks have been investigated by the regulators. Whether or not these are false positive will only be 
found if regulators initiate investigations and release their findings. 
64 “In response to the rapidly changing financial landscape the FCA set up Project Innovate and so regulators 
are working to keep up with new business models entering the financial system” (Government Office for 
Science, 2015, p.47). 





a cohesive strategy in both their trading and quoting, since most transactions originate from 
a quote65. This chapter identifies potential manipulation behaviour in the quote data that 
affects the quality of the WMR Fix price.  
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.2 discusses the background 
and motivation of this chapter and explains the structure of the FX market and the dataset 
that is used for the empirical analysis of this chapter. Section 6.3 explains the ManIx 
methodology and its identification and statistical verification phases. Section 6.4 presents the 
results of implementing ManIx and compares the findings of ManIx by media reports and 
regulatory investigation findings and section 6.5 draws conclusion of the chapter.  
6.2. Background, Motivation and Data  
6.2.1. The Forex Market – A Quote Driven Market 
The FX market is a geographically dispersed, decentralised, quote driven, and 
primarily over the counter market (FSB, 2014). Due to these attributes, there is not a single 
database that contains all the transactions conducted in this market. However, active dealers 
in the FX market disseminate the price that they are willing to trade on, in the form of 
indicative data (Goodhart and O'Hara, 1997). Indicative quotes are disseminated on different 
platforms with the most important one being Thomson Reuters (Martens and Kofman, 
1998); more than 50% of all the electronic trading in the foreign exchange market occurs on 
the Reuters platform (Risk, 2011) and the majority of the main players in the FX market 
disseminate their indicative quotes on this platform.  
In recent years, advances in communication technology have contributed to the 
integration of the FX market and enabled customers to access multi-pricing sources 
                                                 
65 See section 6.2.1. for further details 





simultaneously. This has led to an increased share of electronic trading in the FX market, 
with 90% of the trades in the FX spot market being conducted via electronic platforms. 
Though the overwhelming majority of the FX market trades occur on electronic platforms, 
there is not a single database that includes all the trades in this market. However, the vast 
majority of transactions in the FX market, conducted on an electronic platform, originate 
from a quote in two ways. First, a customer asks for a quote from a dealer or multiple dealers, 
simultaneously, for ask and bid prices for a specific size and subsequently accepts the desired 
side. Second, dealers stream a series of quotes, with predefined sizes. A trader could accept 
either side of a quote (ask or bid) and conduct a transaction (RBS Market Place, 2014a; 
2014b). In either of the situations, a quote disseminated by a dealer is displayed on multiple 
electronic platforms, while a transaction is recorded merely on a single platform. 
Furthermore, a quote is disseminated with the identity of the disseminator, while transaction 
data do not include any identity information due to privacy reasons.  
Based on the aforementioned reasons, a comprehensive set of quotes with the 
identity of their disseminators, is the most adequate, available dataset to study the FX market, 
should the behaviour of individual dealers be the focus of the analysis.  
6.2.2. The WMR Benchmark  
In 1990 the World Markets (WM) Company, a small actuarial firm in Edinburgh, 
needed a single exchange rate for valuing the international portfolio of its pension fund 
clients. Until then a closing rate, published by Financial Times the following morning, was 
being used. The WM Company proposed their idea of producing a “carefully defined, 
cleaned, and screened benchmark” with Reuters (Willson-Taylor, 2013, p.2). The FX Fix rate 
was introduced by the WM Company by using a Reuters’ data feed in 1994 (World Market 
Company, 2015). The daily Fix rate produced by WM/Reuters at 4pm London time, also 
known as WMR Fix rate or London closing rate, “is by far the dominant benchmark being 





used, not just in FX, but also as a key input in multi-currency equity, bond, and credit indices” 
(FSB, 2014, p.1). Due to the prominence of this benchmark and in response to the recent 
scandal in the FX Fix rate, HM Treasury in the UK has brought WMR and six other 
benchmarks “into the regulatory perimeter [to] enable close and continuous supervision by 
the UK regulators, as well as providing specific powers of enforcement against those that 
manipulate these benchmarks” (HM Treasury, 2015, p.6)66.  
The Fix rate is used in a variety of financial benchmarks and by a majority of 
investment entities that invest globally such as asset managers (including ETFs and corporate 
end users), non-financial corporates, and index providers (FSB, 2014). The main cause 
behind the emergence of the Fix rate manipulation problem is the way it is being used. Due 
to the growth in demand for trading at a fix rate and a consequent increase in competition 
from banks for this business, FX dealers have increasingly agreed to buy from or sell to their 
clients at the mid-point fix price, rather than applying the spread. Dealers receive orders from 
their clients ahead and within the Fix rate window and guarantee to buy or sell at the yet 
unknown mid-point Fix price. In order to manage the risk of trading at the mid-point Fix 
rate, dealers attempt to manage their risk by trading before and around the fixing window. It 
is clear that the larger the size of a dealer’s clientele, the easier it will be for the dealer to 
‘predict’ the direction of the price movement.  
The WMR Fix rate manipulation scandal that unfolded in 2014 shook the foundation 
of many banks. These investigations have resulted in the largest ever fines imposed by 
regulators on a group of banks (Ring and Vaughan, 2014). The Bank of England fired its 
chief currency dealer, Martin Mallett, because of his failure to inform his superiors of the 
practice of sharing clients’ information by traders (Vaughan and Hamilton, 2014). There have 
                                                 
66 Explanatory memorandum to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (regulated activities) (amendment) 
order 2015 no. 369, section 2, by HM treasury.   





been many investigations and law suits since 2014. More details of these investigations are 
discussed in section 6.4.  
6.2.3. Data 
This chapter starts investigating WM/R fix rate manipulation by using a subset of 
the Quote Dataset explained in chapter 3. This subset includes merely the quotes, in the six 
currency pairs, around WM/R fixing window. Recall that the Quote Dataset contains quotes 
from EUR/GBP, EUR/JPY, EUR/USD, GBP/JPY, GBP/USD, and USD/JPY. The 
dataset spans from April 22nd, 2013 to March 27th 2014. There are 92 dealers from 6 
continents, 42 countries and 49 cities that form 104 dealer-locations – of which 69 are active 
around the fixing window. There are two reasons for the difference between the number of 
dealers and locations in this chapter’s dataset in comparison to the original Quote Dataset, 
explained in chapter 3. First, this chapter’s quote dataset includes only the days that there has 
been no interruption in capturing the data around WM/R fix rate. Second, not all dealers 
have been active around the WM/R fix rate.  
Table 6.1 reports the descriptive statistics of the Quote Dataset of the one-minute 
fixing window: from 15:59:30.000 to 16:00:30.000. It contains 225 days with 109,474 quotes 
in total for all the six currency pairs. GBP/JPY is the most active currency with an average 
of 102 quotes per day, while USD/JPY is the least active with an average of 72 quotes per 
day. It suggests that for all currency pairs more than one quote per second is disseminated.  
[Table 6.1 Here] 
For dealer information, the Dealers/Locations column depicts the total number of 
unique dealers/locations in the Quote Dataset. The reason for distinguishing between the 
branches of the same dealers in different locations is due to their different characteristics. 
For instance, the Royal Bank of Scotland has two branches, one in New York and one in 





London. The London branch is active from 8am to 4pm GMT time while the one in New 
York is active around the clock. In total, there are 69 unique dealer/locations across 37 cities 
in the Quote Dataset. For more information regarding the dealers, their locations, and the 
currency pairs they are active in, see the appendix.  
6.3. The Manipulation Intention Index (ManIx) 
To search and identify the potentially manipulative behaviour of market participants, 
it is begun by analysing the objective of manipulative behaviour. It is noted that the outcome 
of the manipulation is influenced by the fixing methodology. In order to calculate the fix 
price, WM Company captures snapshots of trades/quotes, for 60 seconds centred at 4pm 
GMT, at the interval of one second. Then after validation of the captured snapshots the 
medians of bid and ask prices are calculated and the minimum standard spread is applied to 
produce the final fix price67 (WM Company, 2015). Thus, a market participant who wishes 
to manipulate the fix rate should do so by manipulating the median price, since it is the most 
prominent element of the fix price calculation process.  
The proposed method for identifying manipulative behaviour consists of two phases, 
identification and statistical verification. The first phase, identification, identifies those quote 
updates that contributed to the movement of the current median towards the final median, 
where the current median is the median of the quotes since the start of the fixing period up 
to the current quote. The idea behind this phase is that for every quote update, if a dealer 
has manipulation intention, the dealer strives to move the median towards the intended 
                                                 
67 “WM performs tolerance checks at the time the data are sourced and again after the calculation of the 
benchmark is complete. This may result in some captured data being excluded from the fix calculation.” (World 
Market Company, 2015, p.6). Though the mid-price Fix rate is the most common form of use, the Fix rate is 
published as bid and ask prices. As a result, in this methodology the bid and ask quotes separately are examined 
to analyze the behavior of dealers. 





direction. The second phase, statistical verification, determines whether the realised measures 
of manipulation intention are statistically significant.  
6.3.1. The Identification Phase 
This chapter’s proposed methodology identifies those quote updates that are 
contributing to the movement of the current median towards the final median, where the 
current median is the median of the quotes since the start of the fixing period up to the 
current quote. The idea behind this methodology is that for every quote update, if a dealer 
has manipulation intention, the dealer strives to move the median in the intended direction. 
For successful manipulations, the realised medians would be a good proxy for dealers’ 
manipulation targets. This methodology determines whether a set of quotes, disseminated 
by a dealer is placed strategically to move the Fix price. Specifically, two conditions should 
be met to classify each quote as a Potentially Manipulative Quote (PMQ): 
𝐼𝐹 {
𝑆(𝐹𝑚 − 𝐶𝑚) ∗ 𝑆(𝑃𝑡 − 𝐶𝑚) = 1
𝒂𝒏𝒅
 𝑆(𝐹𝑚 − 𝐶𝑚) ∗ 𝑆(𝑃𝑡 − 𝑃𝑡−1) = 1
 
 
⇒  𝑃𝑀𝑄 = 1, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑃𝑀𝑄 = 0 (1) 
Where Fm, Cm, Pt, and Pt-1 are the final median, current median, the quote price
68 at 
time t, and quote price at time t-1, respectively; final and current medians are the final median 
of the price in the fixing windows and the median up to the current quote, respectively; S(x) 
is the sign of x and is equal to +1, 0, and -1 when x is positive, zero, and negative, respectively. 
If PMQ is equal to 1 it means that the quote could potentially be manipulative and otherwise, 
if zero. By definition, the PMQ for the first quote is zero, since there is no activity before it 
in the fixing window to compare it with. It should be mentioned that equation (1) does not 
take into account the magnitude of price change that could also be a source of price 
manipulation. 
                                                 
68 Fm, Cm, Pt, and Pt-1 refer to both ask and bid prices. 





Equation (1) states that a potentially manipulative quote is a quote that meets two 
conditions. First, the sign of the difference between the final and current median is equal to 
the sign of the difference between current price and the current median, it is called the 
location condition. This suggests that the new quoted price will move the current median 
towards the final median. Second, the sign of the difference between the final and current 
median is equal to the sign of the difference between the current price and the previous price, 
it is called the direction condition. This suggests that the direction of the latest quote is in 
the same direction as the intended median movement. The reason for this second condition 
is to capture a strong form of manipulative behaviour. For example, when quoting to move 
the median down, a down tick quote is more likely to be so when the resulting latest quote 
is at a lower level for others to follow69. To put it simply, equation (1) determines whether 
the current quote is moving the price towards the final median. 
The final step of the identification phase is constructing the ManIx score for a given 
fixing session. In order to do so, the PMQ score of each dealer is aggregated in each fixing 
daily. Thus, the ManIx score is formulated as below:  
 
 




Where ManIxi,j is the aggregated PMQ score for dealer i in day j, n is the number of 
all quotes in the fixing window j, and ManIxk is the ManIx score for quote k. Di is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 when quote k belongs to dealer i and 0 otherwise.  
                                                 
69 It is possible to quote a price lower than the current median while higher than the last quote price. Such a 
quote would be a less effective manipulation than a down tick quote (a quote that has a quote price lower than 
the previous quote price).  





6.3.2. The Statistical Verification Phase 
The aim of this research is to develop a framework and a methodology that can 
identify manipulative behaviour within the WMR fixing window. This methodology, ManIx, 
identifies which quotes strategically contribute to the final realization of the Fix rate. Such 
behaviour, per se, is not necessarily a sign of manipulative behaviour since it could be just a 
coincidence that the quote meets the specified condition. Strategically placing quotes in order 
to move it in a dealer’s desired direction and successfully doing so is a manipulative behaviour. 
The question that needs addressing is how to differentiate the random from the systematic 
strategic behaviour of a dealer. To this end, a bootstrap test for the ManIx statistics is 
designed.  
Simulations are run that randomise dealers’ quoting sequences while maintaining 
their quoting characteristics (size and direction of the tick movement). Maintaining the 
number of quotes and the size of tick movement in their quotes control for the potential size 
effect and information effect that may affect the calculation of ManIx. For example, for a 
dealer who quotes more often, then it is more likely that they will have a false positive ManIx 
by chance. Comparing the realised ManIx with a bootstrap simulation that maintains such a 
property will control for such a potential bias.  
For each day, in each currency pair, 10,000 series of randomised quotes are generated. 
All of these randomised sequences have the same total price movement, and dealers maintain 
their number of quotes and the associated tick movements as the realised sequence in the 
fixing. The only thing that changes is the location of the dealers’ quotes in the overall 
sequence. After generating these series, the simulated PMQ and ManIx scores for each dealer 
in that day are calculated.  
The design of this verification is to differentiate a dealer’s contribution to price 
discovery from manipulation. The simulated sequences will maintain the same level of 





contribution to price discovery (the total number of ticks that a dealer would have moved 
the price) while the timing of the contribution is different. In these simulated sequences, 
there will be quotes that have ManIx equal to 1 but are due to randomness. The assumption 
is that if a dealer is making quotes to time the market so that the median will move in an 
intended direction, their realised ManIx for that fixing session will be at the right tail of the 
ManIx distribution generated from the 10,000 randomised quote sequences; otherwise, the 
realised ManIx will be indistinct from that of the randomised sequences. 
 To exemplify the process of the verification phase, consider the following example. 
Assume five quotes, Q1 to Q5, are disseminated by three dealers, A, B, and C and the 
sequence of the quotes is given in Table 6.2. Panel A, demonstrates the original quote series. 
The subscripts for a dealer demonstrate the sequence of price for that dealer. The 
randomised sequence starts by keeping the first quote the same as the original sequence, in 
order to maintain the start and finish prices for all the sequences to be the same as the original 
one. For instance, Panel B shows an illustration of the randomization process. Q1 to Q5 are 
randomised as Q1, Q5, Q2, Q3, and Q4. In order to rebuild the price series after 
randomization, the price change of the quote in the sequence is applied. For example, the 
second quote in the randomised series is Q5, which was B2 in the original quote. The 
corresponding price change for B2 was “-0.1”. Therefore, the price in the randomised series 
will be the previous price plus the corresponding change, which is equal to 1.8 + (-0.1) = 1.7. 
Notice that the total contribution to price discovery of each dealer is maintained. For 
example, for dealer B their total contribution to price discovery is zero in both panels (0.1+(-
0.1)=0). What is different is the timing of these contributions to the sequence. If the timing 
is strategic to manipulate the fixing, a randomization will remove this effect and, therefore, 
reduce the possibility of generating a positive ManIx signal in the randomization. 
[Table 6.2 Here] 





For each day, in each currency pair, 10,000 series of randomised quotes are generated. 
After generating these series, the PMQ score and ManIx score are calculated for each of the 
dealers in that day. To determine whether a dealer’s quoting behaviour was a result of random 
or strategic quoting, it is identified where the original ManIx score lies within the simulated 
ManIx scores distribution. If the original ManIx score lies within the top 5% of the simulated 
ManIx score histogram, the behaviour of the dealer on that day is classified as manipulative, 
otherwise it is classified as random or non-manipulative.  
[Figure 6.1 Here] 
Figure 6.1 illustrates a simulation distribution for ask price of RBS (New York branch) 
on 21st June 2013 for the GBP/USD currency pair with the realised ManIx score of 17. Out 
of the 10,000 simulated ManIx scores, only 0.92% of them are larger or equal to the realised 
ManIx score by the dealer on the day. In other words, the original ManIx score, realised by 
the dealer, lies within the top 5% of the simulated ManIx distribution and, consequently, the 
dealer’s ask quotes are identified as manipulative.  
6.4. Results and Discussion  
6.4.1. An Overview of Fix Rate Discovery 
Table 6.3 reports the daily distribution of the average ManIx per quote. For each day, 
the average ManIx is calculated for each currency pair using all dealers’ quotes. Such per 
quote averages give an idea of the frequency of quotes that are captured as potentially 
manipulative by the ManIx. Panel A shows that on average the number of quotes that are 
deemed to be manipulative range from 10 (10) to 22 (21) percent for the Ask (Bid) price. For 
instance, the daily mean of the average ManIx per quote is 0.1334 for EURGBP. This means 





that on average, almost, 1 out of 7.5 quotes coincides with the potential manipulation 
definition70.  
[Table 6.3 Here] 
6.4.2. ManIx and Regulatory Investigations 
Table 6.4 reports the identified dealers with significant ManIx. If the realised ManIx 
score lies within the top 5% of the simulated ManIx score, the dealer’s behaviour in that day 
is classified as manipulative, otherwise it is classified as random or non-manipulative. In 
terms of the EUR/GBP, EUR/JPY, EUR/USD, GBP/JPY, GBP/USD, and USD/JPY 
currency pairs the results identify 7, 6, 5, 6, 7, and 3 dealers, respectively, who their quoting 
behaviour is identified as potentially manipulative. The number of days that dealers have 
manipulated the market varies amongst the dealers71. In all the currency pairs, Barclays and 
the Royal Bank of Scotland, both London and New York branches, Rabobank, and Societe 
Generale demonstrate considerably greater manipulative behaviour than other dealers. 
Table 6.4 provides a short list that can guide regulators in their potential 
investigations of manipulation. How can this list be verified and, therefore, provide evidence 
for the validity of the ManIx methodology? It is unlikely to be able to identify manipulation 
using publicly available data (even ex-post) as was discussed earlier and this is one of the 
motivations behind developing ManIx. The manipulative behaviour can only be identified 
and confirmed through detailed investigation with access to private trade and chat records. 
Such investigations are costly to both regulators and banks and, therefore, if ManIx can act 
as an effective monitoring system it will help direct the limited regulatory resource to more 
targeted investigations. To validate this measure, a table of banks that have been investigated 
and fined has been compiled.  
                                                 
70 The division of 1 by 0.1334 yields 7.5, which means 1 quote out of 7.5 quotes contribute to Fix rate discovery.  
71 Note that only dealers that have at least one significant ManIx are included in the list.  





[Table 6.4 Here] 
Table 6.5 reports a collection of fines imposed on the banks following the 
investigations and law suits around the globe. It shows that most of the investigations have 
happened in the UK and U.S. The UK regulator, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) 
fined five banks $1.7 billion for manipulating the WMR benchmark in November 2014 and 
Barclays $441 in May 2015 (FCA, 2014e; 2015) 72. The Swiss Financial Market Supervisory 
Authority (FINMA) imposed a $139 million fine on UBS bank for its FX manipulation 
(FINMA, 2014). In the U.S., the Commodity and Future Trading Commission (CFTC) fined 
five banks: Citibank, HSBC, JPMorgan, RBS, and UBS a total of $1.4 billion in November 
2014 and Barclays for $400 million in May 2015 (CFTC, 2014; 2015). At the same time, the 
United States Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) fined BOA, Citi, and JP 
Morgan a total of $950 million for unsafe or unsound practices related to their foreign 
exchange (FX) trading businesses (OCC, 2014) 
[Table 6.5 Here] 
Subsequently, a second wave of investigation announcements were released in May, 
2015. The Department of Justice (DOJ) fined Citibank, JP Morgan, Barclays, RBS, and UBS 
a total of $2.5 billion for conspiring to manipulate the price of U.S. dollars and euros 
exchanged in the foreign currency exchange (FX) spot market. (DOJ 2015). The Federal 
Reserve imposed a fine of $342 million on each of Citibank, Barclays, and UBS banks, a fine 
of $274 million on RBS and $205 million on BOA (FED, 2015). These fines are among the 
largest ever assessed by the Federal Reserve (FED 2015). Finally, the New York Department 
of Financial Services (NYDFS) imposed a $485 million fine on Barclays for its role in 
                                                 
72  Although some examples of these banks’ manipulations were published by the FCA, there is no 
comprehensive information on the currencies that they manipulated. 





manipulation of WMR rate since the bank was chartered by the state of New York (NYDFS, 
2015).  
The regulatory investigations are being followed by lawsuits from investors against 
involved banks in WMR fix rate manipulation. In a lawsuit brought by the Scott and Scott 
law firm against involved banks: Barclays, RBS, and UBS settled with their investors for $384 
million, $255 million, and $135 million, respectively (Kleinman, 2015; Kennedy, 2015). In 
addition, the Scott and Scott law firm brought a lawsuit against Societe Generale for its role 
in manipulating the WMR Fix rate (Voris, 2015). The litigation document released by Scott 
and Scott demonstrates the participation of Citibank, Barclays, RBS, UBS, and Societe 
Generale in chat rooms for manipulating the WMR fix rate (Scott and Scott, 2015, p. 43 and 
p.44). The litigation document on page 45 mentions that UBS, RBS, and Barclays with other 
banks, agreed to manipulate the GBP/USD currency pair, exactly as was identified in Table 
6.4 (Scott and Scott, 2015, p. 45). In addition, on page 75 of the same document, the 
transcript of a chat between Citigroup and JP Morgan traders demonstrates their intention 
to manipulate the EUR/USD currency pair. Considering these settlements, the total amount 
of fines and settlements banks encountered by December 2015 reached $11.8 billion. In 
addition, more than 40 traders have been fired, suspended, put on leave, or resigned since 
the start of the investigations (McGeever, 2014). 
Comparing the list of banks being fined by regulators to the identified list, there are 
two important observations. First, four out of the top five identified banks have been heavily 
fined by regulators. The exception is JP Morgan which is more active on the EBS platform 
and not featured in Thomson Reuter’s database73. Economically, 68% ($8 billion) of the 
regulator fines are from the top 8 banks that have been identified by ManIx in Table 6.4. If 
                                                 
73 Similarly, BoA and BNP Paribas are not in the quote dataset. These banks are more active in the EBS 
platform. 





the regulators focused their investigations on the identified list, they would have covered the 
major suspects. Importantly, having such a monitoring system in place would speed up the 
response of investigators to potential manipulation as a timely signal would be generated by 
the ManIx. Second, although some banks were not investigated by regulators, they conducted 
their own internal investigations into the attempted manipulation of the WMR fix rates by 
their employees. In May 2014, Commerzbank AG, Germany’s second largest lender, fired 
one FX trader and suspended another one on suspicions of the attempted manipulation of 
the Polish zloty's euro exchange rate (Schuetze and McGeever, 2014). Rabobank, which was 
fined $974 million during 2014 for manipulating interest rates, suspended two senior FX 
traders, Gary Andrews and Chris Twort, employees of the bank since 2004 and 2010, 
respectively (Gaal and Choudhury, 2014). The New York State regulator, subpoenaed Societe 
Generale in December 2014, a month after U.S., U.K. and Swiss regulators concluded their 
probe into the rigging of the FX rate (Saks-McLeod, 2015).  
Overall, the media reports and regulatory findings discussed above confirm that the 
banks highlighted by this chapter’s monitoring methodology have been investigated by 
regulators. This supports the notion that this monitoring methodology aligns with the actions 
of regulators and should provide value because of its time and cost effective design. This 
methodology, however, also signals potential manipulative behaviour by banks that have not 
been investigated. Whether these are false positives in this chapter’s estimation or a lapse in 
regulatory activity is open to question and can only be clarified by further regulatory 
investigation in the future. 
6.4.3. Out of sample test 
One interesting question to ask is what has happened to the quotation behaviour of 
dealers after the breakout of the scandal and especially the regulatory investigations. Two 
main structural changes have taken place. First, from February 2015, the fixing period has 





changed from 60 seconds to 300 seconds. Second, there are more dealers involved in the 
fixing window in 2016 than was the case for 2013 and 2014. To demonstrate the application 
in this new environment, Table 6.6 reports the results of ManIx for the period from the 2nd 
March to 30th March 2016. 
[Table 6.6 Here] 
Table 6.6 shows there are some significant results. Particularly, RBS and Rabobank 
have the highest number of significant days. In order to compare these results with those of 
2013-14, since there are different number of days and dealers in the two periods, the total 
number of dealer-days is calculated for each currency pair for each period. By dividing the 
total number of identified events (significant ManIx) in each currency by the total number 
of dealer-days, the occurrence of the frequency of potential manipulative behaviour can be 
observed. By comparing the columns event per dealer-day (E/DD) in Table 6.7 it can be 
ascertained if the frequency has changed between the periods 2013-14 and March 2016. 
[Table 6.7 Here] 
Table 6.7 shows the results of comparing the frequency of potential manipulative 
behaviour by dealers in 2013-14 and 2016 periods. With the exceptions of the EUR/GBP 
and USD/JPY currency pairs, there is a reduction in the frequency of ManIx occurrence. 
After the change in the fix rate calculation and the exhaustive investigations by regulators, 
ManIx shows a decrease in its frequency of occurrence by more than 4 times on average. 
Nevertheless, there are still some signs of significant ManIx that may worth close monitoring 
by regulators. 
6.4.4 Network Analyses – Signs of Collusion 
One of the arguments for not regulating the FX market is that given its size and 
competition, it is less likely that any one bank can manipulate this market. Manipulating the 





fix rate requires a considerable amount of capital and coordination between colluding traders. 
For example, some traders disclosed to Bloomberg news that they would need more than 
€200 million to have a possibility of moving the fix rate (Vaughan et al., 2013). Furthermore, 
the manipulation could “backfire” if another party enters the market with a large order in the 
opposite direction. Indeed, there is the suggestion that the manipulators are not acting alone 
and collude via the sharing of information through chatrooms (Ahmed, 2014; Finch and 
Vaughan, 2014). However, directly detecting and investigating such networks requires special 
access to information that is deemed to be private and confidential. 
Three methods of collusion can be deduced from the regulators’ findings (FCA, 
2014d). First, traders transfer all of the orders to one trader who executes the orders in the 
collective desired direction. Second, traders transfer their orders to two or more traders and 
these traders join forces and third, trading with dealers out of the network by giving them 
orders to trade in the desired direction. Since in the first case scenario the manipulation is 
conducted merely by one dealer, it is not possible to identify the network of dealers behind 
the manipulation with the existing data. The second and third methods suggest that the 
collusion will have a trail of coordination in the trading activity. While the ManIx measure is 
designed to capture manipulative intention on a quote by quote basis, examining all dealers’ 
quotes in the same fixing window will flag up potential collusion networks. To this end, 
network graphs of banks that have significant manipulative behaviour in a same fixing 
window are drawn.  
When identifying the list of potential manipulative banks, a strong statistical criterion 
of 5% significance in identifying the significant ManIx is applied. This produces the short 
and focused list of banks in Table 6.4. However, in order to identify potential collusion 
effects, a more relaxed criterion of 10% significance is chosen when identifying individual 
significant ManIx. This follows the logic that when banks collude to achieve manipulation, 





the act of manipulation will be less obvious in each individual bank. These network graphs 
are reported in Figure 6.2. Any two banks that have a significant ManIx on the same day for 
a given pair of currencies will have a connection value of one. All these connections are 
counted for all dealers in each fixing. The lines show the connections while the size of each 
node shows its prominence in the network. 
The network analyses in Figure 6.2 demonstrate three features of such networks. 
First, there can be a large network of interconnected banks. For example, this is illustrated 
in Panels A, C and D. They show that a large number of banks are interconnected by their 
behaviour consistent with manipulation. For example, in Panel A for the EUR/GBP 
currency pair, there has been suspected collusion between four banks: Rabobank, Danske 
Bank, CIBC, and Barclays. Second, there can be more than one network identified. This is 
illustrated in Panels B, E and F. This fragmentation demonstrates that not all those identified 
as potential manipulators are connected. Finally, some banks are found to play a dominant 
role in the network. For example, Barclays has a centrality and a prominent role with the 
highest number of connecting banks in Panel A for the EUR/GBP currency pair. Similarly, 
RBS-NYC has played the central role in the EUR/JPY, EUR/USD and GBP/USD currency 
pairs, while RBS-LON plays the central role in the USD/JPY currency pair and WGZ-Bank 
plays the major role in the GBP/JPY currency pair. 
[Figure 6.2 Here] 
In the regulators’ investigative findings (discussed in Section 6.4) the individual banks 
who manipulated the fix rate were identified. However, there was very little mention as to 
which banks colluded over which currencies. Therefore, verification of this chapter’s findings 
in this section based on the regulators’ findings or media reports is not possible. The only 
chatroom members identified by regulators are “The Cartel” chatroom that consisted of 
traders from JP Morgan, UBS, and Citigroup (Finch and Vaughan, 2014). However, this 





chatroom was not the only existing network of manipulators and there existed different 
chatrooms with names such as “The A Team”, “The 3 Musketeers”, and “The Players” 
(Ahmed, 2014). The network analysis presented here is, however, a way to detect potential 
collusive behaviour and it could be a toolkit for regulators and banks to further target the 
investigation of collusion. 
6.5. Conclusion 
The WMR benchmark rate is important for a number of financial instruments and 
markets, and its seemingly extensive manipulation has given rise to a lot of regulatory 
‘interest’. The problem facing regulators in tackling this issue in a timely and effective manner 
is having data and a methodology that identifies potential manipulation as it progresses. In 
response to this issue a dataset based on quotes is constructed and an index (ManIx) is 
developed that is able to capture the intended manipulation of the benchmark rate. This 
chapter identifies banks that are prone to potential manipulative behaviour and uses ex post 
regulator investigation data to verify its findings. Essentially, this chapter provides a warning 
system that will help regulators and FX market participants to keep up with the speed and 
size of the FX market in order to conduct their monitoring and investigative activities.  
The exercise of developing an automatic monitoring system is of great importance 
to regulators given the rapid increase of speed in the financial markets. Having an automatic 
monitoring system will help regulators to allocate their limited resources to timely 
investigations. This chapter demonstrates the feasibility of developing such a regulation 
technology and tests its effectiveness. The out of sample analysis provides some evidence of 
improvement in the fixing quality after the regulators’ investigation and the adjustment of 
the fixing methodology. Nevertheless, there are still some signs of significant ManIx that 
may be worth close monitoring by regulators. The limitation of the current study is the 





unavailability of transaction data with identity; however, such data can only be made available 
via requests from regulators. Finally, the application of this technology is not confined to 
foreign exchange rate fixing. For example, it can be applied to securities data to identify 
manipulation near the close of day trading. This is potentially important in days when the 
closing price has important implications for other markets such as derivative settlement or 







Tables and Figures 
Table 6.1 Dataset Summary Statistics 
This table reports the descriptive statistics of the dataset of the one-minute fixing window: from 15:59:30.000 to 16:00:30.000. The Days column shows the number of days that the data 
was captured without any interruption. The Sum, Mean, Min, Max, and STD columns report the total, average, minimum, maximum and standard deviation of the number of quotes in the 
one-minute fixing window, respectively. The Dealers and Locations columns depict the total number of distinct dealers and locations that are active within the fixing window in the Quote 
Dataset, respectively. The Dealers/Locations column depicts the total number of unique dealers/location in the Quote Dataset. 
 
Currency Days Sum Mean Min  Max STD Dealers Locations Dealers-Locations 
EUR/GBP 212 16,156 76.21 48 122 13.28 36 22 38 
EUR/JPY 216 16,825 77.89 55 108 10.76 33 21 34 
EUR/USD 215 18,571 86.38 48 127 14.42 49 31 52 
GBP/JPY 216 22,027 101.98 72 133 11.91 33 21 34 
GBP/USD 224 20,672 92.29 44 144 16.14 44 28 47 
USD/JPY 210 15,223 72.49 36 118 13.35 33 18 34 








Figure 6.1 Example of Statistical Verification through Bootstrapping 
Figure 6.1 illustrates a simulation distribution for one dealer day for RBS New York. The realised ManIx for RBS New York on June 21st, 2013 is equal to 17, which lies within the top 5% 









Table 6.2 Randomization process 
This tables illustrates the process of price sequence randomisation before bootstrapping.  
 
Panel A. Original Price Series 
Quote Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
Price 1.8 1.9 2.1 1.7 1.6 
Dealer A1 B1 A2 C1 B2 
Change 0 0.1 0.2 -0.4 -0.1 
Panel B. Randomised Price Series 
Quote Q1 Q5 Q2 Q3 Q4 
Price 1.8 1.7 1.8 2.0 1.6 
Dealer A1 B2 B1 A2 C1 










Table 6.3 ManIx Summary Statistics 
This table reports the daily distribution of the average ManIx per quote. Column N represents the number of days available in the Quote Dataset for a 
currency pair. Mean, Median, Std Dev, Min, and Max represent the summary statistics. 
 
   Average ManIx Ask  Average ManIx Bid 
Currency N Mean Median Std Dev Min Max  Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 
EURGBP 212 0.1334 0.1343 0.1014 0 0.4111  0.1314 0.1149 0.0920 0 0.3623 
EURJPY 216 0.2194 0.2298 0.1035 0 0.4247  0.2042 0.2051 0.0990 0 0.4267 
EURUSD 215 0.1499 0.1429 0.0905 0 0.3697  0.1481 0.1481 0.0887 0 0.4118 
GBPJPY 216 0.0971 0.0950 0.0384 0 0.2083  0.0954 0.0980 0.0371 0 0.1848 
GBPUSD 224 0.2099 0.2215 0.0956 0 0.3910  0.1903 0.1971 0.0988 0 0.4235 









Table 6.4 Dealers with Manipulative (Significant Abnormal) Activities during Fixing 
This table reports a list of dealer-locations that are identified by the simulations to have manipulative/significant-abnormal activity. If the realised ManIx score is significant at the 5% level 
given the simulated ManIx distribution from the 10,000 simulations, the dealer’s behaviour in that day is classified as manipulative, otherwise it is classified as random or non-manipulative. 
This table reports the total number of days a dealer participates in the fixing and the number of days their ManIx measures are significant for the Bid and Ask prices. The shaded rows 
indicate banks that are featured in investigations that are summarised in Table 6.5. 
  EUR/GBP EUR/JPY EUR/USD GBP/JPY GBP/USD USD/JPY Sum 
Dealer Location CTotal CAsk CBid CTotal CAsk CBid CTotal CAsk CBid CTotal CAsk CBid CTotal CAsk CBid CTotal CAsk CBid  
RBS NYC 207 5 3 211 6 7 211 6 3 211 2 3 219 13 8 205 3 4 63 
RBS LON 196 4 5 198 4 4 198 1 9    203 11 10 197 2 5 55 
BARCLAYS GFX 212 0 2 194 2 2       223 0 1    7 
RABOBANKGFM LON 162 0 1 44 1 0          162 1 1 4 
SOC GENERALE PAR 200 1 0 215 0 2 211 0 1          4 
WGZ BANK DUS 115 0 1       117 1 1       3 
BK MONTREAL MON             29 1 1    2 
CITIBANK PRG       209 0 2          2 
COMMERZBANK FFT 211 1 0          223 1 0    2 
KBC GFX    159 2 0             2 
UBS ZUR             212 1 1    2 
BANCA AKROS MIL             150 1 0    1 
BCP LIS          207 0 1       1 
CIBC TOR          173 0 1       1 
DANSKE BANK COP          174 0 1       1 
ICBC LON       73 1 0          1 
SEB STO          189 0 1       1 






Table 6.5 Investigations, Law Suits and Fines 
This table reports a collection of fines imposed on the banks following the investigations and law suits. The data are collected from various regulatory press releases and news disclosures. 
Since some investigations are still on going, this table covers all announcements up to December 2015. The fines are reported in millions of dollars. FCA: Financial Conduct Authority, 
FINMA: Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority, CFTC: Commodity Futures Trading Commission, OCC: office of the comptroller of the currency, DOJ: Department of Justice, 














Country U.K. Swiss United States of America Total 




Banks          
BARCLAYS 441  400  650 342 485 384 2,702 
CITI 358  310 350 925 342   2,285 
JP MORGAN 352  310 350 550 342  99.5 2,004 
RBS 344  290  395 274  255 1,558 
UBS 371 139 290  203 342  135 1,480 
HSBC 343  275     285 903 
BOA    250  205  180 635 
BNP PARIBAS        
249 249 GOLDMAN 
SACHS 
       





Table 6.6 Dealers with Manipulative Activities during Fixing 
This table reports a list of dealer-locations that are identified by the simulations to have manipulative/significant-abnormal activity in March 2016. If the 
realised ManIx score is significant at the 5% level given the simulated ManIx distribution from the 10,000 simulations, the dealer’s behaviour in that day is 
classified as manipulative - otherwise it is classified as random or non-manipulative. This table reports the total number of days a dealer participates in the 
fixing and the number of days their ManIx measures are significant for the Bid and Ask prices. Columns CT, CA, and CB demonstrate the total number of 




EUR/GBP EUR/JPY EUR/USD GBP/JPY GBP/USD USD/JPY Sum 
Dealer Location CT CA CB CT CA CB CT CA CB CT CA CB CT CA CB CT CA CB   






  19 0 1 4 
Rabobank LON 18 0 2     19 0 1     18 0 1     4 
Barclays LON 20 0 1 20 1 0                  2 
BNY Mellon NYC                      18 1 0  1 
Total 
  








Table 6.7 Frequency of Manipulation Occurrence 
This table reports the frequency of the occurrence of significant ManIx for the 2013-14 and 2016 periods. The column Dealer-Day shows the total number of dealers who have been active 
in all days in a currency pair. The column Events reports the number of significant ManIx for both ask and bid. The column E/DD is the percentage of significant ManIx occurrence that 





Currency Dealer-Day Events E/DD Dealer-Day Events E/DD 
EUR/GBP 3,982 23 0.58% 384 5 1.30% 
EUR/JPY 3,895 30 0.77% 381 2 0.52% 
EUR/USD 4,276 23 0.54% 415 1 0.24% 
GBP/JPY 3,896 11 0.28% 381 0 0.00% 
GBP/USD 4,653 49 1.05% 390 1 0.26% 
USD/JPY 3,404 16 0.47% 317 2 0.63% 






Figure 6.2 Manipulative Networks 
This figure illustrates the identified network of manipulators for each of the six currency pairs. In order to 
identify the network of manipulators, the network connection and strength is determined by the number of 
the times that any two banks have a significant ManIx for a currency pair on a same day. The weight on each 
link demonstrates the number of days that a specific pair of dealers may have colluded together. The grey, 
black, and grey dashed lines illustrate collusion between dealers in manipulating bid, ask, and both bid and ask 
prices, respectively. 
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This appendix reports the active dealers, their locations and the number of quotes during the fix 
Panel A. Active Dealers in Africa 
Name Country City €/£ €/¥ €/$ £/¥ £/$ $/¥ 
ABSA BANK SOUTH AFRICA JOHANNESBURG   11    
NEDBANK SOUTH AFRICA JOHANNESBURG     2,522  
Panel B. Active Dealers in Asia 
Name Country City €/£ €/¥ €/$ £/¥ £/$ $/¥ 
AL HILAL BANK UAE ABU DHABI   4  4  
ASYA KATILIM 
BANKASI A.S 
TURKEY ISTANBUL   53  59  








BANK OF CHINA 
HONG KONG HONG KONG   12  9 11 
ING BANK TURKEY ISTANBUL     811  
KASPI BANK KAZAKHSTAN ALMATY   383  388 353 
NATIONAL 
BANK OF OMAN 
OMAN MUSCAT   7  7 6 
OMAN ARAB 
BANK 
OMAN MUSCAT   8   6 
PROMSVYAZ 
BANK 
RUSSIA MOSCOW   14    
QATAR ISLAMIC 
BANK 
QATAR DOHA   497    
YAPI KREDI 
BANK 
TURKEY ISTANBUL   6  210  
Panel C. Active Dealers in Australia 
Name Country City €/£ €/¥ €/$ £/¥ £/$ $/¥ 
LLOYDS BANK AUSTRALIA SYDNEY 45      
WESTPAC BANK AUSTRALIA SYDNEY 71 88 59 101 89 72 
Panel D. Active Dealers with Multiple Location 















GLOBAL FOREX 3 2 1 2   
























GLOBAL FOREX 2 686  907 318 601 























GLOBAL FOREX 12 17  22   
         
         
Panel E. Active Dealers in America 





CANADA MONTREAL   54  107 56 
Brown Brothers 
Harriman & Co 
U.S.A NEW YORK  311 291 407 289 288 
RADA FOREX U.S.A NEW YORK  9  12 1 4 




U.S.A NEW YORK 286    386  
THE BANK OF 
NEW YORK 
MELLON 
U.S.A NEW YORK   546  755 564 
INTERCAM 
BANK 
MEXICO MEXICO CITY   4  236  
Panel F. Active Dealers in Europe 
Name Country City €/£ €/¥ €/$ £/¥ £/$ $/¥ 
ALLIED IRISH IRELAND DUBLIN 427 513 342 698 498 330 
BANCA AKROS ITALY MILAN 217 224 116 284 265 259 
BANCA MONTE 
DEI PASCHI DI 
SIENA 




PORTUGAL LISBON  1,517  1,977   
BANCO DE 
SABADELL 
SPAIN SABADELL 244 257 172 324   
BANCO 
POPOLARE 
ITALY BERGAMO 252 259 148 318 210  
BANCPOST SA ROMANIA BUCHAREST     125  
BANK BPH SA POLAND WARSAW 58  61  74 63 
CAIXA GERAL 
DE DEPOSITOS 










PRAGUE   1,768    
COMMERZBAN
K 
GERMANY FRANKFURT 946 860 979 1,106 1,058 695 
COMMONWEAL




LONDON      1,491 
DANSKE BANK DENMARK COPENHAGEN 781 696 328 884 347 268 
DBS BANK HONG KONG HONG KONG   761   850 
DEN NORSKE 
BANK 









LONDON   313  50  





































GERMANY STUTTGART 101 107 95 142 106  




FRANCE PARIS 8 14 12 17 11 10 







LONDON 816 133 562 181 587 603 
RAIFFEISEN 
BANK 




LONDON 2,070 1,624 2,765 1,896 2,552 1,983 




SWEDEN STOCKHOLM 756 413  509  738 
SOCIETE 
GENERALE 
FRANCE PARIS 576 857 677 1,088  264 
UBS SWITZERLAND ZURICH 368 385 378 501 375 306 




SWITZERLAND ZURICH 123 171 128 222 179 100 















Advances in information technologies and the emergence of algorithmic and high 
frequency traders have dramatically changed the way that financial markets work. The 
emergence of HFTs, these new highly sophisticated and fast market players has raised 
concerns of regulators, academics, and practitioners regarding their potential negative impact 
on financial markets. Many studies have examined the impact of ATs and HFTs in financial 
markets, particularly in equity markets. However, there is a lack of study on the impact of 
HFTs and ATs on the FX market due to the lack of reliable data and difficulties in identifying 
market participants (BIS, 2011). Examining the impact of ATs and HFTs on this market is 
of  great importance because the FX market is the biggest and arguably the most important 
financial market in the world, which impacts on almost every aspect a of country’s economy. 
The first contribution of this thesis is the construction of a unique and comprehensive Quote 
Dataset that has two advantages over existing datasets. First, it includes the identity and 
location of market participants that addresses the issue of market participants’ identification 
and second, it is accurate to the millisecond making it an adequate dataset for studying high 
frequency quoting.  





This thesis attempts to explore the impact of HFTs on the price discovery process, 
one of the most prominent functions of financial markets, in the FX market. This is done 
through three empirical chapters. The first empirical chapter (chapter 4) studies the impact 
of the individual market participant’s quoting speed on short-term and long-term price 
discovery. The second empirical chapter (chapter 5) examines the impact of economist 
affiliation, geographical proximity, and the quoting speed of a market participant on his  
contribution to price discovery around macroeconomic news announcements. Finally, the 
third empirical chapter (chapter 6) designs, implements, and tests an algorithm for identifying 
market participants who manipulate the WM/R fix rate that is one of the most important 
benchmarks in the FX.  
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 7.2 summarises the findings of the three 
empirical chapters and explains their implications and section 7.3 discusses the limitations of 
this study and introduces some directions for future research in this field.  
7.2. Summary of Findings and Regulatory Implications 
7.2.1. High Frequency Quoting and Price Discovery  
The first empirical chapter of this thesis (chapter 4) examines the impact of individual 
market participants’ quoting speed on their contribution to price discovery. Two time 
horizons of 1-minute and 1-day are studied, where the 1-minute time horizon is used as a 
proxy for short-term or transitory price discovery and the 1-day time horizon is used as a 
proxy for long-term price discovery. In order to quantify the market participants’ speed, a 
new measure of speed is defined, which in addition to the number of quotes disseminated 
by a dealer also controls for the time period that a market participant has been active. In 
addition, to control for a dealer’s one-sided trading and inventory control three measures of 
buy-sell intention, widening spread, and quote aggressiveness are defined. Chapter 4’s 





findings show while the increase in quoting speed of market participants improves their 
ability in predicting short-term price movements (contributing to short-term market price 
discovery), there is no relationship between the quoting speed of dealers and their impact on 
long-term,  price discovery. 
 This finding supports short-termism in the FX markets and shows that market 
players in the FX focus more on short-term information that could be unrelated to 
fundamentals rather than fundamental information. Theoretical and empirical studies explain 
that the concentration of market participants on short-term information rather than 
fundamental information distorts the price discovery process and makes markets less 
efficient (Froot et al., 1992; Menkoff, 2001; Zhang, 2010; Vives, 1995). The lack of 
relationship between market participants quoting speed and their contribution to long-term 
price discovery and strong evidence of short-termism in the FX market reflect the concerns 
of academics, practitioners, and regulators regarding the potential negative effects of HFTs 
on market efficiency. The regulatory implication of this finding suggests that the arms race 
in trading technology is potentially a social waste since it does not produce social benefit by 
having no impact on the long-term information discovery which is the key function of 
financial markets.  
7.2.2. Do Economists Add Value to the FX? 
Macroeconomic news announcements are one of the main driving forces behind 
exchange rate movements. Therefore, it is of a great importance to study the factors that 
impact market participants’ contribution to price discovery around them. The second 
empirical chapter (chapter 5) of this thesis evaluates the impact of economist affiliation, 
geographical proximity, and quoting speed on the contribution of market participants to the 
price discovery in the FX market. Although previous studies have examined the impact of 
these three factors in equity markets, their findings cannot be extended to the FX market 





due to the differences in the scope of macroeconomic and firm specific news, information 
transfer medium transparency, and market structure. Chapter 5’s results show that, similar 
to equity markets, market makers with economist affiliation are more informed. However, 
the level of a market maker’ information content is positively affected by the increase in the 
scope of his affiliated economists’ research regarding a country’s economic condition. This 
is one of the differences between FX and equity markets that arises from the difference in 
the scope of macroeconomic and firm specific news. Overall, the findings regarding the 
impact of the economists’ affiliation demonstrate that the positive impact of information 
collection sources on market makers’ information quality, is independent of the market 
structure and information transfer medium. The results regarding the quoting speed of 
market participants are similar to those in the equity markets. Chapter 5 also shows that the 
quoting speed of market participants significantly impacts on their contribution to price 
discovery and the size of this impact is considerably higher than that of having affiliated 
economists. 
The geographical proximity factor is divided into three subsections of geographical 
proximity of dealers and affiliated economists to macroeconomist news sources and dealers 
and economist to each other. The findings depict that the geographical proximity of dealers 
and economists to macroeconomic news sources significantly and positively impacts on the 
market makers’ contribution to price discovery, and this impact is considerably higher than 
that of speed and economist affiliation. However, it is also found that the position of market 
makers and their affiliated economists in the same country limits the amount of information 
that they can access and this is independent of the quality of information set. In other words, 
this finding shows that there is a limit to the amount of information that can be accessed 
from the same location, independent of the quality of information.  





Chapter 5 also contributes to the regulatory debate in two ways. First, the findings in 
chapter 5 show that the market participants’ quoting speed has a significantly positive impact 
on their information advantage. Therefore, early access of high speed market participants to 
macroeconomic news announcements could create an unfair market environment and 
impose significant adverse selection costs on slower traders. Second, the evidence presented 
in chapter 5 demonstrates that the information advantage of market makers with economist 
affiliation is dependent on the scope of their affiliated economists’ research. Considering that 
there is no evidence of privileged access to macroeconomic news, the evidence suggests that 
there is no need for an imposition of regulations similar to Regulation FD regarding the 
macroeconomic news announcements, at least in the context of the FX market. 
7.2.3. Monitoring the FX Rate Benchmark Fix  
In light of the WM/R fix rate manipulation news, the trigger of 20 regulatory 
investigations and consequently the highest amount of fines on banks in history, the third 
empirical chapter of this thesis (chapter 6) focuses on the process of WM/R fix rate discovery 
and proposes a methodology to identify the manipulators of this rate. WM/R fix rate is one 
of the most prominent benchmarks in the FX market that affect $3.6 trillion of assets. Its 
manipulation impacts on almost every entity that is involved in international investment and 
transactions. The break of the WM/R fix rate manipulation news has been a shock to the 
financial system and regulators and raised concerns regarding the lack of regulatory oversight 
in the FX markets.  
Given the rise of high frequency and algorithmic trading in the FX market and limited 
resources of regulators, the challenge that regulators face is the design of a method that in a 
timely manner can monitor market participants and provide a warning signal that prompts 
further investigation. Chapter 6 of this thesis designs, implements, and tests an algorithm for 
monitoring and identification of WM/R fix rate manipulators. This methodology that is 





called manipulation index (ManIx) is designed by understanding a manipulator’s objective 
function and consists of two phases of identification and verification. These two phases are 
designed to identify the market participants who systematically and strategically place their 
quotes to move the WM/R fix rate in their desired direction and differentiate such behaviour 
from the random process of price discovery. ManIx identifies 17 out of 69 dealers in the 
Quote Dataset, who were active within the WM/R fixing window. Out of these 17 dealers 8 
of them have been investigated by regulators or sued by their clients and investors. 4 of the 
identified banks as manipulators account for 68% of the fines imposed by regulators. These 
findings demonstrated the ability of the ManIx in monitoring and identifying manipulative 
behaviour of market participants and its applicability for regulators and policy makers. 
Chapter 6’s contribution to the existing academic literature and regulatory framework is 
threefold. First, it addresses the challenge of monitoring the unregulated FX market, second 
it contributes to the debate on the manner that regulators should respond to the new 
structural changes in financial markets and rapid changes in financial technology. Finally, 
chapter 6 illustrates how quote data could be useful for monitoring and identifying abnormal 
behaviour in the FX markets.  
7.4. The Limitations of The Current Study & Future Research 
Although this thesis research deepens the understanding of the price discovery 
process in the FX markets, it is not without its limitations. The first empirical chapter of this 
thesis contributed to the existing regulatory framework and academic literature by 
demonstrating the impact of a dealer’s quoting speed on the price discovery process. The 
results of the first empirical study show that while the increase in the quoting speed of market 
participants increases their ability to forecast short-term price movements, there is no 
relationship between quoting speed and a dealer’s contribution to long-term price discoveries. 
However, this research could benefit by combining its dataset with transaction data 





(conditional on the inclusion of the traders’ identity) to further examine the impact of order 
cancellation and messaging traffic on the price discovery process. It should be mentioned 
here that obtaining transaction data with the dealers’ identity in order to be merged with the 
Quote Dataset could be difficult. 
The second empirical chapter of this thesis studied the impact of economist 
affiliation, quoting speed, and geographical proximity of a dealer to economists and news 
sources on dealers’ information content. The results show that the affiliation of a dealer with 
economists, particularly the increase in the scope of his affiliated economists’ research, adds 
to the dealer’s information content. The locality of affiliated economists and dealers are also 
found to have a significant impact on a dealer’s information quality. There are some reasons 
given for the locality advantage in the context of equity markets, however, examining them 
in the context of the FX market requires a longer time series. A longer time series would 
allow a better examination of the locality advantage and the reasons behind it. Therefore, 
this research could benefit from a longer time series. Future research can also examine how 
affiliated economists gender, education, work experience, and age impacts on their dealer’s 
behaviour. It is interesting to see how the affiliated economists’ characteristics translates into 
a dealer’s quoting behaviour, if any. This can further help in understanding better the FX 
market information transfer medium mechanisms.  
Finally, the third empirical chapter of this thesis designs, tests, and implements an 
algorithm called ManIx for identifying market participants who systematically and 
strategically manipulated the WM/R fix rate. This algorithm contributes to the existing 
debate on the manner in which regulators should respond to new changes in financial 
markets. Regulators can use ManIx to monitor market participants and individual FX dealers 
could use ManIx to monitor their traders and entities who use their prime brokerage services. 
Future research could add to ManIx by adjusting the design of ManIx to verification phases 





mentioned in the World Market Company’s methodology documentation. The World 
Market Company mentions two phases of validation, while it does not explain explicitly how 
these validations work and what trades or quotes, if any, are affected by these validation 
phases. This adjustment, combined by using the exact data sources that WM/R uses, could 
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